

CHURCH HISTORY

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VOL. XXX

SEPTEMBER, 1961

NO. 3

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GABRIEL BIEL AND LATE MEDIEVAL MYSTICISM

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I. *Nominalism and Mysticism*

1. Though periodization is admittedly a matter of opinion, there is much to warrant the thesis that the later Middle Ages were born in Avignon and were shaped by the uncertainty and hierarchical confusion due to the Babylonian Captivity of the papacy (1309-1377) and the succeeding period of the Schism (1378-1415). The impact, especially of this latter event, can scarcely be overestimated, so much so that we are inclined to advocate the terms "pre-schismatic and schismatic Middle Ages" to replace the traditional terms "early and later Middle Ages."

Four major developments which would prove to have increasing influence on schismatic thought up to the eve of the Reformation are all intimately connected with the fourteenth-century schism. In the realm of political theory one has only to be reminded of the very cause of the Babylonian Captivity, the bull *Unam sanctam* (1302)¹ and the ensuing enthusiasm with which Marsilius of Padua's *Defensor Pacis* (1326) was welcomed and immediately put to use by Louis the Bavarian in his struggle with Pope John XXII (1316-1334).

Though the influence of the anticlerical *Defensor Pacis* on such church-dedicated men as William of Occam (d. 1348) and John Gerson (d. 1429) is still largely overrated,² it marks not only a different conception of the relation between church and society and a new interpretation of the theocratic ideal, but it also would stimulate the church to concentrate on its primary spiritual task of inner reform.

Of equal but less obvious importance is the condemnation by Pope John XXII of the stricter interpretation of the last will of St. Francis. In 1317 he declared the *spirituales*, who rejected even communal possessions as contrary to the will and example of Christ, subject to the Inquisition. Six years later his *Cum inter nonnullos* caused as much division within the Franciscan order as Boniface VIII had earlier in Christendom at large with his *Unam sanctam*.³ The ideal of poverty was so deeply engraved in the medieval mind that the rise of the Fraticelli movement and its identification of papacy and Babylon should not be seen as an isolated and local Italian reaction. French and German fifteenth-century sermons and popular literature reveal the extent to which hierarchy, Pope, bishops, priests and monks are understood to have exchanged poverty for greed. German preachers may have been moved to criticize Avignon taxation by more national considerations, but also such an orthodox and devout preacher as the Frenchman

Michel Menot likes to pit the poverty of Christ against the this-worldly interests of the Curia and can conclude by saying: "Never could less devotion be found in the Church." When somebody from the audience asks him why he does not do something about this horrible abuse, he simply answers: "Friend, we do not have the man [who can bring this about]," and again: "I have no great hopes for the Church unless it be planted anew."⁴

The call for decision between "Christ or Mammon" was by no means a new one.⁵ But while the pre-schismatic claims of the Waldenses could be rejected on grounds of the successes of the Reform papacy, the bull of John XXII weakened the position of the church precisely at a time when it had to face the transition to a money economy with the concomitant rise of the third estate.

The two other developments with which we are now more directly concerned regard schismatic nominalism and mysticism. Both these aspects of late medieval thought have indeed a history that reaches back beyond the Avignon period. But while it is difficult to ascertain to what extent they are related to and reflect changes in the political and economic climate, it is a matter of record that at the time of the Babylonian Captivity, the church felt that these two movements, insofar as they were represented by William of Occam and Meister Eckhart, could not be regarded as orthodox.

The same Pope John XXII in 1326 set up a board to investigate the writings of William of Occam; and though this Franciscan master of theology was never officially condemned, three of the selected fifty-one theses were stigmatized as Pelagian.⁶ In 1329, two years after Eckhart's death, twenty-eight propositions of this Dominican doctor of theology were condemned by John XXII,⁷ for what can be summed up as a heretical doctrine of creation.

These censures are not only indicative of the fact that nominalism and mysticism had entered a new phase in their history; they also would affect and caution the disciples of Occam and Eckhart. Tauler, Suso and Ruysbroeck would later be extremely careful to avoid the alleged heresies of Meister Eckhart. If the censure of Occam had also received the official status of condemnation, its impact would have been equally apparent. As it was, of the two most central doctrines of Christian theology, the doctrines of redemption and creation, the former was not safeguarded in the same way as the latter against heretical interpretations. Nevertheless, it seems clear to us that the peculiar brand of nominalism which we meet in the thought of Gabriel Biel can only be understood once one has noted its (over)zealousness to be orthodox and obedient to the *magisterium* of the Church.

2. The fact that both movements, nominalism and mysticism, met

with the disapproval of Pope John XXII does not of course indicate any inner relationship. On the contrary it is striking that John XXII introduces his condemnation of Eckhart with the words: ". . . we regret to relate that a certain contemporary of ours, a native of Germany, Ekardus by name . . . wanted to know more than he should. . ." This is the extreme opposite of the usual charge against Occam which labels his thought as scepticism and open warfare of faith against reason.⁸

Indeed it is fair to say that while generally the opposition of scholasticism and mysticism is rejected by scholars today as untenable, nominalism and mysticism are still supposed to be mutually exclusive. As great an historian of Christian thought as Reinholt Seeberg felt that though these two movements share a psychological interest and are both basically indifferent as regards ecclesiastical dogma—*sic!*—they form the sharpest possible contrast: empiricism versus idealism.⁹ In Luther scholarship one meets without exception with the same thesis: the mystical and nominalistic elements in Luther's theology are reduced to two absolutely independent sources. Nobody has formulated this more succinctly than Erich Seeberg who stated that the difference between Luther's theology and nominalism was to be found in Luther's mystical teaching; and vice versa, what differentiates his thought from mysticism would be his nominalism.¹⁰

Though we are not concerned here with Luther and Reformation thought, an indirect and implicit conclusion of this paper will be that Luther's enthusiasm for such mystical authors as John Tauler and Gerard Zerbold of Zutphen can be adequately explained from his intimate knowledge of Biel's *oeuvre* and marks therefore the hypothesis of a second formative influence by so-called German Mysticism as redundant.

3. It seems to us that there is a ready explanation for the fact that the thesis that nominalism and mysticism would be mutually exclusive was advanced and has since gone unchallenged. The boundaries of mysticism are defined in such a way as to exclude the possibility of nominalistic mysticism from the outset. Mysticism is then supposed to deal with the intellectual intuition of transcendental reality.¹¹

This definition represents very well the position of Thomas Aquinas. Thomas taught that the goal of mysticism or its equivalent, the contemplative life, is the vision of God understood as the ultimate truth: "contemplation pertains to the simple act of gazing on the truth."¹²

Insofar as the union itself is not a comprehensive knowledge of God but a complete satisfaction of the longing for God, the will of

course participates in this mystical experience; God as the highest truth is at the same time the highest good.¹³

With Eckhart and his school we meet with an even greater emphasis on the intellect in the contemplative life. This appears at two points. In the exposition of the doctrine of God it is stated that God does not know because he is, but that he is because he knows. In the analyses of the nature of man the *Fünklein* or *Grund* in man is seen as the spark of divine intelligence.

As only the intellect is beyond multiformity, "it is the same thing to say that God is wholly Intellect and that God is one";¹⁴ in this sense there is a God beyond God, the godhead beyond the trinitarian God of the Christian faith.¹⁵

The Dionysian themes of the darkness of God and the need for the negative approach are spelled out in such a way that the three characteristics of the created order, time, pluriformity and corporeality, are seen as *the* obstacles which hinder a union or reunion with God, the source of all being.¹⁶ Escaped from this prison of creation, "the soul is unified with the godhead itself in such a way that it has lost its identity in the same way as a drop of wine disappears in the sea."¹⁷

Without attempting to settle the issue regarding the relation of the Eckhartian school to Dionysius the Areopagite or to Thomas Aquinas, it seems clear to us that the Christian doctrine of creation is threatened here through a close approximation of creation and fall. The distance between creator and creature is not abolished—and in this sense the vague charge of pantheism certainly does not apply—but the broken union between God and man is traced back, not to the fall of man, but to his creation. Of the traditional three stages, purgation, illumination and union, the first stage refers to the effort to break down the wall or veil of creation to reach then the intellectual intuition of transcendental reality, the union with God in which the soul is absorbed.

If one defines mysticism in this way, it does indeed exclude the possibility of a nominalistic type of mysticism. The very mark of nominalism is its rejection of the Thomistic and Neoplatonic elements constitutive for the Eckhartian position. The first point made in a Prologue to Lombard's *Sentences* by a theologian of the nominalistic school of thought is that intuitive knowledge of God is strictly the prerogative of the *beati*, the members of the Church Triumphant. The only exceptions to this rule are Jesus Christ and St. Paul. The soul of Christ, however, was beatified in the first instant of his birth. The *raptus* of St. Paul indeed presents a difficulty, but is nevertheless an exception from the established rule: the terms *viator* and *comprehensor* or *beatus* are by definition in contrast to each other.¹⁸

The typical nominalistic use of the distinction between God's *potentia absoluta* and *potentia ordinata* provides a structure within which there is no place for a contemplative life understood as the ascent to a vision of the highest truth.

The established order is the product of a decision of God. The highest truth attainable by the *viator* is the knowledge of the decisions of God, i.e., of his revelation. This is the knowledge of faith resting on the authority of the Church and Holy Scripture.¹⁹ As the realm of the *potentia absoluta* refers to all the possible decisions of God (*potentia absoluta* = *potest facere*) the nominalist as a theologian is concerned with what God actually decided (*potentia ordinata* = *vult facere*); the summit of his reach is therefore not the intellect or being of God but the will of God.

Purgation, the first stage, is not an effort to pierce the veil of creation—this would run counter to man's ordained status as *viator*—but is the battle against sin to regain the perfection of the original righteousness of Adam before the fall.

At the point where human reason finds its limitations, the soul meets the divine will and is united with it in love, not through conformity of intellect, but *per voluntatis conformitatem*.²⁰

The divine abyss with which the nominalistic mystic is united in love can no longer be divine truth or the abyss beyond God, but is the inscrutable will of God, to be met in loving encounter and union.

The application of the whole vocabulary of traditional mystical theology cannot obscure the fact that we meet here with an essentially different type of mysticism.

Before we trace in more detail the mystical elements in the theology of Gabriel Biel, we should like to point out that we are not reintroducing the long-debated distinction between speculative and practical mysticism. Cuthbert Butler and Ray Petry have shown convincingly enough that medieval mysticism was consistent in its effort to establish a proper balance between contemplation and action.²¹

On condition that it is understood that in the Thomistic and Eckhartian type of mysticism the will, and in the Gabrielistic type knowledge, plays an important auxiliary part, the distinction between speculative and affective mysticism is perfectly acceptable.

To conclude this first section on the relation of nominalism and mysticism, we can say that if one defines mysticism as intellectual intuition of transcendental reality, there is no such phenomenon as nominalistic or affective mysticism. If, however, we find one of Gerson's descriptions of mysticism acceptable, according to which mysticism is the outreach of the soul to a union with God through the desire of love,²² which resides not in the intellective but in the affec-

tive power of the soul and has not the *verum* but the *bonum* as its object,²³ we find that the sources themselves allow for an affective type of mysticism which replaced in nominalistic circles speculative mysticism.²⁴

II. *Nominalism and Mysticism with John Gerson*

1. Biel's authority *par eminence* for all problems concerning the contemplative life is John Gerson, the influential Chancellor of the University of Paris from 1395 throughout the turbulent beginnings of the conciliar high tide of the fifteenth century.

For Biel, Gerson was a great systematic and mystical authority whom he honored and quoted, not only from his university lectern in Tübingen, but even from his pulpit at the Cathedral of Mainz. There was no doubt in his mind nor in that of the other nominalistic schoolmen that Gerson belonged to the *via moderna*.²⁵

A reference to the thought of Gerson should have sufficed to prove the compatibility of nominalism and mysticism. Nevertheless, there is less unanimity as regards Gerson's position in our time than in fifteenth-century nominalism. One is faced with the remarkable situation that those who stress the nominalistic aspects of his thought challenge his place in the mystical school of thought,²⁶ while at the same time those who find in him primarily a mystic are not willing to count him with the nominalistic school of thought.²⁷ One cannot be far from the truth when one explains these contradictory conclusions from the indicated presupposition that there exists no common ground between nominalism and mysticism. Freed from such a presupposition we may be in a favorable position to come to a wholesome understanding of this authority of Gabriel Biel.

We are not concerned here with the totality of Gerson's thought but only with those aspects which have led scholars to assume either that, driven by his mystical insights, he broke away from the nominalism of his teacher d'Ailly, or, duped by his adherence to nominalistic concepts, he misunderstood and rejected mysticism.

His attack on the scholastic theology of his time, which indeed pervades most of his writings, should not be interpreted as an attack on nominalism. His two lectures "against vain curiosity in matters of faith"²⁸ are as explicit as one might possibly wish.

In these he complains about the lack of piety and unity in theological education; instead of being wiser than God, one should in all humility submit to the inscrutability of God's will.²⁹ This now is the main theme of nominalism: the *viator* cannot go beyond the revelation of God to enter the inner chamber of his wisdom—a clear reaction against essentialist theology. This implies that the reach of human reason is limited to the realm of revelation. Operating within this

realm it can succeed in proving that the articles of faith are not contrary to the results of the secular sciences.³⁰

His criticism of party strife and disunity does certainly not mean that nominalism stood under the same curse of vain curiosity; neither does his quoting of opinions of St. Thomas indicate that he would favor Thomism.³¹

It is the *formalantes*, the followers of Duns Scotus, that Gerson has especially in mind when he is criticizing the Franciscans for deserting the great Bonaventure.³² His claim to absolute impartiality³³ makes it all the more significant that the only modern doctor openly attacked is John of Ripa,³⁴ a fervent Scotist. Here as elsewhere Gerson is a true disciple of d'Ailly and Occam.³⁵

In view of this clear witness of the sources we should beware of lending too much weight to the fact that shortly after the two lectures "against vain curiosity" were held, Gerson permitted the Dominicans to return to Paris (1403).³⁶ In a letter published at the occasion of the return of the Dominicans, Gerson makes clear that he did not for a moment wish to justify their aberrations but that Christian love required him to give them an opportunity to prove themselves. Frankly enough he concedes that this act of Christian love happens to be the more expedient decision as regards the unity and honor of faith and university.³⁷

Again, Gerson is motivated by a nominalistic ideal, to restore unity within the realm of theology by humbly concentrating on the data of faith which alone would neutralize the rift-causing influence of philosophy.

In a striking parallel to the union efforts of the Council of Pisa (1409), it would be the tragic fate of nominalism that instead of reforming the existing schools of St. Thomas and Duns Scotus, it would add to the confusion by becoming a third party in schismatic university life.

2. Turning now to the second enemy against whom Gerson is taking up arms, we have to investigate to what extent he rejected mysticism as such along with what he understood to be heretical mysticism.

After what has been said, we are not surprised to find that humility is for Gerson the central value, not only on the first stage of purgation, but as the abiding context within which alone the mystical experience can be attained. Humility stands here for submission of intellect and will to the spiritual authority of Scripture and Church.

In his treatise on mystical theology he casts his whole treatment within the structure of the question "whether the knowledge of God can be better acquired by the penitent affect than by the intellect."³⁸ The answer is twofold. First, while it would be ideal to combine mys-

tical and scholastic theology,³⁹ mystical theology is more perfect than scholastic theology because it cannot be abused except—to be sure—by those who lack humility. The most common abuse of scholastic theology is that one theologizes with the mouth and not with the heart.⁴⁰ This is now impossible in mystical theology which by definition is theology of the heart.⁴¹

In the second place mystical theology is not the special field of some learned men but can be acquired by a mere woman or simpleton. It is acquired through intensive exercise of moral virtues which prepare the soul for purgation, illumination and perfection.⁴² From this vantage point Gerson criticizes two kinds of heretical mysticism, both resulting from a lack of humility. In the first place he reproaches the sect of the Beghards with such words that he must have had in mind the propositions which were censured in 1311 by Pope Clement V.⁴³ He especially protests against the concept that the mystic in the third stage would be freed from his obligations to ecclesiastical and divine law. This antinomianism of course runs counter to the nominalistic thesis that the creature, however high a level of perfection he attains, remains unable to escape the set limits of the established order, and that his understanding of God can never break through the boundaries of revelation. Within this dome of the established order the Christian is intellectually dependent on the teaching of the church which he cannot possibly scorn, even while finding union with God.⁴⁴ In a treatise against the flagellants, written while attending the Council of Constance (July 1417), Gerson indicates that the greatest danger of this heresy is that it leads to a by-passing of the sacrament of penance, the very heart of man's disposition for union with God.⁴⁵ The affections of the heart have to be regulated by the law of Christ, and this law is sufficiently revealed in the Decalogue and authoritatively unfolded by the Apostles and Holy Doctors.⁴⁶

While the antinomians threaten a proper understanding of the central function of the sacrament of penance, Gerson attacks a second mystical heresy which endangers the Christian understanding of the union with God. This second heresy can be reduced to the same fundamental lack of humility and insufficient understanding of the qualitative difference between the creature and the Creator. Once it is understood that the mystical union should be interpreted in terms of perfection, i.e. as submission to the will of God, and through this conformity as an intimate union of love,⁴⁷ the dangers of speculative mysticism are avoided.

The union of will, in contrast with the essential union as taught in the condemned theses of Eckhart and in his school of speculative

mysticism, bespeaks the nominalistic emphasis on the disproportion between God and man.⁴⁸

Gerson in his presentation of this heretical point of view remains so close to the text of the condemned tenth proposition of Eckhart that there can be little doubt that he had this German mystic in mind; he goes on to say that this position is renewed by Ruysbroeck.⁴⁹ Gerson finds two Eckhartian symbols of union especially misleading, i.e., the image of the drop of water which falls in a wine jar and thus loses its identity like food when it is digested; and secondly the image of transubstantiation which encourages exactly the same error.⁵⁰

This survey of Gerson's thought enables us to define our earlier distinction between affective and speculative mysticism with somewhat greater precision. His emphasis on the abiding necessity for submission to God's revealed will expressed in sacramental confession on the one hand, and his rejection of the Eckhartian type of essentialist mysticism on the other hand, suggest the parallel distinction of penitential versus transformation mysticism.

The foregoing analyses have shown that nominalism and transformation mysticism are indeed mutually exclusive. The second kind, penitential mysticism, however, can not only be adjusted to nominalistic presuppositions, but forms a natural complement to this type of scholastic thought. Gerson has proved not to be a split person, torn between two incompatible allegiances; his regard for the qualitative difference between God and man has been shown to provide the one basis from which he attacks both the vain curiosity of the systematic theologians and the presumptuousness of the Beghards and Eckhartians.⁵¹

Finally, we should make one more point. Penitential mysticism is in no sense proleptic but implies a strong eschatological emphasis. The constant awareness of the contrast between the status of the *viator* now and the status of the *comprehensor* in the heavenly Jerusalem indicates this clearly.⁵² The clear vision of God is an eschatological experience about which we can only speak on the authority of such a witness as St. Paul after his return from the seventh heaven. Because of this point of view, Gerson was even in his own time accused of not being a genuine mystic,⁵³ and these accusations have been repeated till the present day.

There are passages which are widely interpreted as containing a confession of Gerson that he has never experienced the highest stage of mystical vision. These interpreters, however, have misunderstood the nominalistic image of "color-blindness" which Gerson uses in this connection. This is merely another way of saying *fides ex auditu*: I believe on the authority of the Church that these colors—the vision of God—exist, and only on this condition can I relive this experience insofar as the status of the *viator* permits.⁵⁴

Union with the abyss of God's inscrutable will is Gerson's understanding of the mystical experience granted to privileged *viatores*. This union forms the highest stage and the goal of penitential mysticism. The union with the abyss, which is union with the god-head beyond God—Eckhart—and union with the essence of God's being—Ruysbroeck—is for Gerson an eschatological event granted only to the *comprehensores*.⁵⁵

III. *The Mystical Elements in the Theology of Gabriel Biel.*

1. In view of our conclusions regarding John Gerson, it should not surprise us to discover a similar marriage between nominalism and mysticism in the works of Gabriel Biel. Yet Biel did not write any treatise on mystical theology, nor is his type of mysticism in every respect identical with the one we encountered with Gerson. Often he disappoints us by merely referring back to the mystical *opus* of Gerson with which he shows himself to be well acquainted. Furthermore, we have not found a trace of the Gersonian juxtaposition of speculative and mystical theology which would have led Biel to deal with mysticism *per se*.

Finally, there is no mention in the secondary literature of the mystical teaching of Biel. This is undoubtedly due in part to the common presupposition discussed above that nominalism and mysticism must be mutually exclusive. But this striking silence can also be explained from the fact that Biel scholars have till the present day relied almost exclusively on Biel's commentary on Lombard's *Sentences* and to a lesser degree on his *Exposition of the Mass*. These two writings constitute, however, less than half of the whole *corpus* of his writings. Biel's sermons are far more revealing in this respect than his more academic publications.

Though one is not justified in speaking of Biel's mystical theology as such—it is more appropriate to speak of the mystical elements in Biel's theology—an analysis which takes all his writings into consideration does not leave room for doubt that Biel took the mystical aspect of the life of the *viator* most seriously.

In the following presentation we will survey these mystical elements in more detail. As appears from Biel's frequent quotations from and references to Gerson, the mystical teaching of the Parisian Chancellor provides us with the natural context within which Biel's presentations should be placed; at the same time this context enables us to note possible deviations, additions or derivations.

The most striking aspect of the mystical elements in Biel's theology is what one can characterize as a strong tendency towards (a) *democratization of mysticism*. This does not, however, prevent

him from stressing (b) the *eschatological dimension* of the perfect union and (c) the special union granted in this life to the *spiritual aristocracy*.

The possibility of coexistence of the democratic and aristocratic emphases is due to a reinterpretation of the traditional tripartition of beginning, advanced, and perfect Christians. While the term "hierarchy" is still understood as constituted by progressive stages of holiness,⁵⁶ this meaning is qualified by Biel's appreciation of the peculiar perfection and integrity of each of these groups in themselves: the three *stages* are understood as three *status*.⁵⁷

The nominalistic doctrine of the *facere quod in se est*, the obligation of each man to do his very best, and of the implied natural capacity of man to love God above everything else is necessarily accompanied by a relativization of the commands of God. Not only the beginners, but also the advanced and so-called perfect have to do their very best. Perfection is not an absolute static standard but is dynamically related to the circumstances of a particular individual. Gerson has already defended this thesis against the presumptuousness of those who had chosen the monastic life and thus considered themselves to belong to a higher class.⁵⁸ Biel formulates this succinctly by stating that *every Christian in a state of grace is in a state of perfection*.⁵⁹ The contemplative life may be the purer one; the active life is nevertheless more intense and fruitful.⁶⁰

This democratic ideal forms the basis for Biel's rejection of excessive asceticism in general and the observantist reform movement in particular. Going beyond the position taken by Gerson in his treatise against the flagellants, Biel criticizes not so much antinomianism as the arrogance resulting from a pretentious legalism.⁶¹

In Gerson's treatise *Super Magnificat*, we find conclusive evidence that this contrast between Gerson and Biel is not a mere hypothesis. In one passage, he describes how the devil travels through the world to confuse the children of God. In accordance with his approach to Eve, he tempts those who are on the point of entering an order with questions to make them reconsider their decision. He asks why they want to flee the world; isn't it man's nature to live in society; can't one work out one's salvation in worldly garb, under the one abbot Jesus Christ; shouldn't one enjoy the law of freedom given by God and purchased by Christ; why observe all these extra rules when one has not even sufficient power to obey the basic commandments; do not all these obligations merely force one to abound in sin?⁶²

The self-same arguments which according to Gerson are diabolical are used by Biel to defend the secular form of life in the *De votio Moderna*. The life of the Brethren of the Common Life is for him

characterized by a life in the freedom of the Christian law, under the one abbot Jesus Christ, without obligation to observances above and beyond the precepts. Thus, in all humility, the apostolic admonition is obeyed that everyone should remain in the state in which he is called.⁶³

Though Biel even in this short treatise refers to Gerson to support his own position,⁶⁴ it is hard to construct a sharper contrast than that between Gerson and Biel as concerns the monastic life.⁶⁵

Although the *Devotio Moderna* is believed in our day to mark the beginning of the observantist movement,⁶⁶ Biel feels that the *Devotio Moderna* stood for reform through an active life of simple piety. This ideal of reform stands for him *over against* the rigoristic ideal of the observantist "second generation," an ungrateful heir to the successes of the *Devotio Moderna*.⁶⁷ External evidence documents this attitude of Biel in an unexpected way. The famous ascetic protagonist of observantism, John Geiler of Kaysersberg (d. 1510), known as the German Savonarola, seems to have been in contact with Biel. In an interesting passage hitherto unnoted, Jacob Otherus writes in the dedication of Geiler's posthumously published *Navicula Penitentie* to prior Georg Reisch of the Carthusian monastery near Freiburg i. Br., that Geiler would have become a hermit if Biel had not thwarted his wishes.⁶⁸

In an eloquent indictment of observantism, Biel first defends explicitly the laxer ideal by referring to the basic goodness of creation, the dangers of self-destruction, and the decisive importance of inner piety; not exterior observances but a pure conscience marks the perfect monk.⁶⁹

Yet the deepest motivation for Biel's opposition to rigoristic asceticism is, as we have seen, not to be found primarily in his rejection of antinomianism or observantism, but in his own understanding of the indomitable and abiding power of sin, an important aspect of his democratization of the ideal of perfection: the law of the flesh may be mitigated by abstinence, but its fire cannot be extinguished in this life.⁷⁰ This Gabrielistic emphasis, so important for his understanding of justification, prevents his sometimes exuberant descriptions of union of the "perfect" with God from contradicting the law of relativity which proved to apply on the two lower levels, those of the beginners and the advanced. Even the perfection of the "perfect" is subject to the law of sin; in their clearest possible vision of God and their most intimate union with God, they are bound to be severely attacked by temptations.⁷¹

The stubborn nature of sin prevents even the aristocrats of the spirit from transcending the set limitations that mark the existence of

the *viator*. Thus an equilibrium is established between the theological virtues of love and hope. While in the Eckhartian school Christian hope is fulfilled and thus absorbed by love, the perfect vision of God will, according to Biel, be granted only at the end of time when the *viator* has been transformed into the *comprehensor* and *beatus*.⁷² We will have to keep the essential eschatological character of this future transformation in mind when we proceed to analyze Biel's understanding of the highest possible union with God in this life.

2. After this survey of the three characteristics of the mystical elements in Biel's theology, we will have to investigate them in greater detail. We will ask what now precisely is meant by the tendency towards democratization of mysticism on the one hand and the special union granted to the spiritual aristocracy on the other, and finally how these two are related.

In the history of asceticism from the Essenes and the Eastern desert fathers via John Cassian, Gregory the Great and Hugh of St. Victor, a series of scales and methods had been elaborated which usually did not replace, but clarified the tripartite mystic route of purgation, illumination and union taught by Dionysius.⁷³

The close relation of monasticism and asceticism indicates already that these scales are meant as descriptions of the growth from perfection to perfection, under the counsels and not only under the precepts. Though the terms are not always clearly defined and have different meanings for different authors, *lectio*, *meditatio*, and *oratio* are generally understood as exercises of Christians in a state of grace, who climb in this way to the highest stage of contemplation.⁷⁴

These stages mark a growth in grace and are, therefore, an unfolding of the initial gift of sanctifying grace in baptism or its restoration in the sacrament of penance. Its point of departure is thus the sacramentally infused *gratia gratum faciens*. While this *gratia gratum faciens* is necessary for salvation, the indicated stages lead to a higher form of perfection; they lead beyond the point of the requirements of the evangelical precepts.

While there is no indication that Biel consciously breaks with this tradition, he brings the scales and methods of perfection to bear on the sinner *on his way to* repentance and thus *before* the infusion of the *gratia gratum faciens*. The most important consequence of this shift is that what was traditionally a freely chosen exercise of the just, with *contemplation* as its highest level, has now become an effort necessary on the part of the sinner for his salvation, under the precepts, with *contrition* as its highest level.⁷⁵

This contrition is understood as the absolute love for God, unadulterated by egoism; and while the road leading to this act of deep

and honest penitence is marked by the states of *lectio*, *meditatio* and *oratio* which in other systems *follow* contrition, the act of contrition itself is described in terms closely resembling those traditionally used for the mystical union with God.

Biel's most common form of argumentation runs as follows: to be saved, one has to fulfill the law, i.e., to love God with all his heart. Man is able to produce this love without infused grace, the *gratia gratum faciens*. In this way if he does his very best, he will receive immediately, at the moment that he reaches the point of love for God above everything else, this gift of sanctifying grace.⁷⁶

How can man unaided by grace reach that high point of love? By reading and meditation. Reading informs our darkened minds and provides them with such data as the Incarnation and the coming judgment. Thus informed, meditation inflames the will with love for a God who gave himself for the sinful world, and chills the will with fear of a God who knows every thought and will return to judge the quick and the dead.⁷⁷

While meditation on the punishing righteousness of God restrains the will from disobedience, the self-sacrifice of God excites the will to such a point that the sinner is properly disposed for the inhabitation of the Holy Spirit. In this context Biel preaches a stern anti-pelagian doctrine of unmerited love. As we noted before, however, the unmerited sacrifice of God proves to be an act of the past which has merely a psychological relevance in the present, and thus functions as an inspiring example for the sinner to break with his own power the bonds of sin and pride.⁷⁸

The sinner is called upon to cleanse the house of his soul by a sincere love for God. The more mystical descriptions of the ensuing infusion are given when the gift of the *gratia gratum faciens* is understood as the birth of Christ in the soul.⁷⁹ Christ is called the sole and only dependable foundation, in whom the Christian lives through faith, moves through hope and with whom he is united through love. This Christ-birth in the soul is not an exalted stage of perfection for a small privileged group, but necessary for the salvation of every Christian.⁸⁰

The initiative that man has to take remains withal the main interest and is sometimes stressed to the point where Biel can say that through man's decision to open the door of his heart, *God* is converted and moved to dwell in the soul through the gift of sanctifying grace.⁸¹

We note that Biel is somewhat loose in his terminology. Here he speaks about the descent of God, above about the inhabitation of Christ, most frequently about the gift of the Holy Spirit.

When he compares the spiritual birth of Christ *in mente* (!) with the Incarnation he makes a point of saying that only the second Person of the Trinity came in the flesh, but that in the inhabitation the three Persons are indivisible.⁸²

If he had left us a more systematic treatment these points would certainly have caught his well-trained eye. As it is, we have to remember that the better part of our sources are sermons which were written over an extended period of time.

The spiritual birth of the soul is nevertheless presented as a union with the Word through sanctifying grace, which simultaneously implies the descent of Christ and the ascent of the soul to union with Christ in love.⁸³

This union can best be interpreted as *communion* with Christ. Notwithstanding the use of a rather inconsistent but basically theocentric terminology, one is forced to conclude that this communion with Christ is psychological in nature and anthropocentrically determined: it is not an operation of the Holy Spirit but of the spirit of man. Though contrition on its highest level encounters the Holy Spirit, Christ, God or the *gratia gratum faciens*, this is a concomitant appendix to a human act. This human act is indeed brought about by God but in an indirect way, through the psychological impact of past and future historical acts of God: the Incarnation and the last judgment.⁸⁴

In the present moment of the life of the common Christian the distance between God and his creature can and has to be bridged by the mental ascent which takes the form of adjustment to the will of God: *consentiendo sue voluntati*.

We mark here that this agreement with the will of God has to be distinguished from the absolute conformity or union with the will of God which is the privilege of the aristocrats of the spirit.

We saw how *lectio* and *meditatio* stimulated the sinner to love God above everything else. It is not clear whether the third stage, *oratio*, is located before or after the moment of infusion of sanctifying grace. Biel shows far less interest in systematization of stages, steps and virtues than e.g. his contemporary and fellow nominalist, Wessel Gansfort,⁸⁵ or the earlier Gerard Zerbald van Zutphen.⁸⁶

As, in his understanding, the contrition and its concomitant union with Christ is necessary for salvation,⁸⁷ he is intent on a simplification of traditional ascetic teaching in order to be able to transfer it from the refectory to the pulpit. He grants that the ascent to contrition implies the climbing of a scale of virtues, but he is quick to add that one virtue is all-sufficient: humility.⁸⁸

In view of the fact that the psychological communion with Christ is to be included under the precepts, it does not surprise us to find Biel

saying that this decisive and basic virtue is not difficult to acquire. Nobody can excuse himself on grounds that humility would be beyond his reach; a proper consideration of the majesty of God's creation humiliates man sufficiently.⁸⁹

In view of Biel's description of the nature and necessity of contrition, we are now in a position to understand what we earlier called "a strong tendency towards democratization of mysticism."

This democratization is due to Biel's emphasis on the psychological communion with Christ as a basic requirement for every Christian. Gerson made a step in this direction by contrasting mysticism with scholasticism as not limited to learned doctors but including even mere women and simpletons. Gerson makes it clear, however, that the mystical experience marks an advanced stage of sanctity which transcends the level of the beginners. For Biel one cannot even be a beginner without what he describes as "Christ-mysticism."

We spoke only of "a strong tendency," because closer investigation of the use of mystical terminology unmasked what appeared to be "Christ-mysticism" as an eloquent description of a psychological state of mind which can with more right be termed self-justifying piety than mysticism.

3. This term "self-justifying piety," however, should not mislead us; it is only one side of the coin. When the *viator* walks on the paths of the law oscillating between fear and love, he receives at the very moment that he produces the required act of supreme love for God, sanctifying grace. This infusion is always accompanied by the inhabitation of the Holy Spirit, Christ or the Holy Trinity. From this point of view this self-justifying piety can equally well be termed pneumatic piety. The sermons show us again that when Biel in his academic works stresses that God *de potentia absoluta* can accept a man to life eternal without inherent grace,⁹⁰ but that this is not the case *de potentia ordinata*,⁹¹ he is absolutely serious: the gift of sanctifying grace is necessary for salvation.⁹² This grace is a created gift of the Holy Spirit which links the converted sinner in a bond of love with Jesus Christ.⁹³

It is important to emphasize this necessity of created grace in view of the widespread misunderstanding according to which the nominalistic doctrine of justification would be essentially forensic. This interpretation is probably due to the term "acceptation" itself.

In connection with the theology of Duns Scotus for whom this term received a new importance,⁹⁴ it has often been alleged that justification would not refer to an internal enrichment of the sinner but

only to a changed relationship with God.⁹⁵ The same point has repeatedly been made with respect to Occam and Biel who are on this point of one mind with Scotus.⁹⁶

One can easily understand that the Scotistic and nominalistic doctrine of sin with its relational emphasis on the obligation to punishment could facilitate a parallel relational understanding of their doctrine of justification.

It is indeed true that the major emphasis is not on the created grace but on the act of acceptance, uncreated grace.⁹⁷ Against the Thomistic insistence on created grace, the Scotists and nominalists insist on the limited effectiveness of the habit of grace.

The acceptance by God, however, is not the exterior declaration or *favor dei* of later Protestant orthodoxy; it is the coming of the Holy Spirit himself. In justification, therefore, two gifts are granted: (1) the created grace, necessary according to God's revealed will, as the *ratio meriti*; (2) the Holy Spirit, necessary in an absolute sense, as the *ratio acceptationis*.⁹⁸

We are here not so much interested in this structure of thought itself; these data are by no means unknown. But because of the long-standing misconception of the *potentia ordinata* as a nominalistic subterfuge, the nominalistic position has been interpreted either as a mere negative rejection of the Thomist position or positively as a proto-Protestant doctrine of justification. In the first point there is some truth, since one senses in the Scotistic and nominalistic criticism a protest against the ontological "Dinglichkeit" of the Thomistic concept of grace.

Our consideration of the mystical elements in Biel's theology—and here we resume our main argument—throws light on the extent of the spiritualization of the process of justification: the inhabitation of the Holy Spirit is not a special privilege of the aristocrats of the spirit but required of every Christian. The other side of self-justifying piety is pneumatic piety: acceptance, far from being an exterior imputation of righteousness, is indeed the coming of the Holy Spirit himself to all Christians. The term *favor* is once used by Biel; but not, however, to indicate a forensic declarative act of God, but as a description of the habit of inherent grace.⁹⁹

As we have seen, the arrival of the Holy Spirit can very well be described as the incorporation into Christ. Membership in the visible Church is only the incorporation into Christ by *faith*; it is necessary for salvation that one be also incorporated into Christ through *faith active in love*.¹⁰⁰

One last remark on the connection of justification and mysticism. One can—and shculd—stress that the existential meaning of Christ for the *viator* is primarily that of the judge who notes every single act so that he is prepared for the last judgment. This other aspect however, that of the inhabitation of Christ or His Spirit, should be seen as its counterpart and completion. Indeed in humility man has to prepare his house and to drive out in fear and trembling the “ass” that polluted this house and made it an uninhabitable stable: Christ the judge is watching every *viator* closely to observe whether he is indeed preparing his soul for His inhabitation. The emphasis on the prior necessity of this self-cleansing activity of the soul gave us reason to speak about “self-justifying piety.” But at the very moment that the sinner has completed his preparations, i.e., at the moment of his conversion, sanctifying grace is given and the Holy Spirit or Christ takes up His residence in the soul.¹⁰¹

This being the case, it does not surprise us that we found no trace of a distinction between justification and sanctification. This does not mean that justification is momentary or complete at the first moment of justification. The inhabitation is only the first beginning in the process of justification.¹⁰² In this sense we have to understand Biel's three *status* of the beginners, the advanced and the perfect.

In actual life there are of course many such processes of justification, since most *viatores* will lose the inhabitation and sanctifying grace by falling in mortal sin and will need to recover these again by conversion, i.e., contrition.

Everything taken into consideration, we may say that the noted democratization of mysticism also throws new light on Biel's doctrine of justification by implying the necessity of inherent grace and inhabitation for all Christians and thus establishing beyond doubt that *this doctrine of acceptation can in no sense of the word be characterized as forensic.*

4. Notwithstanding the emphasis on the abiding necessity of humility and the central function of the sacrament of penance, the psychological adjustment to the will of God does not imply a special operation of the Holy Spirit which proved to be a mark of the penitential mysticism of John Gerson. The same does not apply to Biel's description of the special union granted only to the most advanced. As this group is only of marginal interest for Biel who apparently has primarily the average Christian in mind, we can be brief in our discussion.

From the sanctification by contrition and confession Biel distinguishes a special inhabitation of the Holy Spirit which nobody can

understand who has not experienced it. This leads to a transformation of the soul which is not understood as an essential union but as a union through love in conformity to the will of God, of higher quality than the mere adjustment to God's will.¹⁰³

It is clear that Biel has now turned from a description of the life of the common Christian under the precepts to a life of renunciation under the counsels. He always takes care to add the words "as far as possible in this world," or the like, to ward off the dangers of extreme asceticism and to remind his listeners of the impossibility of conquering concupiscence; but the shift of focus is clear.¹⁰⁴ The perfect Christian no longer needs psychological stimulation to love God; he lives already in God.¹⁰⁵

Biel is not always as careful as Gerson to interpret the mystical union as one of conformity with God's will. Though in some cases he makes clear that the perfect transformation is an eschatological experience in which the perfect will share only after the resurrection,¹⁰⁶ when he comes to speak about eucharistic mysticism, he seems to choose exactly the formulations which Gerson had criticized in Ruysbroeck. The soul of the worthy participant is said to be changed into the body of Christ through a most intimate union.¹⁰⁷

The realistic character of this union is underlined when Biel says that the soul does not merely become a Christbearer but indeed God, albeit not on grounds of a change of essence. On grounds of his participation in God the soul is more truly in God than in the body.¹⁰⁸

One should not expect such mystical experiences every time one takes communion. They are extra gifts *ex opere operantis*, above and beyond the normal sanctification *ex opere operato*. Frequent communion is therefore advisable.¹⁰⁹

One should be grateful for this gift of union when it occurs, but when it does not happen, one should remember that the kingdom of God exists in love and not in the sweet experience of union.¹¹⁰

In his lectures on the Mass, Biel spells out his understanding of mystical deification. In the spiritual eating of the mystical Body of Christ,¹¹¹ a deification takes place in which the soul or the essence of the mind remains while its accidents are changed.¹¹² In this way Biel indeed wards off the danger of such loss of identity as was criticized by Gerson and expressed by Eckhart with the image of the drop that disappears in the sea.

One more point should be made. The experience of *this* union is not merely a matter of proper preparation and reception of the gift

of special grace. It depends to a certain degree also on the structure of one's personality in the same way in which some people cry easily.¹¹³

* * *

At the end of our investigation we may conclude that there is reason to prefer the title "mystical elements in Biel's theology" to "Biel's mystical theology." The noted inconsistencies in terminology as such are revealing. Biel's major systematic work, his *Sentences* commentary, seems at first sight void of any mystical teaching. It is indeed only on grounds of his *Sermons* and *Exposition of the Mass* that one understands that such terms as "contritio" and "ex opere operantis" etc., have for Biel mystical connotations.

We have seen, however, that most of the inconsistencies can be reduced to a two-fold use of mystical terminology: first on the level of contrition, the love for God above everything else, required of all Christians as necessary for their salvation; secondly on the level of the chosen few, the perfect ones. Though with respect to eucharistic mysticism Biel can formulate himself in a way reminiscent of the Eckhartian school of thought, in the total context of his theology his description of the mysticism of the perfect can be characterized as penitential mysticism.

In contrast to the democratic mysticism of the first level—which proved to be in fact self-justifying or pneumatic piety—the mysticism of the second level can be termed aristocratic mysticism insofar as the personality structure of the chosen few makes them naturally fit to experience the sweetness of the union with God, through love, in conformity to his will.

The abiding eschatological context, due to Biel's understanding of the persistence of concupiscence, notwithstanding a progressive sanctification, prevents the transformation or deification of the perfect from transcending the limitations set for the *viator* and thus respects the incommensurability between Creator and creation which is the basic presupposition of the nominalist theologian. Finally we can return to our point of departure: Gabriel Biel as much as John Gerson provides the historian of Christian thought with decisive documentation to prove that mysticism and nominalism are ideal partners in a wholesome "mystical marriage."

1. Henricus Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, Freiburg 1937²³, 468-469.
2. Cf. the otherwise useful survey of Marcel Pacaut, *La Théocratie, L'Église et le Pouvoir au Moyen Age*, Paris 1957, 200ff. Cf. Alexander Passerin d'Entrèves, *The Medieval Contribution to Political Thought*, New York 1959², 86.
3. Denzinger, 494.
4. "Nunquam in ecclesia fuit minor devotio," in *Sermons choisis de Michel Menot*, ed. Neve, Paris 1924, 16. "Sed frater, quare non ponitur remedium cum abusus sit adeo magnus? Amice, non habeo hominem"; *op. cit.*, 343. "Nec de ea spem magnam habemus, nisi iterum de novo planteretur"; *op. cit.*, 374. The *restitutio* idea as expressed in this *iterum de novo* is according to modern scholars of the Radical Reformation the characteristic of this movement; this idea is then contrasted with the *reformatio* idea of the Magisterial Reformation. A survey of late medieval sermonic literature indicates, however, that the *restitutio* idea marks the rise of the donatistic tide towards the end of the Middle Ages and is not restricted to such isolated groups as the Waldensians and Fraticelli, to which the Radical Reformation is usually related.
5. Cf. Ernst Werner, *Pauperes Christi, Studien in social-religiösen Bewegungen im Zeitalter des Reformpapsttums*, Leipzig 1956, 165ff.
6. A. Pelzer "Les 51 articles de Guillaume Occam, censurées en Avignon en 1326," in *RHE XVIII* (1922), 240ff; J. Koch, "Neue Aktenstücke zu dem gegen Wilhelm Ockham in Avignon geführten Prozess," in: *KTAM VII* (1935), 353f; *VIII* (1936), 79ff, 168ff.
7. Denz., 501ff; complete text H. S. Denifle, *ALKM*, II (1886), 636ff; M. H. Laurent, "Autour du procès de Maître Eckhardt... Les documents vaticanes," in *Divus Thomas XIII* (1936), 331ff; 430ff. Cf. the excellent contribution by Otto Karrer and Herma Piesch, *Meister Eckharts Rechtfertigungsschrift*, Erfurt 1927.
8. "Faith was intact but to follow Ockham was to give up any hope of achieving, in this life, a positive philosophical understanding of its intelligible meaning." Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, London 1955, 498. "Les données de la foi qu'il déclare inaccessibles à la raison ne tarderont pas à être jugées contraires à la raison." Maurice de Wulf, *Histoire de la Philosophie Médiévale*, III, Paris 1947, 46. Cf. however the criticism of Philoteus Boehner, "A Recent Presentation of Ockham's Philosophy," in *FS* 9 (1949), 443 ff; "... le nominalisme terministe était une doctrine trop sèche et trop formelle... pour ne pas provoquer une révolte de la sensibilité et ne pas rejeter les esprits vers le mysticisme." A. Renaudet, *Pré-réforme et Humanisme à Paris pendant les premières guerres d'Italie 1494-1517*, Paris 1953, 67-68. "Chez les élèves d'Ockham, la doctrine nouvelle ne créa qu'une soumission inerte à un dogme qui cessait de parler à l'esprit et au cœur." *Ibid.*, 66.
9. "Zunächst ist es klar, dass Nominalismus und Mystik in scharfem Gegensatz zueinanderstehen.... Das Erfahrungsprinzip, das die Nominalisten auf die natürliche Dinge anwenden, wird von diesen mystischen Theologen in Bezug auf Gott und sein Wirken gebraucht. Darin ist die Differenz wie die Gemeinsamkeit des beiderseitigen Interesses enthalten, daraus begreift sich auch die beiderseitige Gleichgültigkeit dem kirchlichen Dogma gegenüber." *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte III*, Basel 1953, 675.
10. "Man kann wohl die Frage: Worin unterscheidet sich Luther vom Nominalismus? durch den Hinweis auf seine Beziehung zur Mystik beantworten; wie man umgekehrt sagen kann, dass es gerade die positivistischen... Elemente der ockhamistischen Theologie sind, die ihn letztlich von der Mystik unterscheiden." *Luther's Theologie in ihren Grundzügen*, Stuttgart 1950², 39f.
11. Art. "Contemplation" in *Dictionnaire de spiritualité* II, Paris 1953, col. 1643ff. Cf. the excellent introduction by Ray C. Petry, *Late Medieval Mysticism*, Philadelphia 1957, 17ff; Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism*, New York 1930¹², 72; A. B. Sharp, *Mysticism, Its True Nature and Value*, London 1910, 74, 96.
12. *ST* II II. q 180. art 3. ad 2: "contemplatio pertinet ad simplicem intuitum veritatis." Cf. *Contra Gentiles* II, q. 83: "finis igitur hominis est pervenire ad veritatis contemplationem."
13. "Ici bas comme au ciel, imparfaite ou parfaite, la contemplation est formellement un acte d'intelligence. Non que la volonté n'y joue un grand rôle, mais l'intelligence est la faculté qui saisit la vérité." F. D. Joret, *La Contemplation mystique d'après S. Thomas d'Aquin*, Lille 1923, 54.
14. Etienne Gilson, *op. cit.*, 440.
15. *Die lateinische Werke*, ed. Ernst Benz, Josef Koch, Stuttgart 1939, V, 40ff.
16. J. Quint, *Die deutschen Werke Meister Eckharts*, I, *Predigten*, Stuttgart 1936;

11, 178, 4ff; 12, 193, 3ff. Franz Pfeiffer, *Meister Eckhart*, Göttingen 1924, XVIII, 78, 22ff.

17. Pfeiffer, *op. cit.*, 467, 6ff: "Dâ wirt die sèle vereinet in der blözen gotheit, daz si nimmer mîr müge funden werden, als vil al ein tropfe wînes mittem in dem mer." Cf. Tauler, F. Vetter, *Die Predigten Taulers*, Berlin 1910, 33; Suso, M. Diepenbrock, *Heinrich Suso's, genannt Amandus, Leben und Schriften*, Augsburg 1853, 266.

18. "... Christus autem semper habuit noticiam intuitivam deitatis secundum humanitatem quia anima eius in instanti creationis fuit beata." [from the life of the viator] "... excluditur intellectus beati deum clare videntis... viator et comprehensor ex opposito distinguuntur. *Ib.* I. QQ. Biel, *Questio I. Prologi*. Cf. III *Sent.* d 13. q 1. art 3. dub 1.

19. "... omnis cognitio dei viatoris est cognitio fidei." Biel, III *Sent.* d 34, q 1. art 2, concl. 1; "... non sit alia patris cognitio quam ea que per fidem, aut narrantis ei ingeritur simpliciter autoritatem." Gerson, *De simpli cordis XII*, *Opera omnia*, ed. Du Pin, Antwerp 1706, III, 461 D.

20. Gerson, *De mystica theologia* Cons. 39 O; III, 393 C: "Spiritus ergo noster cum deo adheret per intimum amorem, unus spiritus est cum eo per voluntatis conformitatem... Itaque cui sic [Jesus, praying in the Garden] unitur deo et adheret per amorosam voluntatis conformitatem utique stabilitur in eo!" Cf. *De Cons. theol.* III; I, 157; *De Mystica theol.* spec. 39 O; III, 393. Biel: "... gaudium... ex conformitate sue voluntatis cum voluntate paterna." *Lect. 64* F.

21. Butler, *Western Mysticism*, London 1926; Petry, "Social Responsibility and the Late Medieval Mystics," in *Church History*, XXI (1952) 3ff. I do not see, however, how Maria Lücker could come to the conclusion that Eckhart teaches that the contemplative life would merely form the introductory stage for the active life. *Meister Eckhart und die Devotio Moderna*, Leiden 1950, 9. Cf. Pfeiffer, *op. cit.*, IX, 53. 1ff: "Maria was & Martha, & si María würde..."

22. "... theologiam mysticam sic possumus describere: theologia mystica est extensio animi in deum per amoris desiderium. Alter sic: theologia mystica est experimentalis cognitio habita deo per amoris intuitivi complexum. Alter sic: theologia mystica est sapientia sapida noticia habita deo dum ei supremus apex affective potentie rationalis per amorem coniungitur et unitur." *De Mystica theologia speculativa* Cons. 28 E; III, 383.

23. "Speculative theologia est in potentia intellectiva cuius obiectum est verum. Mysticam vero reponimus in potentia affectiva cui pro obiecto bonum assignamus." *Ibid. Cons. 29 F*; III, 384.

24. We have therefore to disagree with Ray Petry's conclusion: "Perhaps of more working validity than the speculative-affective character is the applicability of the threefold way to the mystic experience." *Late Medieval Mysticism*, 21. As we will see, the interpretation of the threefold way depends on the prior question in which of the two schools the mystic stands.

25. Cf. Johannes Altenstaig, *Vocabularius theologie*, Hagenau 1517; this invaluable dictionary of late medieval theology is essentially an inventory of the nominalistic theological vocabulary. After Gabriel Biel, John Gerson is the second authority to whom Altenstaig turns for reference; with regard to such mystical terms as, e.g., "assimilatio," "abyssus," and "status beatitudinis" Gerson becomes the main and in most cases the sole authority.

26. "Auch sein Kampf gegen den von ihm falsch verstandenen Ruysbroeck bestätigt seine Distanz von der wirklichen Mystik." Walter Dresz, *Die Theologie Gersons*, Gütersloh 1931, 50. For Gerson's criticism on Ruysbroeck see André Combes, *Essai sur la critique de Ruysbroeck par Gerson*, II, La première critique gersonienne du *De ornato spiritualium nuptiarum*, Paris 1948. According to Combes, Gerson's nominalism prevents him from admitting more than a moral union and forces him thus to do Ruysbroeck injustice: "Ne concevant pas de moyen terme entre la métaphysique et la morale et ne pouvant réduire la troisième partie du *De ornato* à une thèse d'union morale entre l'homme et Dieu, il a rétréci ses textes scripturaires aux limites d'une pure morale..." *op. cit.*, 249.

27. Fr. Ehrle characterizes Gerson's thought as "Reaktion gegen den Ockamismus," *Der Sentenzen Kommentar Peters von Candia, des Pisaner Papstes Alexander V*, Munster 1. W. 1925, 92. Cf. James Connolly, *John Gerson, Reformer and Mystic*, Louvain 1928, 85: "... though his training and the whole tradition of his learning was Nominalistic, Gerson was a Realist in his Theology and in his Mysticism," *op. cit.*, 236. Connolly refers here to B. Bess, "Gerson, Joh. Charlier," article in *RE* VI, 613, Leipzig 1899; J.B. Schwab, *Johann Gerson, Professor der Theologie und Kanzler der Universität Paris*, Wurzburg 1858, 311. Cf. also Etienne Gilson, *op. cit.*, 529: "In fact, Gerson had never adhered to nominalism except

against a certain realism..." In his analyses of what he calls the "Journey's End" Gilson came to the harsh judgment: "This doctrinal confusion finds its saddened and powerless [sic!] witness in the person of John Gerson ..." *Ibid.*, 528.

28. *Opera I*, 83-106.

29. "... pergere ultra volentes defecerunt scrutantes scrutinio. Quo pacto sic! Quia certe ea quae in liberrima potestate dei posita erant, dum attingere et ad quasdam necessitatis regulas adducere conati sunt, ipsi evanuerunt in cogitationibus suis et obseveratum est insipiens cor eorum Rom. 1:21. Philosophi igitur dum hoc secretum divini voluntatis penetrare duxerunt experientia, moluntur, quidni deficiant? *Quoniam sicut divina voluntas huius ratio est, ita solis illis scire concessum est, quibus ipsa voluerit revelare.* Ita de incarnatione et de reliquis nostrae fidei articulis..." I, 92. "Et vitium est velle plus quam oportet sapere..." I, 93.

30. "... articulos fidei nullo modo esse contra philosophiam naturalem, sed eidem potius consensi sunt, quamquam eos attingere et invenire suum non est; praesertim nisi praevia fidei revelatione quae tales veritates subministret." I, 92. Cf. *Sermo Dominice IV Adv.*: "Deus enim facere potest de creatura sua ad eam secundum beneplacitum suum obligare; sufficit pro rationabili causa, ut dieat: sic mihi placeat." III, 928.

31. References of quotations of St. Thomas in Connolly, *op. cit.*, 286, n.1.

32. "... nec admirari sufficio qualiter patres et fratres minores dimisso tanto doctore ... converterunt se ad nescio quos novellos..." I, 91; "... studeo eos quos scotistas appellamus ad concordiam cum aliis doctoribus adducere ..." I, 101.

33. "... obtestor ne quis existimet me velle cuiquam doctori vel personae vel religioni detrahere." I, 97.

34. "Concipere itaque quod in divinis sit aliquid esse formale... ut ripa posuit, istud parit in animo meo majorem difficultatem quam sit illa propter quam elucidandam ista talia reperiunter, imo nequeo non videre ista palam esse erronea." I, 101. Cf. A. Combes "Jean de Vippa, Jean de Rupa ou Jean de Ripa," in *AHDL* 14 (1939), 253ff; *Id. Jean Gerson commentateur dionysien*, Paris 1930, 608ff.

35. A. Stöckl, *Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, II. Mainz 1865, 960 f.; Bernhard Meller, *Studien zur Erkenntnislehre des Peter von Ailly*, Freiburg 1954, 187ff, 140.

36. H. Denifle-E. Chatelain, *Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis III*, Paris 1894, 506. Connolly, *op. cit.*, 85, stresses this point to show Gerson's "conversion" from nominalism to realism.

37. "Nolo putet aliquis, me hoc loco justificationem seu defensionem partis illius quae depulsa vel avulsa est suscepisse, fratres praedicatorum loquor..." I, 111f. "Ergo non tam quod licet ex juris rigore quam quid expediat exquiratur." I, 112.

38. III, 361.

39. "Et quoniam nostrum hactenus studium fuit concordare theologiam hanc mysticam nostram scholastica..." IV, 54.

40. "Alioquin tales theologizant solis auri- bus corporis... Mystica vero theologia sicut non versatur in tali cognitione literatoria, sic non habet necessariam talem scholam que schola intellectus dici potest, sed adquiritur per scholam affectus..." Cons. 30 G; III, 385f. "Quis autem appropinquaverit igni et vestimenta eius non ardeant vel calescent?" Cons. 8 P; III, 369.

41. "Sic ergo de theologia speculativa dicimus quod non quilibet perversa est aut perverso inhabitat, nec in ea vitia esse ponimus. Sed in abutentibus ea qualiter nullus in theologia mystica esse potest nisi forsitan modo pretracto per superbiem obiective." Cons. 32 I; III, 387f.

42. "... per exercitum vehemens moralium virtutum disponentium animam ad purgationem et in theologicis illuminantibus eam in beatificis virtutibus eam perfruentibus proportionaliter ad tres actus hierarchicos qui sunt purgare, illuminare, et perficiere... licet sit suprema et perfectissima notitia ipsa tamen potest haberi a quolibet fidelis etiam si sit muliercula vel idiota..." *Ibid.* Cf. III, 406: "Saepe enim ubi minus cognitionis ibi plus affectum."

43. "... itaque sequebantur (Beghardi) affectus suos sine regula et ordine postposita legem christi, presumptio nequissima precipitavit eos ut dicentes hominem postquam ad pacem tranquillam spiritus pervenisset, absolutum esse legibus divinorum preceptorum..." Cons. 8 P; III, 369. Cf. Denz., 473: "Quod illi, qui sunt in praedicto gradu perfectionis et spiritu libertatis, non sunt humanae subiecti oboedientiae, nec ad aliqua praecepta ecclesiae obligantur..." Cf. A. Mens, *Oorsprong en betekenis van de nederlandse Begijnen en Begardenbeweging*, Antwerpen 1947, 147ff, 198ff; E. W. McDonnell, *The Beguines and Beghards in Medieval Culture*, New Brunswick 1954. Extensive bibliography here.

44. "... pronissimi sunt ad errores, etiam supra indevotos, si non regulaverint

affectus suos ad normam legis christi . . ." *Ibid.*

45. He quotes the opinion of the flagellants as "...haec flagellatio potior est ad delendum peccata, quam quaecunque confessio . . ." II, 660. One side remark is the only passage known to us where Gerson contrasts the "one for all" character of Christ's work with the "imitation of Christ" theme, a contrast which would later shape the foundation of the Reformation understanding of justification and sanctification: "Christus autem ex gratia sua (sicut notatur in dicto petri prius allegato [Acts 15:10]) voluit nos misericorditer salvare per sanguinem suum semel effusum . . ." *Ibid.*

46. "Lex christi sufficienter data est in praeeceptionis decalogi . . ." II, 661. "Lex christi sufficienter ab apostolis et sacris doctoribus explicata . . ." *Ibid.*, 662. "...eupidius fertur in illa quae sunt adiuventionis sua, quam quae sunt divinae iussionis et hic est unus superbiae gradus . . ." *Ibid.*, 661-62.

47. "...dum ita fuerit conformis et subdita quod ipsius et dei sit unum velle et unum nolle, quod amicitiae proprium est . . ." *De consolatione theologiae* III, prosa 1; I, 157; "...unitur deo et adheret per amorosam voluntatis conformitatem . . ." *De mystica theologiae* spec. Cons. 39; III, 393.

48. In the essentialist school "...anima perdit se et esse suum et accipit verum esse divinum sic quod iam non est creatura nec per creaturam videt aut amat deum sed est ipse deus qui videtur et amatur." Cons. 41; III, 394. Cf. the tenth condemned Eckhartian proposition: "Nos transformamur totaliter in deum et convertimur in eum; simili modo sicut in sacramento panis convertitur in corpus christi; sic ego convertor in eum, quod ipse me operatur suum esse unum, non simile; per viventem deum verum est, quod ibi nulla est distinctio." Denz., 510.

49. "Hanc etiam nisus est renovare auctor illius tractatus cuius titulus est 'de ornato spiritualium nuptiarum' . . ." On the contrary, "...anima talis semper remanet in esse suo proprio quod habet in suo genere sed dicitur tantummodo similitudine transformari sicut amatorum dicimus eorū unum et animam unam quod utique concedimus." Gerson, *ibid.*

50. "Dixerunt enim quod anima sic unitur deo et in ipsum transformatur quemadmodum, si gutta aquae mittatur in dolium fontis vini. Illa namque gutta tunc perdit esse proprium, convertiturque totaliter in alienum velut etiam si eibus per nutritionem convertatur in eibatum . . . Rursus [propter] eandem rationem similitudo transubstantiationis que fit in benedicto sacramento non satis est idonea ad explicandum transformationis in deum amatum." Cons. 41 P; III, 394f. André Combes discusses a parallel passage in the letter of the Parisian Chancellor to Bartholomew ("Addit quod perditur anima contemplantis in esse tali divino abyssali ut reperibilis non sit ab aliqua creatura." *Epistola I ad Bartholomaeum*; in Combes, *Essai . . .* II, 108ff.) and concludes that Gerson in his attack on Ruysbroeck has especially in mind Jean Courtecuise [Brevicoxa], a disciple of John of Ripa. *Op. cit.*, 229. Gerson's aside "amplius non ignoro fuisse et esse quosdam ex theologis disputantes satis curiose si posset de absoluta potentia anima rationalis cognoscere et beatificari formaliter per divinam essentiam absque medio alio" (*ibid.*, 214) can be thus interpreted. Gerson's main purpose (this attack was only *amplius*), however, is to combat a type of mysticism which he knew to be widely spread, especially in the Low Countries and the Rhine Valley.

51. "Sane tota vel praecipua causa difficultatis ad intelligentiam scholasticam in hac parte videtur esse propter omnitudinem finiti ad infinitum, creaturae scilicet ad creatorem impropotionem . . ." *Super Cantica Canticorum* IV; IV, 54.

52. "Sane tota vel praecipua causa difficultatis ad intelligentiam scholasticam in hac parte videtur esse propter omnitudinem finiti ad infinitum, creaturae scilicet ad creatorem impropotionem et aequivocationem, quemadmodum diversi doctores diversos sibi terminos invenerunt." *Ibid.* Cf. my "Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism," in *HTR* 53 (1960), 47ff.

53. E. Vansteenberghe, "Autour de la 'Docte Ignorance.' Une controverse sur la théologie mystique au XV siècle," in *BB* XIV (1915), 2-4 in which the *Tractatus cuiusdam carthusiensis de mystica theologia* is published: "Ex hac elici potest quod venerandus doctor in hac dumtaxat materia fuit unus ex illis, de quibus scribit apostolus, semper discentes et numquam ad scientiam veritatis pervenientes." *Op. cit.*, 165.

54. "Hic est nunc punctus difficultatis et mysterium absconditum quod nemo novit per experientiam nisi qui accipit." *De Cons. theol.* IV; I, 178. "Hoc autem est manus absconditum et nomen novum in calculo scriptum, quod nemo novit nisi qui acceperit." *De Probatione Spirituum*, Cons. 1; I, 38. See for the contrary opinion Dresz, *op. cit.*, 123 f. and Connolly, *op. cit.*, 271.

55. "Hinc pervenit ex dispensatione misericordie dei quod ab electis suis sepe declinat ipse sed non in via nec in finem. Abyssum vero iudiciorum eius quis investigabitur." *De mystica theol. praeac. Cons. 6*; III, 408.

The following sigla refer to the quoted editions of the works of Gabriel Biel:

Sent. = *Epithoma pariter et collectorium circa quattuor sententiarum libros*. Tübingen 1501.

Lect. = *Sacri canonis misse expositio resolutissima*. Basel 1510.

S.C.E. = *Sacrosancti canonis misse expositione... in epitomen contracta*. Antwerpen 1516.

S. I = *Sermones dominicales de tempore*. Hagenau 1510.

S. II = *Sermones de festivitatibus christi*. Hagenau 1510.

S. III = *Sermones de festivitatibus gloriose virginis marie*. Hagenau 1510.

S. IV = *Sermones de sanctis*. Basel 1519.

56. "Notandum quod hierarchia dicitur a 'gera' quod est sacer, et 'archia' quod est principatus, quasi sacer principatus." Biel, II *Sent.* d. 9. q. 1. art. 1. nota 1. (A.) "Vel clarius et aliter accipitur hec distinctio (hierarchie create) secundum tres status et officia qui sunt: status contemplativorum, prelatorum et activorum" *Ibid.* C. Cf. *S. IV.* 32 I. For medieval use of Dionysian terminology cf. F. Ruello "Etude du terme 'fagotodotis' dans quelques commentaires médiévaux des Noms Divins," in *RTAM* 24 (1957), 225ff; 25 (1958), 5ff; André Combes, *Jean Gerson commentateur Dionysien*, Paris 1940, esp. 180ff.

57. "Scimus quoniam in magna domo Dei multa sunt vasa diversis usibus apta. Et in corpore ecclesie mistico diversa sunt membra, omnia autem membra non eundem actum habent sed pro perfectione corporis huius facti sunt necessari pedes quo ad suum officium quam oculorum vel manuum." *De communis Vita clericorum*, Koninklijke Bibliotheek in Den Haag, Ms. 75 G. 58, fol. 15ff; ed. W. M. Landeen, *Research Studies—Washington State University* 28 (1960), 79ff, 91; *Id.* "Gabriel Biel and the Brethren of the Common Life in Germany," in *Church History* XX (1951), 23ff. On pp. 25ff. Landeen reports the general content of this interesting treatise but does not include the more salient points. It should be noted that its theme and structure are the same as *S. IV.* 11.

58. "Beati qui perfecte et totaliter deum diligunt non faciunt opus consilii sed magis praecepti quoniam maxime obligant perfecte deum diligere. Ex quo apparet ultra, quod illud quod cadit sub praecepto potest diversimode impleri absque culpa vel transgressione. Aliter enim diligunt deum viatores aliter com-

prehensores; aliter perfecti viri, aliter incipientes et aliter proficientes. Et tamen minus peccant imperfecti si non aequo deum diligunt velut perfecti iam in charitate firmati et radieati; nec imputatur viatoribus ad culpam si non eo amore unitivo deo haerent quo et ipsi beati..." *De consiliis evangelicis et de statu perfectionis; Opera II.*, 672. This impatience appears again in the *Tractatus de Perfectione Cordis*, III, 439, to which Gerson refers in one of the "Consultations" recently published by P. Glorieux: "... de perfectione statuum contentio qualiter fit a non nullis, sapit fermentum pharisaeum"; "L'activité littéraire de Gerson à Lyon, Correspondance inédite avec la Grande-Chartreuse," in *RTAM* 18 (1951), 257.

59. "Omnis existens in gratia gratum faciente est in statu perfectionis religionis christiane" *S. IV.* 30 K.

60. "Et licet vita contemplativa simpliciter sit melior et nobilior, vita activa, videntur tamen se habere sepenumero ut excedens et excessum" *S. IV.* 7 C. "... contemplativa est deo familiarior et purior, tametsi alia sit sepenumero intensior et fructuosior." *S. IV.* 7 B.

61. "... qui ex hoc se putant bone voluntatis quia singularibus quibusdam observantia puta orationibus, ieuniis, celebribus ceterisque spiritualibus exercitiis intendunt etiam laboriose multum." *S. II.* 5 F.

62. "Circumit iste Satan terram et perambulat eam, ut circumstantias omnium consideret... Itaque considerat dum circuit et observat volentes placere deo. Videt aptum aliquem ad religionis ingressum, impellit ad oppositum sic illudens: Cur civilem vis deserere conversationem; quoniam homo natura civile animal est... Cur non poteris sub habitu seculari salutem tuam operari sub uno Abbato suo Christo? Gaudeas lege libertatis, quam dedit tibi deus et emit christus. Quid pulchrius, quid eligibilius libertate? Cur tot et tales vis subire observationes et vota super te inducere, qui non sufficiis ad precepta servanda? Quid sunt obligations tot, nisi laquei totidem ad transgressores? Vide ne illaqueatus verbis oris tui cadas... Ecce quot quales in religionibus defecerunt; quot ceciderunt..." *Tractatus Octavus Super Magnificat; Opera IV.*, 364 A. ff.

63. "... nobis interim satis est ad omnem perfectionem stare et vivere in libertate legis christiane sub uno abate christo Ihesu servando pro posse primo quidem regulam preceptorum suorum sine quibus non est salus... In his vero que non possumus satus non iudicamus non esse irretitos et obligatos voto vel professione strictiori... Sumus

itaque contenti sorte nostra non alta sapientes sed humilibus consentientes et obedientes verbo apostolico quo suadet, ut unusquisque in qua vocacione vocatus est, permaneat." *De Communi vita*, fol. 3; *ed. cit.*, 81.

64. *Ibid.*, fol. 2; *ed. cit.*, 80.

65. For completeness' sake, we should add that Biel does not want to reject "nonsecular" monastic life: "Quotquot igitur sunt qui ad ardua scandere multaque et magna profiteri, vovere ac reddere domino deo suo possunt, laudamus eos..." *Ibid.*, *ed. cit.*, 81.

66. "De Devotio Moderna verspreidde zich... Temidden van deze groei ontstond ook het begin van het observantisme..." R. R. Post, *Kerkgeschiedenis van Nederland in de Middeleeuwen*, Utrecht 1957, I, 355. "Haar mannen (de congregatie van Windesheim) kwamen op voor een strikte observantie..." II, 97.

67. "...ex ista radice annuente gratia dei pullularerit fructus tam universalis reformationis non solum illius ordinis [Windesheim] verum etiam plurimorum aliorum ordinum..."; "multi ex hiis qui noviter surrexerunt atque defunctis patribus successere eti debita gratitudine non responderunt"; "(Assumimus etiam laborem manualem) ...pro devitando ocio quod malorum omnium seminarium est perniciosum." "(mendicitati)... qui peccata populi comedunt debitos se orationum et suffragiorum constituant." "Cantica vero divina cantare etiam manibus onerantes facile possunt." *De Communi Vita Clericorum*, fol. 13; fol. 17; *ed. cit.*, 88ff.

68. *Navicula Penitentie*, Augsburg 1511. *Dedicatio*: "Adeoque vitam secretiorem amavit ut secum tacite deliberans erenum ipsum nisi a Gabriele Buehel et Eggelingo prohibitus intrasset." On what grounds Biel would have this authority is unclear. Eggelingus is Biel's predecessor as Cathedral preacher in Mainz; Biel confesses that he owes much to him for his *Expositio*. Cf. *Lection 88 P.* For Geiler's observantism cf. the careful study by L. Dacheux, *Un réformateur catholique à la fin de XVe siècle: Jean Geiler de Kaysersberg*, Paris 1876, esp. 180ff.

69. "Tertio ideo dominus duxit vitam laxiorum... ut per hoc doceret fideles suos quia non est standum in solis exterioribus, sed per ea tendere debemus ad interiora." *S. IV*, 19 G. "Non enim alba aut nigra cuculla, non alta tonsura, nec ampla corona, sed conscientia pura et mentis munditia, abiectione voluntatis proprie et charitas perfecta monachum facit. Qui in mundo est, fugiat in claustrum; sed caveat ne ibi dormitit..."

vita enim confert meritum, locus non facit sanctum... nihil prodest esse observatorem in rebus minimis cum principia negligantur." *Ibid.*, H. Cf. *S. IV*, 30 K.

70. *II Sent.* d. 30. q2. art 2. *concl.*, 4 G. "Lex enim membrorum sive fomes; temperata abstinentia mitigari potest sed in hac vita extingui non valet." *S. II*, 3 H.

71. "Sed gradus ille tertius qui solum perfectorum est habet deum nedum pro fine sicut duo priores, sed etiam pro obiecto immediato, quia eorum opus est contemplari divinas perfectiones et ferventissimo amore soli deo inherere cum contemptu omnium temporalium et terrenorum. Nec tamen ita quiete possunt his inherere quin licet non a carne vel mundo omnino non temptentur vel modice..." *III Sent.* d 29. q 1. art. 3. *dub.* 2.

72. "In presenti quidem pane verbi, pane sacramentali, pane devotionis et in futuro pane beatifice visionis et fruitionis... ingredientes per fidem, egredientes a fide ad speciem, a credulitate ad contemplationem." *S. I.* 41 G. Cf. *Lect.* 64 O.

73. U. Berlière, *L'ascèse bénédictine des origines à la fin du XIIe siècle*, Paris 1927; F. Vernet, *La spiritualité médiévale*, Paris 1929. For Dionysius see M. de Gandillac, *Oeuvres complètes du Pseudo-Denys l'Aréopagite*, Paris 1943, 295f. Most helpful and seemingly forgotten, the general study by J. Heerink, *Introductio in theologiam spiritualem, asceticam et mysticam*, Roma 1931.

74. Biel's authorities at this point are Hugh of St. Victor and John Gerson. Cf. Hugh, *Eruditio Didascalie*: "Quatuor sunt in quibus nunc exercetur vita ilustrorum et quasi per quosdam gradus ad futuram perfectionem sublevamur, videlicet lectio sive doctrina, meditatio oratio, operatio. Quinta deinde sequitur contemplatio." *PL* 176, 797. Cf. Gerson, *Opera III*, 383.

75. *III Sent.* d 26. q 1. art 3. *dub.* 2 N. *IV Sent.* d 14. q 2, a 1, n 2, *in fine*: "...numquam sacramentum penetentie delet peccatum sine contritione previa vel concomitante."

76. "Et hec aliquo modo est nobis in precepto, aliquo modo non. Non est in precepto quantum ad eius infusionem, nam solius dei est eius infusio. Est autem in precepto quantum ad nostram preparationem et eius conservationem: ad scil. faciendum quod in nobis est ut infundatur... Sed quomodo illam charitatem tam necessariam adquirere possumus? Respondetur breviter quod immediatissima ac ultimata dispositio ad eam est... actualiter diligere dominum ex toto corde etc. Hac enim dilec-

tione stante in anima statim imo simul cum ea infunditur charitas. Sed quomodo ad hanc dilectionem perveniemus? Responsio: tribus gradibus quos ponit Hugo in de scala paradisi. Hi sunt lectio, meditatio, oratio, quam sequitur contemplatio..." *S I*, 85 C/D.

77. "Affectus autem preparatur lectione et meditatione... Neque enim est affectio aliqua bona et laudabilis quam meditatio non pareat. Siquidem meditatio attenta divine potentie, sapientie et bonitatis, proprie infirmitatis, ignorantie, malicie, affectus, parit timorem, admirationem, amorem ut late ostendit Joannes Gerson de mystica theologia practica C. 8... Primum ergo est per prudentiam cognoscere petenda quam confert lectio. Secundum vigilans et studiosa cognitorum masticatio, que est meditatio excitans fervorem et affectum. Demum sequitur desideratorum bonorum petitio." *S I*, 47 C. Gerson, *op. cit.*, Cons. 8 G; III, 411f.

78. "Sola ergo causa tantorum beneficiorum intrinseca et essentialis bonitas est dei qui nullis nostris meritis prior dilexit nos... Huius autem amoris ex sola essentiali et intrinseca dei bonitate procedentis diligens meditatio excitat in nobis dilectionem amicicie qua eum propter seipsum (quia bonus est) diligimus, qua dilectione tanquam principalissima dispositione in nobis existente sine mora spiritus sanctus illabitur. Non enim potest hec dilectio stare sine spiritu sancto cum sit dispositio sufficiens et immediata." *S II*, 36 F; cf. 29 H, 39 H; *Lect. 77 T*; *S II*, 18 I: "(dilectio dei) ...qua deo bene propter seipsum volumus atque in eius perfectione gaudemus et nos sue voluntati conformare cupimus. Et hic amor dispositio proxima est ad gratiam gratum facientem et ea inexistente ac cooperante meritaria est vite eterna." Cf. *IV Sent. d* 14. q 1. art 2. concl 5 U.

79. "Nulla enim opera tanquam bona ad meritum imputantur que non ex radice charitatis procedunt. Hec sola edificium nostrum exornat ut christus inhabitare dignetur," *S II*, 50 G.

80. "His tribus in christo fundamento unico et solidissimo vivimus, movemur et sumus. Vivimus per fidem, sicut scriptum est 'justus ex fide vivit' *Hab.* 2 [4]. Movemur in eo per spem que sursum sunt desiderantes per quam futuram civitatem inquirimus non habentes hic mansionem, *Heb.* XIII [14]. Sumus in eo per unientem charitatem... His nisi firmiter adheremus frustra de beatitudine speramus. Ille enim tres necessarie sunt ad salutem... Omnis qui habet spem hanc in christo sanctificatus est sicut et ille sanctus est. Nemo autem nisi sanctus beatitudinem sortietur quia nihil inquinatum intrabit in illam..." *Ibid.* G/H.

81. "Converti ad deum — appropinquare deo — aperiri illi est facere quod in se est. Convertitur autem deus ad hominem. Appropinquit ei et intrat habitando in eo et cenando cum illo, per gratiam quam infundit." *II Sent. d* 27. q 1. art. 2. concl. 4 K.

82. "Et quamvis solum verbum natum sit in carne, non pater, non spiritus sanctus, non tamen solum verbum nascitur in mente quia non solus inhabitat sed et pater et spiritus sanctus." *S II*, 12 B.

83. "Est ergo spiritualis nativitas unio verbi cum natura intellectuali per gratiam gratum facientem... Nam per eandem gratiam sive charitatem quam nobis infundendo in nos descendit, sibiique unit, etiam elevamur in eum charitable, voluntati sue consentiendo ac per hoc spiritualiter enum gignimus ac nobis unimus." *Ibid.* Usually, however, the *christus extra nos* is emphasized: "Quid enim aliud fundamentum posset esse christiano quam christus, cui servire, quem imitari, ad cuius regnum necesse est aspirare..." *S II*, 50 E.

84. *II Sent. d* 27. q 1. art. 2. concl. 4 K.

85. "Oratio est ascensus mentis in deum per pium et humilem affectum. Affectus autem preparatur lectione et meditatione..." *S I*, 47 C.

86. "Tractatus de cohibendis cogitationibus et de modo constituendarum meditationum, scala meditationis vocatur," in *M. Wesseli Opera*, Groningae 1614, fol. 194-408.

87. *De spiritualibus ascensionibus*, ed. H. Mahien, Brugge 19412. W. Jappe Albert's helpful article "Zur Historiographie der Devotio Moderna und ihren Erforschung" in *Westfälische Forschungen* 11 (1958), 51-67, is indicative of the lack of research in the later developments of the *Devotio Moderna*. It would require a special study to establish in detail to what extent Biel is dependent on the piety of the *Devotio Moderna*. Insofar as this movement is far from monolithic, it would be especially revealing to compare Biel with two other leading contemporaries, Wessel Gansfort and Staupitz. The totally different understanding of the relation of contrition and *gratia gratum faciens*, — for both Wessel and Staupitz the temporal aspect of the *gratia predestinationis*, — would be a major point of differentiation; cf. Maarten van Rhyn, *Wessel Gansfort*, 's Gravenhage 1917, 238; Ernst Wolf, *Staupitz and Luther*, Leipzig 1927, n. 5, 92ff. The mystical significance of the *act of commemoration* in the Lord's Supper emphasized especially by the Sacramentarians and

Spiritualists has not yet been acknowledged. See IV *Sent.* d 14. q 2. art. 1. nota in fine.

88. "...ut ascendamus virtutum scalem erigamus, cuius etsi multi sunt gradus secundum numerum virtutum, unum tamen et principalem gradum ascendamus qui sufficit nos in altum sustulere, ipse est humilitas ceterarum fundamentum virtutum." *S I.* 48 E.

89. "Et revera facile est humiliari quoniam universa prebent occasionem humilitatis reete consideranti... Nullum ergo nobis relinquitur excusationis velamen." *S I.* 48 G.

90. I *Sent.* d 17. q 1. art. 2. concl. 1; Oceam, *ibid.*, q 2. B. Scotus, *Rep. Ibid.* q 2. n 5.

91. *Ibid.* concl. 2. Oceam, *ibid.* q 3. C. Scotus *Ox.* *ibid.* q 3. n. 19.

92. "Omnis actus meritorius necessario presupponit charitatem creatam secundum legem dei ordinatam." I *Sent.* d 17. q 3. art. 2. concl. 1.

93. "Infundit enim spiritus sanctus dona sua eis quos ad se convertit. Certus sum quod neque mors neque vita... poterit nos separare a charitate dei que est in christo iesu domino nostro: et hec necessario est omni homini ad salutem." *S I.* 85 C.

94. Werner Dettloff, *Die Lehre von der Acceptatio Divina bei Johannes Duns Scotus, mit besondere Berücksichtigung der Rechtfertigungslehre*, Werl 1954, esp. 204 ff.

95. Karl Werner, *Johannes Duns Scotus*, Wien 1881, 424; Reinhold Seeburg, *Die Theologie Joh. Duns Scotus*, Leipzig 1900, 312.

96. Carl Feckes, *Die Rechtfertigungslehre des Gabriel Biel*, Munster 1925, 80 f. Otto Scheel, *op. cit.*, II³-4, 174 ff.

97. II *Sent.* d 31. q 1. concl. 1, 3.

98. This distinction makes it possible to reinterpret and save Lombard's thesis that we love God and the neighbor through the Holy Spirit—rejected by the post-Lombardian scholastic tradition: "Nec vult magister negare quin preter illud donum quod est spiritus sanctus etiam aliud donum creatum donetur quod sit habitus inclinans ad diligendum." I *Sent.* d 17. q 3. art. 2. concl. 2. Oceam, *ibid.* B; both dependent upon Scotus, *Ord.* I. d 17. c 1. Cf. further Dettloff, *op. cit.*, 14 f, 154 f. "...summus creator...dignatur nostram animam sibi templum dedicare in quo nendum in donis sed personaliter vult habitare..." *S II.* 53 B.

99. "Dilectio habitualis est aliquod immanens seu favor quidam manens cesse ante actu voluntatis et cognitionis natum inclinare ad actus dilectionis..." *S I.* 85 C. As far as I can see

this is a remarkable use of the word "favor." Peter of Palude uses the word "fautor" indeed in a forensic sense: "Tertia fautoria est facti si quis alimoniam mittat vel liberet... Dicuntur credentes qui habent fidem eorum implieata, non explicitam: reputantes eos bonos et habere bonam fidem." The word can also be applied to the defense by a lawyer of someone against the accusation of heresy by inquisitioners. This may explain the incorporation of the word in the Protestant dogmatic vocabulary. Palude, IV *Sent.* d 18. q 3. Cf. Jacobus Altenstaig, *Vocabularius Theologie*, Hagenau 1517, s.v.

100. "Non omnes qui intra ecclesiam fide et numero salutem finaliter consequentur: nam ad vite consecrationem non sufficit christo incorporari fide nisi etiam ei inhereamus gratia, opere et amore." *S II.* 48 F.

101. *S I.* 48 C-F; *S I.* 66 F; *S I.* 79 H in fine.

102. "...charitas augmentabilis est in viatore per actus ex gratia procedentes meritorie." I *Sent.* d 17. q 4. prop. 9.

103. "Alius est adventus quo nendum inhabitando animam sanctificat, sed specialiter visitat, perficit ac magnitudine sue dilectionis replet. Atque ipsum quem sie visitat in se transformat, ut secum unus fiat spiritus, non essentia sed voluntatis conformitate. Quam consolationis dulcedinem exprimere nemo potest, nec intelligere inexpertus... Ad sic recipiendum spiritum sanctum non sufficit renunciare illicitis mundi... sed etiam licitis, quantum status mortali tatis admittit." *S I.* 49 D. Cf. *S IV.* 40 L.

104. "Perfecti primo habent omnia terrena despiciere... (quantam hec vita permittit)." *S IV.* 32 L.

105. "Talis enim non indiget voce exteriore ad devotionem excitandum seu affectum inflammandum" *Lect.* 62 D.

106. "In primo, perfectus homo subtrahit se creature, conservat se deo, perdit sese in deo in quo omnia possidet. In secundo se perdit in sua cognitione. In tertio in sua affectione... Sie ergo per amorem transformatur in deum... In his nos exercentes similes erimus angelis dei in resurrectione." *S IV.* 32 L.

107. "Ita anima digne accedens... convertitur in corpus christi dum ei per intimam et gratiosam unionem incorporatur... Sie per hanc conversionem anima manet in christo et vivit vita gratiae qui est per christum... anima mutatur in christum cum iam fit celestis et ordinatur per hunc eum in vitam eternam." *S II.* 45 M. Cf. *Lect.* 36 N. This part of *S II.* 45 carries the title "Mystificatio predictorum."

108. "Unde fit ut non solum participatione huius sacramenti dicatur homo christiferus quasi christum ferens vel habens sed divinum imo deus, non per essentiam sed participatione... Cum enim sic per hominem christum anima deo per affectum coniungitur... ita ut verius sit in deo quem amat quam in corpore quod animat... Verius inquam non essentie permutatione," *S* II. 45 O. Cf. Ruyssbroeck, *De Ornatu* III, 4.

109. "...prudenter vero qui sibi consciit frequenter accedunt quia que dicta sunt et si conferat quandoque propter opus operantis addit tamen multum virtute operis operati quod non consequuntur qui se subtrahunt etiam ex devotione," *Ibid.*, U.

110. "...paratus nihilominus ea carere bono animo si non detur, recogitans assidue quia non in sentimento huius dulcedinis sed in charitate est regnum dei." *Lect.* 86 S.

111. "Corpus Christi verum comeditur sacramentaliter i.e. sub specie panis. Corpus Christi mysticum comeditur spiritualiter in fide cordis..." *Lect.* 36 G.

112. "...In sumptione dum mens in deum transformatur remanet quidem essentia mentis que est anima sed accidentia nova succedunt... dici potest quod sunt dii sub humana specie transformati." *Lect.* 86 A.

113. "Sepe enim contingit quod hi qui maiorem habent dei dilectionem intensive et extensive minus sentiunt se affili ad deum et minus experientur dulorem duleedinis ad deum quam alii qui sunt minoris in dilectione... ad quod cooperantur hominis naturalia sic vel sic qualificata. Hinc aliqui mox flent..." *S* IV. 7 C.

THE TRAGEDY
OF
AENEAS SYLVIUS PICCOLOMINI (Pope Pius II):
AN INTERPRETATION¹
(FOR WALLACE K. FERGUSON)
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Since the publication of Voigt's classic volumes on Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini a century ago,² scholarly interest in the celebrated pontiff of the mid-fifteenth century has grown, not withered, with the years.³ While the wealth of material contained in Aeneas's writings may in part explain this continuing interest, to a greater degree it is Aeneas himself who has fascinated historians.⁴ Yet for all the attention lavished upon him, there has been little agreement in the interpretation of Aeneas's personality and historical significance.⁵ This is not surprising. Since the days of Burckhardt, the fifteenth century in Italy has elicited different interpretations, and it is only natural that this diversity be reflected in the treatment of one who was, as all admit, the mirror of the age.⁶ Besides, it must be acknowledged that his life is so enigmatic in so many ways that agreement over its final meaning is probably impossible.

There remain perhaps some lines of interpretation which may prove helpful in understanding Aeneas. One such possibility suggests itself the moment we consider the salient facts of his career. In the first place, Aeneas was a humanist, a professional student of the *litterae humaniores*. He acquired this vocation during his youth, and while he discarded many opinions during his life, to the end he regarded himself as one committed to the Muses.⁷ It was his gifts as a humanist, especially his *eloquentia*, which brought him early success at the Council of Basel and later a position of honour at the court of the Emperor Frederick III of Austria.⁸ At the same time, Aeneas the humanist became Aeneas the diplomat. His tongue was supple, his mind dexterous. His years at Basel, with all its intrigues, and his activities as an imperial councillor in a Germany rent by internecine rivalries among the princes, bestowed upon him a wide knowledge of persons and places and, above all, a profound understanding of human nature. His abilities, natural and acquired, thus combined to make Aeneas a master of European diplomacy in the fifteenth century.

The many journeys of the humanist-diplomat finally brought him home to Italy. For his labours on behalf of Church and Empire, Aeneas received an episcopal see and eventually the cardinalate. On 19 August, 1458, he was elected pope, assuming the title Pius II. On the surface of things, Aeneas seemed admirably qualified for this supreme office. Few contemporary developments in European civilization had escaped his observation or failed to become part of his experience. As one who both knew and was known by men and nations, Aeneas might well offer Christendom the leadership it needed. He at once showed himself deeply aware of his responsibilities by declaring that the purpose dearest to his heart was the inauguration of a crusade against the Turks.⁹ In October, 1458, he summoned the princes of Europe to meet at Mantua to organize such an expedition,¹⁰ and in June of the following year he opened the congress in person. The response to his appeals at Mantua and afterwards was disappointing.¹¹ Other concerns distracted Christendom and the Papacy. Early in 1462, Aeneas announced his intention of leading the crusade in person, hoping thereby to shame the princes of Europe into decisive action.¹² In October, 1463, he issued the crusade bull, *Ezechielis prophetae*, directed to all the faithful¹³ and laboured to complete his plans for an expedition in which the Venetians would provide the fleet and Philip of Burgundy the requisite military prowess.¹⁴ In June, 1464, he assumed the cross and left Rome forever. It was now too late to turn back, even though the news soon came that the Duke of Burgundy had defected. Arriving at Ancona, the rendezvous for the crusading armies, he found only scattered bands of men, poorly equipped and badly commanded. Surrounded by this ragged crew, Aeneas waited for Christendom's response to his appeal. There was none. The humiliation coincided with a general collapse of his health, never good and of late increasingly poor. When the Venetian fleet finally appeared, Aeneas was *in extremis*. On 14 August, 1464, he died, a signal failure in his self-appointed task of uniting Europe against the Turks.¹⁵

The facts of his life leave us with this question: Why did the pontificate of a man so conversant with the problems of his day and so well endowed in talent and training culminate in a disaster which destroyed him and inflicted serious damage on the prestige of the Apostolic See? The purpose of this article is to suggest an answer to this question. In doing so, it is hoped that a new dimension, the dimension of tragedy, will be added to our appreciation of Aeneas, for, I believe, there is at the centre of Aeneas's life an intellectual and spiritual failure of such scope and significance that to apply the word "tragedy" is neither extravagant nor misplaced.

I

The public career of Aeneas began at the Council of Basel. Whatever assessment we may place on the sincerity of Aeneas's attachment to the conciliar cause,¹⁶ it is certain that at Basel, where the ills of medieval Christendom were clearly displayed, Aeneas became aware of the great problem of the fifteenth century: the restoration of unity to Christendom and the achievement of peace among the nations.¹⁷ However, if the Council brought this deeper understanding, it also revealed its inability to deal with the problem. Accordingly, when Aeneas took service at the court of Frederick III of Austria in the winter of 1442-1443, he gladly transferred his hopes for peace and unity to the Emperor himself and espoused the German policy of "neutrality" in the struggle between Eugene IV and the Council of Basel.¹⁸ Much of this change in attitude may be attributed to the substitution of one employer for another. Nonetheless, Aeneas was not lacking in sincerity in his acceptance of "neutralism" and in his belief that Frederick, as *advocatus ecclesiae*, was the only possible saviour of Christendom from its internal dissensions.¹⁹ To that end he now devoted his literary talents, asserting the claims of Frederick and *sacrum imperium* to hegemony in Europe.²⁰

Yet how might the Emperor bring peace to Germany and to Europe? Some suggested that he call a new general council of the Church.²¹ Still others said that if a council were called at all, it should be composed of the princes of Christendom to the exclusion of the clergy, thus echoing ideas which in one form or another had been current in Europe for almost two centuries.²² Such ideas were anathema to those attached to the papal cause, and even in Aeneas they stimulated uneasy reflections. After all, he had seen Basel lead the Church into a new schism. What might a council of princes do?²³

Soon his concern for the internal harmony of Christendom acquired new strength. The Turkish advance across Eastern Europe, the defeat of the Christian armies at Varna (November, 1444) and the death on that battlefield of one whom Aeneas deeply admired, Giuliano Cesarini, created in Aeneas an enthusiasm for the crusade which matured, over the years, into an abiding passion.²⁴ Peace and unity now became more necessary than ever before, especially in Germany. With deepening insight, Aeneas saw that German "neutrality" must be abolished. It was, he now realized, an essentially selfish way of sacrificing Christendom and the Empire to the interests of the German princes.²⁵ Besides, although Aeneas never dared to say so publicly,²⁶ it was clear that unless Frederick had some outside support, i.e., the Papacy, he would never be able to control the princes.²⁷ Encouraged by the fact that public opinion in Germany

was beginning to turn against "neutrality,"²⁸ Aeneas and his royal master opened negotiations with Pope Eugene IV.²⁹ In a series of exchanges, wherein diplomatic legerdemain blended trickery and evasion with forthrightness and a clear perception of the needs of Germany and Europe, Aeneas, more than any other, effected the return of Germany to the papal obedience.³⁰ The signing of the Concordat of 1448 raised Aeneas to the front rank of European statesmen and gave him new vigour in his labours as imperial publicist. In season and out, his theme was the same: Frederick and Frederick alone could rally Christendom against the infidel.³¹

During the course of negotiations with the Papacy, Aeneas made his personal submission to the Roman Church, and it was natural then, as it is natural now, to question his sincerity.³² However, a close perusal of his letters during this period reveals that, as far as sincerity goes, Aeneas's reconciliation with Rome was sincere. The problem is not his sincerity but the significance of his new allegiance. Here we cannot deny that his attachment to the Papacy is somewhat limited. When Aeneas speaks of papal authority, he does so in terms which, even for Aeneas, are so excessively formal and extravagant that our suspicions are raised as to the precise meaning attached by Aeneas to such language. Or again, papal authority usually appears in his mind in connection with something else: the dignity of the priesthood, the glory of Frederick and the Empire, the need for a new church council, a "good one" this time. All in all, his allegiance to the Roman Church during the years 1445-1452 must be seen as something sincerely accepted but formal in nature and significant only as a means to ends profitable and pertinent to Aeneas, the priest and imperial councillor.³³

This state of mind was not to endure. In early June, 1453, Europe heard of the capture of Constantinople. The disaster did more than provoke rhetorical wails from Aeneas and other humanists.³⁴ It did more than dramatize the imminent peril to Christendom. Although for several months Aeneas clung tenaciously to his noble vision of Frederick defending Christendom against the Turks,³⁵ the fall of Constantinople forced Aeneas to realize that Frederick was not, never had been, and never would be *advocatus ecclesiae*. He was only the shameless abettor of Habsburg ambitions in Eastern Europe, forever helpless in his own domains and on the imperial throne.³⁶ Failing the Empire, there was but one institution which might be able to unite Europe against the Turks: the Papacy. As suggested above, until this time Aeneas's attitude towards the Papacy had been largely formal in character. If he had hitherto acknowledged the papal prerogative of granting official sanction to the crusade, he had

reserved its direction to the Emperor.³⁷ Now, with the collapse of Constantinople and the disintegration of his hopes for Frederick, his eyes turned towards Rome. His allegiance to the Roman Church ceased to be merely formal. It became a dynamic and powerful belief.³⁸

Thus it was that the desire to see the restoration of European unity, as well as enthusiasm for the crusade, finally led Aeneas to perceive the true significance of the great medieval tradition of the *respublica christiana*, at peace and unity with itself, guided and inspired by the sovereign pontiffs of Rome. Looking back over his career, we may say that Aeneas had passed through a series of stages, all of them marked by the medieval tradition of universalism. From the universal claims of the Council of Basel, he had passed to the universalism of Empire, and now, as if for the first time, Aeneas came into a living awareness of that tradition of universalism whose bearer and embodiment was the Church of Rome.

However, if Aeneas's progress towards Rome had been marked by various forms of medieval universalism, it also bore the impress of something quite different: nationalistic patriotism. By this we mean in Aeneas's case his deep affection for his native land, his pride in Italian history and culture, and, above all, his recognition of Italy's uniqueness and his essential solidarity with it.³⁹ This nationalistic patriotism appears in Aeneas's earliest writings, and it grew steadily throughout his career.⁴⁰ At first, much of his concern for Italy and things Italian was expressive only of a natural desire to maintain his ties with his family and also of the fear that his sojourn in Germany might prove to be permanent.⁴¹ Later, his patriotic sentiment was strengthened by his enthusiasm for the crusade, paradoxically enough the same enthusiasm which had led Aeneas to a deeper understanding of the medieval traditions of universalism.⁴² While on the one hand he looked more and more to the Papacy as the leader of Europe against the Turks, so also on the other hand he took an increasing interest in the politics of the Italian peninsula and in the many attempts, made after 1453, to bring peace to the Italian states.⁴³ Soon he was writing that the salvation of Europe could be found only in Italy, the "heart of Christianity," and if only in Italy, then ultimately in the Papacy, the natural leader of the Italian states.⁴⁴

Thus, for Aeneas, the paths of universalism and nationalistic patriotism converged on Rome and the Papacy. It is important to insist that universalism and nationalistic patriotism are not abstractions devoid of valid historical meaning. Vague though these terms undoubtedly are, they nonetheless denote real patterns in historical

development whose existence can be traced at every level in the life of fifteenth century Europe. And if universalism and nationalistic patriotism guided Aeneas in his journey towards the Papacy, as pope Aeneas was to discover the tension and conflict which existed between them.

II

By way of illustration we may begin with the crusade and the Congress of Mantua. From the start, the language of universalism was much in evidence, and membership in the Congress was conceived on the broadest possible lines. As Aeneas never tired of saying, "the conquest of the Turks was not the concern of this or that nation but rather of all Christians."⁴⁵ Yet breadth in representation by itself was not enough. To be truly a council of Christendom the Congress must be a *papal* council, for a true universalism could be founded only upon submission to the Holy See. Admittedly, conciliarism was still a potent force, and there was always the danger that the Congress might get out of hand.⁴⁶ However, it was not so much the fear of conciliarism as it was concern for the traditions of papal and Christian universalism (once expressed, so Aeneas thought, in the crusades of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries) which led him to denounce conciliarism with almost monotonous regularity.⁴⁷ In this context we should refer to the bull *Exsecrabilis* which Aeneas issued at the close of the Congress.⁴⁸ Its explicit purpose was to condemn in advance those whose response to the taxes levied at Mantua in support of the crusade was likely to be an appeal to a future general council. It is worth noting that *Exsecrabilis* attacked all such appeals chiefly as clumsy expedients prejudicial to the unity and harmony of Christendom.⁴⁹

However, if the Congress of Mantua was designed to enhance papal and Christian universalism, in the end it became far more the occasion for a demonstration of nationalistic patriotism. Significantly, it was the French delegation which was responsible for this development. By this it is not implied that the French were more imbued than others with the spirit of nationalistic patriotism. It was rather that their nationalistic feeling had found effective means of expression through the French monarchy. It was this identification of the interests of the French crown and French nationalistic sentiment which made the French embassy at Mantua act as a kind of catalytic agent precipitating a profound transformation in the character of the Congress.

To the Papacy, of course, the French were enemies. They had

produced the Pragmatic Sanction. Issued on 7 July, 1438, the Pragmatic Sanction had declared the adherence of the Catholic Church in France to the decrees of Constance (as emended by the Council of Basel) enunciating conciliar supremacy. Further, with the intention of delivering the Church in France into the hands of the French king, the Sanction accepted as binding a series of "reforms," passed at Basel, which drastically reduced the juridical powers of the Roman curia and the great financial structure erected upon it.⁵⁰ The Papacy had laboured for the abrogation of the Sanction but with little success. Charles VII of France stood firmly behind it,⁵¹ and he had even shown his hostility against the traditional position occupied by the Papacy in European affairs by proposing that the internal peace of Europe, as well as its defence against the Turks, might be handled best through a council of princes under the leadership of France.⁵²

Nonetheless, the clear and present danger posed by the French did not lie in the Pragmatic Sanction. It lay rather in the French claim to the kingdom of Naples. The *Regno* was then in the possession of King Ferrante, and his claim to the throne of his father Alfonso had been accepted by Aeneas shortly after he became pope. The French ambassadors at Mantua taxed Aeneas with what they called a hasty and precipitate action. They made quite clear that the Sanction would be removed and the French would participate in the crusade only when the Papacy abandoned Ferrante and gave its blessing to the restoration of French power in the *Regno*.⁵³ To these demands, Aeneas made at first the traditional answer. He declared that the *Regno* was a fief of the Apostolic See and that the Papacy was not to be bullied into granting it to any nation, the French or anyone else. The Papacy was supreme over kings and nations. The French owed their past glories to the favour of the Church of Rome. He went on to condemn the Pragmatic Sanction for its infringement of papal authority and the traditional liberties of the Church. Rather let the French remove the Sanction, submit their claims to Naples to the judgment of the Roman Church and acknowledge the supremacy of Christ's vicar by joining wholeheartedly in the crusade.⁵⁴

Yet, when it was learned at Mantua that René of Anjou had opened war on Ferrante, this fine defence of papal supremacy and Christian universalism became increasingly overlaid with the impassioned tones of nationalistic patriotism.⁵⁵ The papal denunciations of the French now struck a responsive chord among the Italian states. They had not forgotten that, only a few years before, the so-called Italian League had been created in large measure to protect Italy against French aggression. Many Italian princes now took greater

interest in Mantua and its proceedings. The number attending the Congress increased, and to its official purpose, the defence of Christendom, was now added another objective, less acknowledged but equally potent: the exclusion of the French from Italy.⁵⁶

There is every reason to think that Aeneas welcomed this development. It is true that he realized quite well that most of the princes beyond the Alps either were indifferent or were unable to participate effectively in the crusade. The Italian states held at least some promise of support.⁵⁷ Secondly, Aeneas knew that the growing Italian interest in Mantua would strengthen the prestige of the Papacy in Italy and perhaps transform the nominal position of the Papacy at the head of the Italian League into something more significant.⁵⁸ However, Aeneas's satisfaction with these events at Mantua must be traced in the last analysis to his own nationalistic patriotism. For years he had coveted for Italy the role of saviour of Christendom. He now imagined himself the defender of Italy against the French. At Mantua and thereafter, he constituted himself the spokesman for Italian nationalistic patriotism.⁵⁹

Nonetheless, the needs of the crusade and the traditional doctrines of universalism could not be completely forgotten. The crusade must have the widest possible support. The French must participate, and the Sanction must be abrogated. How could these aims be accomplished in face of French demands on Naples? At Mantua, Aeneas seems to have decided that diplomacy might gain his objectives. He began to spin a web in which to trap the French. He carefully "planted" phrases in his speeches which he was certain the French ambassadors would be quick to report to their royal master. Naples, Aeneas said, had been given to Ferrante *certo modo*, intimating that the Papacy had not shut the door forever on the Angevin claims.⁶⁰ The implication was clear: if France satisfied Aeneas with regard to the Sanction and the crusade, then the Papacy might well satisfy the French with respect to Naples. The French took the bait, and when Louis XI became King of France, negotiations between France and the Papacy began to gather momentum.⁶¹ The course of these negotiations is beyond the scope of this article.⁶² Suffice it to say that Louis abolished the Sanction only to find that Aeneas had hoodwinked him. The Papacy would not countenance the French in the *Regno*.⁶³ Although the traditions of universalism, the claims of the Papacy and the needs of the crusade weighed heavily with Aeneas, in the last analysis his own nationalistic patriotism and his own conception of the Papacy as an Italian power compelled him to deny the French. The Papacy and Aeneas paid dearly for this decision. Louis did not restore the Sanction, but he did retaliate against Aeneas's

betrayal by introducing royal ordinances which, if anything, increased the control of the French Crown over the French Church.⁶⁴ As for the crusade, French support was not forthcoming, and Louis played no small role in effecting the withdrawal of the Duke of Burgundy from the projected expedition in the spring of 1464.⁶⁵

Other instances of the conflict between universalism and nationalistic patriotism may be found elsewhere in Aeneas's pontificate. For example, in his dealings with the College of Cardinals Aeneas repeatedly insisted that the College must be truly universal, i.e., representative of all Christendom.⁶⁶ Was not the Church of Rome universal, and should not she therefore summon to her service eminent men drawn from all nations?⁶⁷ As Aeneas knew well, criticism of the representation of the nations in the College, particularly of the high proportion of Italians, had been endemic in Europe for generations.⁶⁸ Nonetheless, Aeneas's utterances on behalf of the universal character of the College were not translated into action. This was not due to the fact that relations between Aeneas and the College were often strained. The relationship between the Papacy and the cardinalate was never easy during the fifteenth century.⁶⁹ It was rather that the forces of nationalistic patriotism determined otherwise. During the course of his negotiations with Louis XI, Aeneas had been compelled by diplomatic necessity to create new French cardinals, and this in turn forced him to limit the power of the well organized group of French cardinals by naming additional Italian cardinals.⁷⁰ This last action was most agreeable to him, for in the fervour of his own patriotism he considered all French cardinals to be traitors to the Papacy.⁷¹ It was also congruent with his need to strengthen papal control over the papal states, and in this, as well as in the advancement of the papal political position in Italy, the elevation to the cardinalate of trusted associates and relatives was useful.⁷²

At this point we might be tempted to conclude that nationalistic patriotism was the only genuine force at work in Aeneas. The rest was, so to speak, mere "window dressing." Yet to make this judgment would be to fail in a true appreciation of the tragic significance of Aeneas's pontificate. His many attempts to strengthen the inherited traditions of papal and Christian universalism were something more than mere gesture. They were sincerely meant, and the distinguished French historian Roger Aubenas is correct when he salutes Aeneas as the last spokesman for "la grande tradition de l'unitarisme médiéval."⁷³ However, the new forces of nationalistic patriotism also received his allegiance and support. The resulting conflict between universalism and nationalistic patriotism will explain much of the indecision and futility which are such prominent characteristics of

Aeneas's pontificate and which may be seen on many pages of the *Commentaries*.⁷⁴ It will go far to explain the fatal ambiguity which is present in so many of his speeches. His impassioned appeals to Christendom, couched in the terms of *plena potestas* and *respublica christiana*, sounded hollow and insincere to many of his contemporaries. They do so to us. The explanation, however, lies not in personal insincerity but in the fact that the voice of universalism, the spokesman for European unity, was himself too deeply infected with the virus of nationalistic patriotism to be convincing.⁷⁵ The author of so many noble perorations on the supranational dignity of the Roman Church did not hesitate in his account of his own election to declare the Papacy to be an Italian power to be kept in the hands of Italians and away from the hated French.⁷⁶ Aeneas was thus committed to both universalism and nationalistic patriotism, and he could no more resolve the conflict between them in the Europe of his day than he could resolve the same conflict in himself.

His failure here reflects the great issue which confronted the Papacy at the close of the Middle Ages. On the one hand, the Papacy could attempt to recapture the position in Christendom which it had held in the days of Innocent III and in this way continue the struggle to maintain the traditional ideals of Christian unity and universalism. On the other hand, the Papacy might bestow its blessing on nationalistic patriotism, of which the emerging national state and its ecclesiastical counterpart, the national church, were the seal and sign. Yet, in electing this alternative, the Papacy would have to accept more than just the national state with its national church. It would also have to accept the fact that it too was but one state among the many states of Europe, and, above all, that it was an Italian power whose political needs in Italy would always influence to great degree its relations with Christendom. Like Aeneas, the Papacy vacillated between these two alternatives, committed by its traditions to the one and driven by the pressure of historical developments towards the other.⁷⁷

III

Nevertheless, to explain the tragedy of Aeneas Sylvius in terms of an unresolved conflict between universalism and nationalistic patriotism is to offer only a partial explanation. There are other areas in Aeneas's life which require investigation, in particular his intellectual and spiritual development.

It is during his early years, at Basel and in Germany, that Aeneas displays most clearly many of the attitudes and activities of the humanist: reverence for antiquity, an encyclopaedic knowledge of the

Latin classics, enthusiasm for the collection of books and manuscripts, for the spread of classical learning and for the education of the young.⁷⁸ Above all, Aeneas reveals a restless and insatiable curiosity which was to remain with him throughout his life. Yet, when called upon to extol the *raison d'être* of humanistic studies, Aeneas could only respond with a tissue of platitudes.⁷⁹ Taken all in all, his early writings remind us that humanism was for him only what it was for so many of his contemporaries, namely, a tool for professional advancement, a kind of stock-in-trade, to be exhibited on all occasions, edifying or otherwise.⁸⁰ As for his attitudes in the realm of religion and ethics, the sexual irregularities of his youth require no comment.⁸¹ Of far greater significance is the fact that, apart from a youthful experience induced by the impassioned rhetoric of Bernardino of Siena,⁸² Aeneas had scant interest in specifically religious matters.⁸³ Indeed, it is safe to say that Aeneas's attitudes in both humanism and religion rarely passed beyond the superficial level. The heights and the depths were not for him.⁸⁴ His existence was too insecure, his ambitions too ardent. Under the facade of humanism and a conventional Catholicism, there was only a young man, struggling to get ahead, living by his wits and taking pleasure where he found it.

However, for a period of several years beginning in 1444, Aeneas passed through a state of spiritual and emotional tension. New themes appear in his letters: uneasiness over the delights of the senses, pessimism concerning the possibilities of human existence together with sombre thoughts of death, judgment, hell and heaven.⁸⁵ The genuineness of these sentiments has been doubted, and rightly so, if only because Aeneas had a truly remarkable ability of striking a pose, especially when it was expedient to do so.⁸⁶ Certainly it was clear to Aeneas that professional advancement lay only in the Church and that his services to Empire and Papacy were bound one day to bring the ecclesiastical preferment which would rid him of his duties in the imperial chancery, which he disliked,⁸⁷ and eventually lead him back to his beloved Italy.⁸⁸ Yet, when this is said, we must acknowledge the genuineness of this spiritual unrest. For all the artificiality and posing, there is a note of urgency in his letters. The religious enthusiasm observed at Basel and the growing appreciation of the need for peace and harmony in Christendom together engendered new seriousness in the mind of Aeneas.⁸⁹ He now became receptive to the dark side of the humanist tradition, that sense of human mortality, that profound understanding of the tragic contradictions inherent in the human condition which humanism had received from its spiritual and intellectual progenitors, Christian and pagan, and

which had found moving expression in the Augustinian pathos of Petrarch's *Secretum*.⁹⁰ Thus gradually there occurred a transformation in Aeneas's thought and conduct. He took orders in 1446-1447 and assumed the attributes of a self-conscious guardian of Christian faith and practice.⁹¹ All obvious moral irregularities in his life were removed; his mind now turned more frequently to serious matters; his letters assumed a more pious tone;⁹² the former philanderer became the champion of marriage and the home, the counsellor of estranged couples.⁹³

However, though his spiritual unrest was genuine and though it produced many changes in Aeneas's life and thought, its ultimate effect upon his spiritual and intellectual development remains an open question.

First of all, we may enquire if his humanism gained in depth and profundity. Of great relevance here is Aeneas's activity as a historian. He rarely refused the opportunity to sing the praises of historical studies.⁹⁴ Yet, in the final analysis, Aeneas is not really satisfactory as a historian, and this deficiency may be attributed chiefly to the fact that he exhibits but fitfully that truly critical temper of mind which marked the best humanists of the age.⁹⁵ The *Epitome*, which Aeneas wrote of the *Decades* of Flavio Biondo, can only lead the student to draw a sharp contrast between Aeneas's haphazard superficiality and Biondo's originality and seriousness.⁹⁶ Or again, it is profitable to compare his later writing on the Council of Basel, *De rebus Basiliae gestis* (1450), with his earlier works dealing with the same subject.⁹⁷ Does the mature Aeneas give us greater insight into the Council, its problems and its failures? Hardly. We are conscious only that Aeneas has changed from conciliarism to papalism and is anxious to demonstrate the orthodoxy of his mature opinions.⁹⁸ As for the *Commentaries*, there are occasional displays of a critical attitude when dealing with certain medieval legends and superstitions.⁹⁹ Yet there are other occasions when criticism is thrown to the winds. The famous account of Joan of Arc has been praised for its critical objectivity.¹⁰⁰ By way of reply, it may be urged that Aeneas presents the history of Joan as a "wonder story," a fable almost impossible to believe. Little critical analysis is in evidence here. As for his final cryptic comments on the ultimate inspiration of the Maid, they may be traced not to any critical judgment or "scepticism" but rather to his inveterate hatred of the French which would not allow him to acknowledge that the saviour of the French nation might have been divinely inspired.¹⁰¹ Granted that the *Commentaries* are a treasure trove of information and give superb testimony to Aeneas's insight into men and politics, the

critical spirit therein displayed is that born of the diplomat's trade, not the historian's craft.¹⁰² The *Commentaries* remain not only a mixture of truth and falsehood but also a fantastic *mélange* of irrelevant material, prejudice and special pleading, characterized by an untiring determination to present the author in the best possible light.¹⁰³ In the end, we must therefore conclude that Aeneas was not so much a historian as a journalist and a publicist. Rhetoric everywhere casts its glittering light of half-truth. It is only occasionally that Aeneas, as a student of the past, operates independently from some ulterior purpose, and the desire to entertain and to edify triumphs all too frequently over the desire to give a coherent and rational explanation of historical events.¹⁰⁴

As for the other writings of his maturity, the *Tractatus* with its unfortunate imitation of Dante,¹⁰⁵ and the *Europa* and other essays in geography, are merely fascinating in their details and charming in their style of presentation.¹⁰⁶ The treatise on education, written at midstream in his career in Germany, is commonplace when compared with the writings of Vittorino da Feltre.¹⁰⁷ In conclusion, therefore, we may suggest that for Aeneas humanism remained the professional form in which his talents were cast as well as a means of private satisfaction. His "spiritual crisis" did not drive him to seek out its philosophical and ethical depths. It never became for him the deeply serious matter that it was for the greatest of his contemporaries. When Aeneas in his later years as pope pleaded with his enemies that they "reject Aeneas and accept Pius," he himself witnessed to the fact that humanism's moral and spiritual possibilities had eluded him.¹⁰⁸ It must therefore occasion little wonder that when this professed student of the Muses became pope he proved largely indifferent to the humanist movement.¹⁰⁹

His religious attitudes are more easily estimated. It is true that after his ordination, Aeneas displayed a pious orthodoxy from which he never deviated. He even exhibited increasing admiration and sympathy for the ascetic and other-worldly religious ideals of the medieval tradition.¹¹⁰ Yet beyond admiration Aeneas did not go. He was never an ascetic, and in his later years he gave no indication of wanting to appropriate for himself the spiritual values of this kind of medieval religion.¹¹¹ We may go farther and suggest that Aeneas's specifically religious activities and pronouncements as pope are convincing only when they concern simple ethical problems¹¹² or are related to Italian popular religion, whose festive nature and high drama Aeneas genuinely loved.¹¹³ The rest usually lack those dynamic qualities of fervour and longing which spring from personal awareness and acceptance, and from this we may deduce that his orthodoxy and

moral rectitude had, like his humanism, few deep roots in his mind and emotions.¹¹⁴

The historian is rightly reluctant to advance any opinion which smacks unduly of the twilight world of *Geistesgeschichte* with its shifting forms and uncertain relationships. Nonetheless, it is this failure to penetrate beneath the surface of both humanism and religion which points beyond itself to the fundamental fact about Aeneas: neither his mind nor his spirit possessed those qualities which might have encouraged and enabled him to create that spiritual and intellectual structure which bestows upon those who possess it a point of view, a standard of measurement by which the issues of life may be assessed. That this judgment is true is indicated by the fact that there is no sign in Aeneas of any sense of conflict, much less of any need for reconciliation, between the ethical ideals of renaissance humanism and those of medieval asceticism. For many of his contemporaries, the conflict between humanism and asceticism was profound and severe. However it was not so, it could not be so, with Aeneas. As suggested above, his admiration of these two interpretations of the meaning and purpose of human existence did not attain the level of profound conviction, with the result that elements of both only jostle together, cheek by jowl, in the mind of Aeneas. There is no evidence whatsoever that Aeneas felt constrained to compare, to contrast, to reconcile and to synthesize the two traditions, and this basic heterogeneity brings us back to our suggestion that Aeneas's life and thought possessed no underlying intellectual and spiritual structure.¹¹⁵

If this interpretation is correct, then we are perhaps enabled to appreciate with greater accuracy the tragedy of Aeneas. We can perhaps set in a more just perspective his failure, for all his talent, to transcend the literary vices of his age. With their interminable digressions, his writings convey too frequently to the reader the feeling of shapelessness and confusion. Even his undue reliance on the power of rhetoric, as well as his great capacity for self-deception, which so many scholars have ascribed to insincerity, now become more amenable to sympathetic understanding.¹¹⁶

This deficiency in spiritual and intellectual structure may also serve to illuminate Aeneas's inability to make any effective contribution towards the resolution of the conflict between medieval universalism and the newer forces of nationalistic patriotism. It may even explain why Aeneas failed to institute comprehensive reforms in the Church and the Papacy. Recent research has rightly stressed the sincerity of his interest in reform.¹¹⁷ He had heard the cries for reform throughout his career, and the famous letter of rebuke, written to Rodrigo Borgia after one of the Cardinal's more reprehensible

escapades, bears eloquent witness to Aeneas's moral sensitivity which knew well that the Church had lost much of its ancient power by reason of mediocrity and even corruption in those things which concern the spirit.¹¹⁸ Yet, in the end, despite a brave and promising beginning, little reform was accomplished. The reason for this may be found, in part, in an understandable reluctance to inaugurate reforms which would curtail papal income at a time when the Papacy was faced with the vast expenditures of a crusade. And again, it is true that cries for reform were suspect to Aeneas and his advisors if only because they were often to be found on the lips of enemies like Gregor Heimburg, whose residual conciliarism and nationalistic sentiment made them sharply opposed to all aspects of papal policy. Nevertheless, the underlying reason for his failure to effect serious reform lies in the fact that Aeneas did not have a homogeneous point of view, a coherent hierarchy of values and insights to which he was committed.¹¹⁹ His own spiritual and intellectual heterogeneity encouraged the growth of confusion and uncertainty in his activities as pontiff. Just as the crusade became obscured beneath the many facets of his Italian policy, so church reform became just one objective among many objectives. Worst of all, Aeneas failed to join forces with any of the truly progressive religious leaders of his day, such as the ardent reformer, Nicolas of Cusa. As the *Commentaries* reveal in painful detail, Nicolas's adherence to spiritual principles upon one occasion provoked a crushing outburst from Aeneas who, for his part, could see nothing in Nicolas's upright zeal beyond a rigidity born of petulance and self-pity.¹²⁰

In the end, Aeneas was incapable either of participating effectively in the strengths of the old medieval order or of entering into the liberating and creative forces at work in the Renaissance. On the one hand, had he been committed to the old way and its values, he would have laboured wholeheartedly to restore the old and to reject the new. Granted that such an attempt would have been foredoomed to failure, nonetheless his pontificate would not have been lacking in unity of purpose, in true dignity and grandeur. On the other, had Aeneas been at once deeply Christian and deeply humanist, he might well have followed in the footsteps of Nicolas V who had dreamed of Rome as the temple of spiritual and intellectual beauty erected upon a Christian orthodoxy purified by the critical fires of humanism.¹²¹ Perhaps too Aeneas might have accepted the forces of nationalistic patriotism with good grace and, under the guidance of the twin stars of humanism and moral reform, led Christendom towards a new kind of unity. Neither of these alternatives, nor any workable combination of the various forces in mid-fifteenth century

Christendom, was possible for Aeneas. He did not possess the equipment necessary to fuse the old and the new into a pattern adequate to the needs of the age. He could only swing haphazardly between the two, unable to set a firm course, incapable of establishing any final goal around and through which the old and the new might be reconciled.

The tragedy of Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini is no isolated phenomenon. To a considerable degree, it is, in microcosm, the tragedy of the Catholic Church in the fifteenth century.¹²² It is granted that all manner of restraint must be exercised by the historian lest he perpetuate the hackneyed and misleading picture of the Church of the pre-Reformation era as a skiff, with neither helmsman nor rudder, drifting helplessly downstream towards an inevitable Niagara. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that, like Aeneas, the Catholic Church in the fifteenth century suffered from profound internal deficiencies of an intellectual and spiritual nature, and that, like Aeneas, the Church was caught between old and new, unable to reconcile those ideals and institutions hallowed by the glory of their medieval past with those prophetic of the modern age.

* * *

Thus it is that, as the *Commentaries* proceed, the signs of frustration and weariness are increasingly apparent. It is almost as if Aeneas realized that all his skill and experience were not enough.¹²³ It is in this light that we should interpret the flight to the countryside, so prominent in the later years of his pontificate, his growing concern for the strength of his family in Siena and in the Papal States and for the construction of monuments to his own glory.¹²⁴ Nevertheless, this period of confusion and inaction came to an end with Aeneas's determination to lead the crusade in person. Here his sense of history, his knowledge of the past spiritual greatness of the Papacy and its historic association with the crusade, came to his assistance. History proffered examples to be imitated, phrases to be repeated. In the last year of his life, the language of Christian sacrifice and devotion, the magnificent cadences of his great medieval predecessors came more easily, more frequently, to his lips. In declaring his intention to be a crusader, Aeneas proclaimed his desire to recall by his deeds the greatness of the medieval Papacy and Church. In one of his most moving allocutions he declared:

By martyrs and confessors alike, our Church was made great. It cannot be preserved unless we imitate our predecessors who founded the Church's kingdom and it is not enough to be confessors and preach to the peoples, to thunder against vices and extol virtues to heaven. We must draw near to those earlier saints who gave their bodies as witnesses of their Lord.¹²⁵

Eloquentia would issue at last in decisive action. He would be Urban II *redivivus*, and more than Urban, he would take the cross himself. In defiance and despair, hope and exaltation, racked by gout and ill health, Aeneas made his last journey to Ancona only to find that Europe had refused the summons and spurned the example of its chief shepherd. The days of Urban were gone forever. His heroism in the last analysis had become merely the last and indeed the greatest of his speeches, and like so many of his speeches, this final gesture had been splendid in form but lacking in real cogency and thus tragically ineffective.

1. This study is derived from a paper read before the Renaissance Society of the University of Western Ontario in December, 1957.
2. G. Voigt, *Enea Silvio de' Piccolomini als Papst Pius der Zweite, und sein Zeitalter* (Berlin, 1856-1863).
3. The latest product of this continuing interest is F. A. Gragg and L. C. Gabel, *The Commentaries of Pius II*, translated and published with notes and an introduction in *Smith College Studies in History*: Book I, vol. XXII (1936-1937); II-III, XXV (1939-1940); IV-V, XXX (1947); VI-IX, XXXV (1951); X-XIII, XLIII (1957). All future references to the *Commentaries* will be to this translation in the pertinent book, volume and page of the *Studies*. Indispensable for proper understanding of this work are H. Kramer, 'Untersuchungen über die *Commentarii des Papstes Pius II.*', *Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Instituts für Geschichtsforschung* XLVIII (1934), 58-92, and G. Bürek, *Selbstdarstellung und Personenbildnis bei Enea Silvio Piccolomini* (Basel-Stuttgart, 1956). The letters of Aeneas (prior to his elevation to the Papacy) are best studied in R. Wolkan, ed., 'Der Briefwechsel des Eneas Silvius Piccolomini', *Fontes rerum austriacarum: Österreichische Geschichtsquellen* LXI-LXII, LXVII-LXVIII (Vienna, 1909-1918). All future references to Wolkan's edition will refer to the appropriate volume and page in the *Fontes*.
4. A select bibliography dealing with Aeneas and his times may be found in the final volume of Gragg and Gabel, *ibid.*
5. While care must be taken not to arrange the diverse interpretations of Aeneas in rigid categories, cf. Th. Buyken, *Enea Silvio Piccolomini, Sein Leben und Werden bis zum Episkopat* (Bonn-Cologne, 1931), 1, certain dif-

ferences in treatment may be briefly indicated. There are those who are content to leave the facts to speak for themselves. The following examples (of varying quality) illustrate this approach: W. Boultong, *Aeneas Silvius* (London, 1908); C. M. Ady, *Pius II (Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini), the Humanist Pope* (London, 1913); J. B. Morrall, 'Pius II: Humanist and Crusader,' *History Today* VIII (1958), 27-37. Of special merit is the excellent historical introduction which opens the final volume of Gragg and Gabel, *op. cit.* The particular danger of this point of view is that Aeneas's life often comes close to losing all historical intelligibility and coherence. Attempts have therefore been made to organize Aeneas's career around some great theme, e.g., Else Hocks, *Pius II. und die Halbmond* (Freiburg, 1941), or, on the other hand, to explain his life by methods more psychological than historical. See G. Lesca, *Commentarii rerum memorabilium—d'Enea Silvio de' Piccolomini* (Pisa, 1893), 402f. A second group of writers attempt boldly to grapple with the problems of interpretation which appear when Aeneas's career is treated as a whole. In this group, pride of place belongs to C. H. Verdière, *Essai sur Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini* (Paris, 1843). Although his work is outdated, Verdière saw many of the problems involved in the interpretation of Aeneas and tried to state them as exactly as possible. Unfortunately, most of the writers of this group have all too often presented Aeneas as an opportunist who was all things to all men as the winds of fortune dictated. Here belong the works of Voigt, *op. cit.*, esp. I, 220; F. Gregorovius, *A History of the City of Rome in the Middle Ages*, trans. by A. Hamilton from the fourth edn. (London, 1900), VII,

I, 92, 162-165, 217; and M. Creighton, *A History of the Papacy from the Great Schism to the Sack of Rome* (new edn., London, 1911), II-III, *passim*. The opinions of Creighton (closely derived from Voigt) are often extreme and founded upon prejudice. See III, 78-79, and the long essay on Aeneas in his *Historical Essays and Reviews*, ed. by L. Creighton (London, 1903), 55-106, esp. 61-62, 81-83. This tradition, sharply critical of Aeneas, still continues. See H. Kaminsky, 'Pius Aeneas among the Taborites,' *Church History* XXVIII (1959), 281-309, esp. 304, nn. 1, 7. Opposed to the pejorative judgments of Voigt and his continuators is the essay of J. Haller, 'Pius II., ein Papst der Renaissance,' *Deutsche Rundschau* CLIII (1912), 194-220. His defence of Aeneas is somewhat unconvincing since Haller, ever the *homo politicus* of papal historiography, cannot avoid delineating an Aeneas dominated by expediency. Of greater significance is the work of L. Pastor, *The History of the Popes*, trans. by F. I. Antrobus, (third edn., London, 1906-1910), I-III. Pastor acknowledged the self-seeking character of his early years but insisted that Aeneas became a sincere Christian and churchman, fully equipped spiritually and intellectually for his ultimate position as pope, I, 340f, III, 17f, 374. There are thus two Aeneases, and the sins of the earlier should not blind us to the virtues of the later Aeneas. Unfortunately, Pastor, wishing to liberate Aeneas from the moralistic criticisms of Voigt, went too far in the other direction and presented the later Aeneas in an almost ideal light. Pastor was closely followed by P. Joachimsohn who stated in his *Gregor Heimburg* (Bamburg, 1891), 147, that if Aeneas began his life as an adventurer he ended it as one of the great pontiffs of the Middle Ages. G. Toffanin, in his edition and translation of Aeneas's famous letter to Mohammed II, *Lettera a Maometta di Pio II* (Napoli, 1953), has given this interpretation a slightly different twist, insisting that the 'worldly' Aeneas and the 'spiritual' Aeneas existed at first side by side. He writes, x-xi: 'In Pio II erano grandi, e forse giganti, la forza del calcolo, e la forza di abbandono all'incalcolabile: e l'una veniva dal realista, l'altra dal visionario; due personaggi uni nel suo cuore...' In the end, however, Toffanin concludes that all was harmoniously resolved, lv: '... (Aeneas) fu una atleta della fede at tra i

grandi papi umanisti forse il più grande.' Toffanin stands between Pastor and yet another interpretation of Aeneas which is represented best by G. Paparelli, *Enea Silvio Piccolomini (Pio II)* (Bari, 1950). This scholar's admiration for his subject knows no bounds, and from his beautiful biography there appears a portrait of Aeneas as the hero of the age, a man deeply in sympathy with its many aspects and inwardly at peace, all contradictory elements resolved into a 'perfetta armonia.' His life was therefore an ever expanding synthesis of the elements of fifteenth century Europe which culminated in his martyrdom on the altar of the highest ideals of traditional Christianity and the newer humanism. See 10-11, 23-24, 30, 34, 80-81, 108, 123, 243, 249-250, 303, 351f. Paparelli's judgments are almost entirely opposed to the interpretations presented in this article. The work of Buyken, *op. cit.*, is by way of contrast more satisfying to this writer. Buyken refuses to indulge in either polemic or apology, remaining content to explain the developments in Aeneas's career in the terms not only of his struggle to find a place in society but also of a sincere attempt to conduct his life in a manner congruent with his own experience and understanding.

6. Voigt, *op. cit.*, III, 724; Ady, *op. cit.*, 348; Paparelli, *op. cit.*, 10, 353.
7. See the opening lines of the bull (April, 1460) *Inter felicitates*, in F. Gaude et al., eds., *Bullarium — taurinensis editio* (Tours, 1860), V, 153. Paparelli, *op. cit.*, 250, believes that his motto *vivere sibi et musis* 'era sempre il sogno secreto dell'anima sua.' However, for a more critical assessment of his devotion to humanism, see below.
8. J. D. Mansi, *Pii II. P.M. olim Aeneae Sylvii Piccolomini Senensis Orationes politicae et ecclesiasticae* (Lucca, 1755-1757). The introduction to the first volume has a catena of quotations from contemporaries in praise of his rhetorical skill.
9. *Commentaries*, II (XXV), 115.
10. Pastor, *op. cit.*, III, 24-25, 381f.
11. Book III (XXV) of the *Commentaries* contains Aeneas's account of the Congress of Mantua.
12. Haller, *op. cit.*, 208, suggests that Aeneas planned to go only part of the way on the crusade and then return home.
13. Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, *Opera quae extant omnia* (Basel, 1571), 914-923. All future references to the *Opera* will be to this edition.

14. *Commentaries*, VII (XXXV), 517f; Mansi, *op. cit.*, II, 174-177, 182f, Appen., 16-17. Two indispensable articles are E. Carusi, 'Preventivi di spesi per la spedizione contro il Turco al tempo di Pio II,' *Archivio Muratoriano* XVI (1915), 273-277, and L. Mohler, 'Bessarions Instruktion für die Kreuzzugspredigt in Venedig (1463),' *Römische Quartalschrift für Christliche Altertumskunde und für Kirchengeschichte* XXXV (1927), 337-349.
15. The tragedy at Ancona may be observed through the eyes of Jacopo Ammanati. See *Pii Secundi pont. max. Commentarii rerum memorabilium — a R. D. Ioanne Gobellino—compositi, et a R.P.D. Francisco Band. Picolomineo Archiepiscopo Senensi* (Rome, 1584), 650-657. See also the narrative account in the *Vita* by Antonio Campano in the *Opera*.
16. Voigt, *op. cit.*, I, 141, 200, denies all sincerity to Aeneas. To be sure, the early letters in Wolkan, LXI, reflect the ambitions and interests which comprise the young Aeneas. Yet, a letter to Piero da Noceto, 58-76, esp. 72-75, shows that Aeneas, although not blind to his own ambitions or to the defects of the Council of Basel, did have real sympathy for the conciliar movement. See also the two works which were composed during this period: *Libellus dialogorum de generalis concilii auctoritate et gestis Basiliensium*, in A. F. Kollar, *Analecta monumentorum Vindobonensis* (Vienna, 1761-1762), II, 691-790, esp. 739, 751; *De Gestis Basiliensi concilii*, in the *Opera*, 1-63, esp. 29.
17. Consult Cesarini's moving appeal for Christian unity which opened the deliberations with the Hussites on January 10, 1433. John of Segovia, *Historia gestorum generalis synodi Basiliensis*, ed. E. Birk, *Monumenta conciliorum generalium seculi decimi quinti, Concilium Basiliense* (Vienna, 1873), II, 299f, and Wolkan, LXI, 85.
18. Both the opening and the closing sections of the famous letter to Cardinal Carvajal (October, 1443), Wolkan, LXI, 208-211, show Aeneas as the upholder of 'neutrality.' However, the remainder of this letter, as well as the sentiments expressed in other letters written at this time, Wolkan, LXI, 132-144, 202-204, show the persistence of a genuine attachment to the conciliar cause. It should be remembered that for some time he maintained close contact with many of his former associates at Basel, Wolkan LXI, 147-148, 150-151.
19. W. T. Waugh in the *Cambridge Medieval History* (Cambridge, 1936), VIII, 42, likened his abandonment of Basel to that of a rat leaving a doomed ship. Creighton, *History*, III, 58, agreed. Even Paparelli, *op. cit.*, 105, finds his hero's action to be an astonishing volte-face. If only to grant Aeneas a modicum of sincerity we may point out that prior to his departure he had increasing doubts as to the effectiveness of the Council, Wolkan, LXI, 79-80, 85, 209. As for his new hopes for Frederick, Wolkan, LXI, 119-121, 156-157, 165-166, 175-177.
20. Wolkan, LXII, 21f, is instructive. In this connection we should refer to his early work on the Empire, the *Pentalogus*, in B. Pez, *Thesaurus anecdotorum novissimus* (Vienna, 1723), IV, 3, 637-744, esp. 665, 737: 'Hoc maximum decus est domus tuae Australis, ut imperium orbis sibi valeat vendicare et apud se stabilere.' Other examples of Aeneas as imperial propagandist may be seen in Mansi, *op. cit.*, I, 113f, 122, 135-136, 140f, 154f, 163f.
21. Wolkan, LXI, 156-157.
22. *Pentalogus*, in Pez, *op. cit.*, 664-665.
23. Wolkan, LXI, 177, 249, 255. Note his reference to the proposals of France for a new general council.
24. At what point do we place the beginning of Aeneas's enthusiasm for the crusade? The *Commentaries*, I (XXII), 65, suggest the coronation of Frederick at Rome in March, 1452. Voigt, *op. cit.*, II, 90-91, emphasizes the importance of the fall of Constantinople in the following year. However, there are letters in Wolkan which show that his concern for the crusade began as early as 1443, LXI, 127, 163-165, 177-179, 202-204, 281-283, 305-309, 322-324, 487-490, the last being a report of the death of Cesarini. Later letters dealing with the crusade and allied topics are Wolkan, LXII, 37-41, 42-44, LXVII, I, 72-77, 88-93, LXVIII, I, 189-202, 204-215, 222. The chief works dealing with Aeneas as the opponent of the Turks are Hocks, *op. cit.*, and R. Eysser, *Papst Pius II. und der Kreuzzug gegen die Türken* (Bucharest, 1938). His activities should be seen against the entire problem of the Turkish advance across Europe. Here the indispensable studies are H. Pfeffermann, *Die Zusammenarbeit der Renaissancepäpste mit den Türken* (Winterthur, 1946); Fr. Babinger, 'Mehmed II., der Eroberer, und Italien,' *Byzantion* XXI (1951), 127-170; D. M. Vaughan,

Europe and the Turk (Liverpool, 1954), 72f.

25. Wolkan, LXI, 318-319, 323-324. Creighton, *History*, III, 60-62, presents an exaggerated picture of Aeneas using German 'neutrality' for self-advancement.

26. Wolkan, LXI, 313-314.

27. Wolkan, LXI, 318-324, 538-545, esp. 544.

28. The shift in German opinion may be traced through Wolkan, LXI, 323-324, 334-337, 493-506, 546-547.

29. It is important to remember that Cesari, Carvajal and others had tried for some time to bring Aeneas over to the papal side, Wolkan, LXI, 127, 208-211. On the lighter side, Aeneas received an appeal from Piero da Noceto, *scriptor apostolicus*, urging him to work for the restoration of Germany to the papal obedience. Such a development would increase the activities of the papal curia and thus rescue Piero from penury, Wolkan, LXI, 219-220.

30. Although now quite old, the basic account for these negotiations remains N. Valois, *La crise religieuse du XVIe siècle. Le pape et le concile* (Paris, 1909), II, 303-321, which may be compared with A. Werminghoff, *Nationalkirchlichen Bestrebungen im deutschen Mittelalter* (Stuttgart, 1910), 86-109.

31. As a kind of *pièce justificative* for the growing unity between Papacy and Empire, Aeneas in 1446 wrote the tract *De ortu et auctoritate romani imperii*, Wolkan, LXVII, I, 6-24. Also, his orations during this period are replete with fulsome praise for Frederick, and he even went so far as to describe Austria as 'umbilicu[m] christianitatis' and 'christianitatis corde,' Mansi, *op. cit.*, I, 148, 154f, 157, 163f. The theories expressed in *De ortu*, together with some similar conceptions to be found in writings dating from this middle period in Aeneas's career, e.g., *Historia Friderici III. Imperatoris*, in Kollar, *op. cit.*, II, 302f, and *Dialogus seu Tractatus*, in J. Cugnoni, 'Aeneae Silvii Piccolomini Senensis qui postea fuit Pius II. pont. max. Opera inedita,' *Atti della R. Accademia dei Lincei. Memorie della Classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche*, ser. III, v. 8 (Rome, 1883), 319-686, rf. here, 574-578, have been subjected to a searching analysis by G. Kallen in his *Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini als Publizist* (Cologne, 1939), *passim*, esp. 45-49. This work is to be preferred to the more superficial examination presented by A. Meusel, *Enea Silvio als Publizist* (Breslau, 1905). Kallen's opinions should be carefully compared with those of E. H. Kantorowicz, 'Pro partia mori in Medieval Political Thought,' *American Historical Review* LVI (1950-1951), 472-492, esp. 490-491, and F. Battaglia, whose excellent monograph *Enea Silvio Piccolomini e Francesco Patrizi* (Florence, 1936), remains the best detailed treatment of Aeneas as a political thinker. Note that much of Aeneas's writings on the Empire will serve admirably to illustrate the decline of the 'imperial idea' in the later Middle Ages as described by G. Barraclough, *The Medieval Empire: Idea and Reality* (Historical Assn., London, 1950), 23, and R. Holtzmann, *Der Weltherrschaftsgedanke des mittelalterlichen Kaisertums und die Souveränität der europäischen Staaten* (Tübingen, 1953), 28f.

32. Throughout his life Aeneas wrote many an *apologia pro vita sua*. One of these, Wolkan, LXVII, I, 54-65, dated August, 1447, belongs here. It is directed to the rector of the University of Cologne (Jordan Mallant), and in this (57) Aeneas declares that he had been an adherent of the papal cause for three years. The statement is correct if we judge Aeneas to mean since 1445. Creighton, *History*, III, 60f, thought him to have been in the papal camp since 1444. The letters dating from that year will not support this suggestion.

33. Mansi, *op. cit.*, I, 87-89, 113-115, 145, 163f, 192-195, 229-230, 237f.

34. Wolkan, LXVIII, I, 199-202, 206f.

35. His final utterances on behalf of Frederick and the imperial ideal may be seen in Wolkan, LXVIII, I, 577-580, 593-606; Mansi, *op. cit.*, I, 258f.

36. The *Historia Dieta Ratisponensis*, Wolkan, LXVIII, I, 492-563, is understandably restrained in its assessment, but it bears clear witness to Aeneas's disillusionment. See also the letters in Wolkan, LXVIII, I, 225-226, 278-285, 443-446, 453-457, 459-474. His opinions may be profitably compared with F. Baethgen, *Europa im Spätmittelalter* (Berlin, 1951), 125-136.

37. *Historia Friderici*, Kollar, *op. cit.*, II, 302-318, and Wolkan, LXVII, I, 72-77. These opinions, which emphasize the necessity for imperial leadership, must always be seen within the context of his doubts as to the moral ability of the Papacy to lead a successful crusade. With many of his contemporaries Aeneas shared the usual critical attitudes towards the Papacy for its 'greed,' etc., Wolkan, LXI, 332-333, LXVII, I, 92.

38. Wolkan, LXVIII, I, 188, is the first

mention of the fall of Constantinople in Aeneas's letters. Those which follow testify to his changed attitude towards the Roman Church. His theme is now, as in Mansi, *op. cit.*, I, 345: '—sed omnes in te (Calixtus III) oculos direxere...', or, Wolkan, LXVIII, I, 296: '—de rebus Turchorum hec scribere possum: nemo est, qui curam ejus rei gerat nisi Romanus pontifex.' Would Europe respond to the papal call for unity against the Turks? Aeneas was not sure. Wolkan, LXVIII, I, 242, 279 (to Leonardo dei Benvoli, September, 1453): 'at caesar ipsi et tibi fatear, quod in re est, etsi Christianae religionis cladem invitum audit, non tamen is est, qui tam potenti hosti resistere possit neque Christianitas ea est, que unius capitis subire juditum velit.'

39. I have used the words 'nationalistic patriotism' with the caveats of many scholars in mind, especially G. Post, 'Two Notes on Nationalism in the Middle Ages,' *Traditio* IX (1953), 281-320, and V. Ilardi, 'Italianità among some Italian Intellectuals in the Early Sixteenth Century,' *Traditio* XII (1956), 339-367, esp. 340-344.

40. Wolkan, LXI, 12-14, 187-188, 285-288, 538-545.

41. Wolkan, LXVII, I, 99: 'viginti jam annos alienos inviso lares, funestus est jam mihi sene frigidus et humidus aer germanicus.' Also Wolkan, LXVIII, I, 9-10, 181, 238-241, 431-432.

42. Even Aeneas's utterances on behalf of imperial universalism are often coloured by nationalistic patriotism: *Historia Friderici*, Kollar, *op. cit.*, II, 302; Mansi, *op. cit.*, I, 274. However, in Mansi, *op. cit.*, I, 313, he attacks all manifestations of nationalistic patriotism. The remarks of Kallen, *op. cit.*, 14f are useful here.

43. This concern begins as early as 1444, Wolkan, LXI, 323-324, and reaches its height in the summer and fall of 1453, e.g., Wolkan, LXVIII, I, 222: '—fortasse medi tempore calamitas Constantiopolitana nostros Italos de pace cogitare magis quam haec tuus admonebit.'

44. Wolkan, LXVIII, I, 228-233, 241-242, 244-245, 296-297, 301-302, 446, 431: '—sed quid fieri contra Turchos poterit, si eor Christianitatis Italia bello premitur.'

45. *Commentaries*, II, III (XXV), 117, 213f. This is the theme of the bull *Vocavit nos Pius* (*supra*, n. 10) as well as of many of his addresses at Mantua, e.g., Mansi, *op. cit.*, II, 69.

46. As Aeneas once wrote concerning the danger of a council, Mansi, *op. cit.*, II, Appen., 3: 'Magni conventus magnos motus pariunt.' The victory of papal supremacy over conciliarism had been completed with the publication of the bull *Laetentur coeli* at the Council of Florence. See G. Hofmann, 'Papato, conciliarismo, patriarcato,' *Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae* II, No. 2 (Rome, 1940), and J. Gill, *The Council of Florence* (Cambridge, 1959), *passim*, text of the bull, 412-415. However, as J. Haschagen, *Staat und Kirche vor der Reformation* (Essen, 1931), 98f, and H. Jedin, *A History of the Council of Trent*, trans. by E. Graf (London-New York, 1957), I, 25f, remind us, conciliarism was still active in Latin Christendom.

47. Mansi, *op. cit.*, II, 32-33; *Commentaries*, III (XXV), 198-199.

48. The text of *Exsecrabilis* may be consulted in Gaude, *op. cit.*, V, 149f.

49. If anything, *Exsecrabilis* only provoked more appeals to 'a future general council.' See the writings of Gregor Heimburg in M. Goldast, *Monarchiae s. romani imperii sive Tractatum* (Frankfurt, 1668), II, 1580f. For the best discussion of the feud between Aeneas and Gregor, see P. Joachimsohn, *op. cit.*, 192f.

50. The account of the Pragmatic Sanction in *Commentaries*, VI (XXXV), 447, is somewhat overdrawn and should be compared with the original in the *Ordonnances des rois de France*, ed. by L. Vilevault and L. Bréquigny (Paris, 1782), XIII, 267-291. The Sanction has received much attention: N. Valois, *Histoire de la Pragmatique Sanction de Bourges sous Charles VII* (Paris, 1906); J. Haller's somewhat acerbic review of the same in *Historische Zeitschrift*, CIII (1909), 1-51; V. Martin, *Les Origines du Gallicanisme* (Paris, 1939), II, 293f. The Sanction's impact on Germany is closely studied in A. Werminghoff, *op. cit.*, 33-85.

51. See P. Ourliac, 'La Pragmatique Sanction et la légation en France du cardinal d'Estouteville,' *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire* LV (1938), 403-432.

52. Wolkan, LXVIII, I, 132-133; *infra*, n. 65; *supra*, n. 22.

53. For the diplomatic background, see J. Haller, ed., *Concilium Basiliense* (Basel, 1896), I, 137; the same author's 'Die Belehnung René von Anjou mit dem Königreich Neapel (1436),' *Quellen und Forschungen aus Italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken* IV (1902), 184-207; also his

review of Valois, *supra*, n. 50, and another review of the important study by G. Soranzo, *Pio II e la politica italiana nella lotta contro i Malatesti* (Padua, 1911), found in *Historische Zeitschrift* CIX (1912), 415-417. Other important studies are Chr. Lucius, *Pius II. und Ludwig XI. von Frankreich* (Heidelberg, 1913), G. Soranzo, *La lega italica (1454-1455)* (Milan, 1924) and the excellent article by V. Ilardi, 'The Italian League, Francesco Sforza and Charles VII (1454-1461)', *Renaissance Studies* VI (1959), 129-166.

54. Mansi, *op. cit.*, II, 31-37, 46-47, 55-56, 65-67, 70-71, 158; *Commentaries*, III (XXXV), 260-268, V (XXX), 360.

55. It is important to recall here that Calixtus III had sent Cardinal Alain de Coëtivy to France to raise money, men and arms for the crusade. The results of his labours had been diverted into René's expedition, *Commentaries*, IV (XXX), 295. Aeneas's animosity against the French goes back many years, Wolkhan, LXI, 13, 18.

56. The visit of Francesco Sforza to Mantua is symbolic of this transformation. The treatment in Ilardi, 'The Italian League,' 150-151, nn. 81-82, should be compared with the less exact discussion in Pastor, *op. cit.*, III, 75. Aeneas's letter to the Doge Pasquale Malipiero shows the way the wind is blowing, *Annali Veneti*, ed. F. Longo, *Archivio storico italiano*, Ser. I, 7, 1 (1843), 7-10. On the other hand, Pfeffermann, *op. cit.*, 78, misunderstands the truth of the situation by saying: 'Der Kongress von Mantua hatte mit einem Fiasco für die Weltmachtstellung des Papsttums geendet.'

57. Baronius-Raynaldus, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, ed. A. Theiner (Bar-le-Duc, 1864-1883), XXIX (1459), 214-215.

58. Ilardi, 'The Italian League,' 141f.

59. In many of his utterances at Mantua, we find the most bewildering alternation between the languages of Christian universalism and nationalistic patriotism. See *Commentaries*, III (XXV), 253f. The nationalistic note grows more powerful, however, as his closing address at Mantua reveals, Mansi, *op. cit.*, II, 80-84, and becomes explicit in his famous remarks to Cosimo dei Medici, *Commentaries*, IV (XXX), 300, in the letter to Borso d'Este, Mansi, *op. cit.*, II, Appen., 124f, and in his defiance of the French during one of the crucial periods in the Neapolitan war, *Commentaries* IV (XXX), 325-326. It should be remembered that *Exsecrabilis* had its place in the attack on the French. See Lucius, *op. cit.*, 17, and G. B. Picotti, *La pubblicazione e i primi effetti della 'Exsecrabilis' di Pio II* (Rome, 1914), *passim*, esp. 7.

60. Mansi, *op. cit.*, II, 45, 160; *Commentaries*, V (XXX), 360. For material on the concession to Ferrante, Ilardi, *op. cit.*, 169f. n. 81 and in Baronius-Raynaldus, *op. cit.*, XXIX (1458), 165-6, esp. the clause: '—quod faciet dominus noster (Pius) sine praejudicio juris alieni.'

61. Louis as Dauphin had promised to abolish the Pragmatic Sanction upon his accession to the throne, N. Valois, *Le Pape et le concile*, II, 292f.

62. Aeneas's account of the negotiations may be pieced together from the *Commentaries*, VII, VIII (XXXV), 504, 508-512, 549-551, X, XII (XLIII), 674-675, 681, 688-689, 793-794, 805-806. The older secondary account in Lucius, *op. cit.*, should be carefully compared with Ilardi, 'The Italian League,' 150f. In this connection, of the greatest value is G. B. Picotti, *La Dieta di Mantova e la politica dei Veneziani* (Venice, 1912).

63. All mention of Sicily is excluded from Aeneas's joyful response to the abrogation of the Sanction. Mansi, *op. cit.*, II, 103-106, and *Opera*, 861-862.

64. *Commentaries*, XII (XLIII), 794, 805-806; Creighton, *History*, III, 304-305. That Aeneas must have been bitterly disappointed by these new restrictions is shown in P. Bourdon, 'L'Abrogation de la Pragmatique et les Règles de la Chancellerie de Pie II,' *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire* XXVIII (1908), 207-224.

65. *Commentaries*, XIII (XLIII), 852f. To make matters worse, Louis persisted in encouraging the heretic George Podiebrad of Bohemia who planned to organize the princes for the defence of Europe and thus take the leadership of the crusade away from the Papacy. Consult Pfeffermann, *op. cit.*, 34, 65-76, the recent work of Kaminsky, *op. cit.*, 301-304, and R. Aubenas and R. Ricard, *L'Église et la Renaissance* (being v. 15 of *Histoire de l'Église*, ed. A. Flieche and others, Paris, 1951), 58-60. Considerations of space have led me to exclude any detailed account of Aeneas's difficulties with George Podiebrad and Bohemia. I must content myself with the suggestion that a full study of their mutual relations would lend additional support to the interpretation of Aeneas presented in this article.

66. The basic work is W. Schürmeyer, *Das Kardinalskollegium unter Pius II*

(Berlin 1914). It should be studied together with the more general treatments offered by B. Arle, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Kardinalskollegiums in der Zeit von Konstanzer bis zum Tridentiner Konzil* (Bonn, 1914), M. Jordan, 'Le Sacré Collège au moyen age,' *Revue des cours et conférences* XXIII (1921-1922), 158-171, 279-291, 427-435, 545-559, 727-740, 128-141, and G. Mollat, 'Le Sacré Collège de Clément V. à Eugène IV.', *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* XLVI (1951), 22-112, 566-594.

67. *Commentaries*, V (XXX), 376. On the problem of representation in the College, see R. Haubst, 'Der Reformentwurf Pius des Zweiten,' *Römische Quartalschrift für Christliche Altertumskunde und Kirchengeschichte* XLIX (1954), 188-242, here 212. These attempted reforms in the College are summarized in H. Jedin, 'Analekten zur Reformtätigkeit der Päpste Julius III. und Paulus IV.', *Römische Quartalschrift* XLIII (1935), 87-156, esp. 87-103.

68. The critique of the College in the late medieval period often assumed the characteristics of a vendetta: Mollat, *op. cit.*, 31, 105-106; Jordan, *op. cit.*, 168-169; Schürmeyer, *op. cit.*, 11-13, 34f; St. Ehses, 'Der Reformentwurf des Kardinals Nikolaus Cusanus,' *Historisches Jahrbuch* XXXII (1911), 274-297, esp. 292-294.

69. For the capitulations imposed on Aeneas at his election, see *Commentaries*, I (XXII), 94, and in Baronius-Raynaldus, *op. cit.*, XXIX (1458), 159-160. The best comment on these is in Schürmeyer, *op. cit.*, 27, 36. The *Commentaries* have many a critique of the cardinals: II-III (XXV), 127-130, 207; IV (XXX), 303-304; XII (XLIII), 823. However, it is important to emphasize that Aeneas succeeded with the College where others had failed. The capitulations imposed on his successor reveal general satisfaction with Aeneas's conduct as pope. See Schürmeyer, *op. cit.*, 36-37.

70. For the organization of the French cardinals in the College, Schürmeyer, *op. cit.*, 16f. As regards the Italian cardinals, perhaps Ilardi, 'The Italian League,' 149-150, goes too far in denying them any feeling of national solidarity. For Aeneas's difficulties in creating new cardinals, *Commentaries*, IV-V (XXX), 302-306, 376-377; VII (XXXV), 495-504.

71. *Commentaries*, II (XXV), 124, 157; V (XXX), 358; VIII (XXXV), 549f; XII (XLIII), 831f. Two things should be noted here. Firstly, a cardinal in the fifteenth century often tended to act as a national agent. See Wolkan, LXII, 33-37, or *Opera*, 843-848. These letters illuminate many of the practices referred to in *Commentaries*, IV (XXX), 302-303. The notes in Schürmeyer, *op. cit.*, 96f, on this point are excellent. Secondly, it should be stated that Aeneas's nationalistic patriotism affected his attitude towards more than French cardinals. The Germans were 'barbarians,' and Nicolas of Cusa was 'too German,' *Commentaries*, II (XXV), 158; XI-XII (XLIII), 736, 839.

72. For general observations on Aeneas's *nepotopolitik*, consult Paparelli, *op. cit.*, 235-243. Pertinent sources are to be found in *Commentaries*, IV (XXX), 302-306; Mansi, *op. cit.*, II, Appen., 137.

73. R. Aubenas and R. Ricard, *op. cit.*, 64.

74. The disagreement between modern scholars over the fundamental purposes of his pontificate bears eloquent testimony to this indecision and futility. What, in the last analysis, was Aeneas's ultimate objective? The crusade? Verdière, *op. cit.*, 157, thought so, and so do many others, e.g., M. P. Gilmore, *The World of Humanism* (New York, 1952), 17, and Pfeffermann, *op. cit.*, 34, who adds for his part the opinion that for Aeneas as well as for most of the Renaissance popes the crusade was only an instrument for the aggrandizement of papal power. On the other hand, Gragg and Gabel, *Commentaries* (XLIII), xxiv-xxvii, tend to minimize the importance of the crusade while Lucius, *op. cit.*, 3, insists that the struggle with Louis XI is the central theme of Aeneas's reign. Significantly, the same confusion over his ultimate purposes existed among his contemporaries. Some of the cardinals accused Aeneas of having sacrificed the crusade for the sake of the expulsion of the French from Italy, *Commentaries*, XII (XLIII), 808-828. *Per contra*, the great Domenico de' Domenichi was convinced that Aeneas was chiefly interested in church reform and the defence of Christendom, Haubst, *op. cit.*, 188.

75. For the importance of the *Commentaries* in the development of Italian nationalistic patriotism, see Kramer, *op. cit.*, 59.

76. *Commentaries*, I, (XXII), 93f; II-III (XXV), 128, 253. Mansi, *op. cit.*, II, 184-188, 195, 200, 211-212. The election has received many superficial treatments, e.g., Morrall, *op. cit.*, 28. However, for a useful analysis, see J. Sigmuller, *Die Papstwahlen*

und die Staaten von 1447 bis 1555 (Tübingen, 1890), 62-92.

77. Of particular merit among the many studies dealing with the great problems encountered by the Church at the close of the Middle Ages are J. Haller, *Papsttum und Kirchenreform* (Berlin, 1903), I; F. Heiler, *Altkirchliche Autonomie und päpstlicher Zentralismus* (Munich, 1941), 283-332; W. Bertrams, *Der neuzeitliche Staatsgedanke und die Konkordate des ausgehenden Mittelalters* (Rome, 1942), 49-111, and W. K. Ferguson, 'The Church in a Changing World,' *American Historical Review* LIX (1953-1954), 1-18.

78. Wolkan, LXI, 28-38, 112-116, 201-202; LXVII, I, 78f, and the early oration at Basel, *In divi Ambrosi celebritate*, Mansi, *op. cit.*, I, 39f.

79. Wolkan, LXI, 121f. To his credit, Aeneas never forgot the insecurities of his early life, Wolkan, LXVIII, I, 163-164. Failure to appreciate the circumstances of his youth has led to the distorted judgments of Voigt, *op. cit.*, I, 220, and Creighton, *Essays*, 60-62.

80. It should be remembered that Aeneas won early notoriety for his erotic compositions, of which an example is the letter written for Sigismund of Austria, Wolkan, LXI, 245-247.

81. Wolkan, LXI, 8-10, 188-191, 239-240, 284-288, 295, 393-395, concluding, 580-581, in disillusionment. Scholars persist in making too much of these early love affairs, e.g., Morrall, *op. cit.*, 29.

82. Paparelli, *op. cit.*, 23-25, treats this fleeting religious experience too seriously.

83. His conventional early piety is reflected in Wolkan, LXI, 85-86, 164-165.

84. Paparelli, *op. cit.*, 85, 93, judges his early humanism to be more profound than it actually was. In his more objective moments, Aeneas had few illusions, Wolkan, LXI, 28f.

85. Wolkan, LXI, 206, 240, 439-451; LXVII, I, 31-33, 68-71, 86-87; LXVIII, I, 238-241.

86. Creighton, *Essays*, 65f, 82-84, 105-106, interprets the development of seriousness in Aeneas as mere opportunism. Haller, *op. cit.*, 215, agrees as does Kaminsky, *op. cit.*, 281. Gregorovius, *op. cit.*, VII, I, 164-165, is even more vitriolic. These continue a tradition derived from Voigt, *op. cit.*, I, 290. While my interpretation is opposed to these adverse judgments, I cannot support the opposite opinion which seems to me to be extraordinarily naive, e.g., Boulting, *op. cit.*, 96: '—his letters show him as he was without any self-consciousness,' and J. S. Nelson, in his translation of *De liberorum educatione* (Washington, D.C., 1940), 17: '—there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of one who is so candid in his exposure of himself.'

87. Aeneas wrote a scathing indictment of life in the imperial curia, thus continuing a venerable medieval tradition. The *De miseriis curialium* is best consulted in Wolkan, LXI, 453-487. See also 196-198, 522-523 and LXVIII, I, 396-397.

88. Wolkan, LXI, 278-288; LXVII, I, 99-100; LXVIII, I, 9-10, 181f. For Aeneas's contribution to the growth of humanism in Germany, see A. Weiss, *Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini als Papst Pius II. Sein Leben und Einfluss auf die Literarische Kultur Deutschlands* (Graz, 1897), esp. 82, and Paparelli, *op. cit.*, 148-150. Aeneas had a low opinion of German culture, *Historia Friderici*, in Kollar, *op. cit.*, II, 11f.

89. The humanist movement exerted great influence on the development of enthusiasm for the crusade. See G. Toffanin, *Lettera a Maometto*, xvi-xvii.

90. A. Tenenti, *Il senso della morte e l'Amore della vita nel Rinascimento* (Turin, 1957), 27-29, 48-49, 58-60, 66-67, 80-107, 139-184.

91. Wolkan, LXVII, I, 28. Essential for the dating of his ordination is A. Mercati, 'Aneddoti per la storia di Pio II, Leone X,' *Archivio della R. Società Romana di storia patria* LVI-LVII (Rome, 1933-1934), 363-374.

92. For the redactions which Aeneas now made of his letters, Wolkan, LXI, xvif, 3-4, 239-240; LXVIII, I, 9-10, 245f.

93. Wolkan, LXVII, I, 31-32, 34-39, 42-44, 68-71, and Mansi, *op. cit.*, I, 70.

94. Wolkan, LXVII, I, 164 is a fair example.

95. Pastor, *op. cit.*, III, 40-44, delivers a veritable panegyric on his abilities as a historian. It may be admitted that Aeneas had at least enough of the historian's attitude to date and arrange his own letters. Yet the redactions indicate that he regarded them not so much as historical documents as literary exercises.

96. See the comment on Eiondo in *Commentaries*, XI (XLIII), 766.

97. *Supra*, n. 16. The *De rebus* may be read in Wolkan, LXVII, I, 164-228.

98. J. Haller, *Concilium Basiliense*, I, 12, presents the harshest judgments on Aeneas as a reliable authority for

the Council of Basel. Indeed, such comments as those found in *Commentaries*, VI (XXXV), 445-446, leave little room for any more favourable opinion.

99. *Commentaries*, I (XXII), 16, 18. It is relevant here to refer to Aeneas's attitude towards John of Capistrano. For the great preacher's virtues, Aeneas had only praise, Wolkan, LXVIII, I, 19-20. However, he was somewhat reserved concerning the saint's miracles, Wolkan, LXVIII, I, 284-285, and *Commentaries*, I (XXII), 54-55. This reserve is to be attributed not to any sceptical attitude but rather to his dislike of John's flamboyant parade of his own powers. See Paparelli, *op. cit.*, 260-263, and Aubenás and Ricard, *op. cit.*, 25, n. 5.

100. *Commentaries*, VI (XXXV), 436-443, and notes.

101. The notes of Gragg and Gabel, *ibid.*, reveal their admiration for his account. Yet they are amazed that no mention is made of Joan's rehabilitation (XLIII, xvii-xviii), and find it 'curious' that Pius does not write more accurately and more authoritatively of a case that so interested him. However, it should be mentioned that the treatment of Joan in the *Commentaries* is a vast improvement over an earlier judgment in *De viris illustribus*, Mansi, *op. cit.*, II, Appen., 186.

102. That Aeneas had a truly superb grasp of the dynamics, both military and political, of the struggle against the Turks is well illustrated in *Commentaries*, XII (XLIII), 814-815.

103. Kramer, *op. cit.*, (*supra*, n. 3), 58, declared the *Commentaries* to be the most subjective of Aeneas's historical work. Bürck, *op. cit.*, 39f, emphasized its function as an official record of his pontificate. As he became older, Aeneas's reporting of events became less reliable. Compare the accounts of an early sea voyage as found in Wolkan, LXI, 4-6, and *Commentaries*, I (XXII), 13. See also the comments by H. Kramer, 'Untersuchung zur "Oesterreichischen Geschichte" des Aeneas Silvius', *Mitteilungen des Oesterreichischen Instituts für Geschichtsforschung* XLV (1931), 23-69, here 31. Paparelli, *op. cit.*, 308, unwittingly gives support to this estimate of the *Commentaries* when he describes the work as 'quasi romanesco amabile disordine...'.¹⁰⁴

104. To the scholarly opinions of Aeneas's value as a historian, cited above in nn. 95f, may be added those of Voigt, *op. cit.*, I, 234-235, II, 312, 319, V. Bayer, *Die Historia Friderici III. Imperatoris des Aenea Silvio de' Piccolomini* (Prague, 1872), 73, 89, 250f, and Creighton, *History*, III, 340-347, which are critical in varying degrees of harshness, as well as those of Gragg and Gabel, *Commentaries*, (XLIII), xxxiii-xxxiv, and Kaminsky, *op. cit.*, 284, 305, n. 15, which are cautiously favourable.

105. Cugnoni, *op. cit.*, 551-552.

106. The analysis of Aeneas's contribution to the science of geography in A. Berg, *Aenea Silvio de' Piccolomini (Papst Pius II.) in seiner Bedeutung als Geograph* (Halle, 1901), esp. 29, 44, is to be preferred to that by K. H. Müller, *Aenea Silvio de' Piccolomini's literarische Tätigkeit auf dem Gebiete der Erdkunde und dessen Einfluss auf die Geographen der Folgezeit* (Fürth, 1903), 51f.

107. Compare *De liberorum educatione* (*supra*, n. 86) with the treatise of Vittorino, conveniently consulted in W. H. Woodward, *Vittorino da Feltre and other Humanist Educators* (Cambridge, 1897), esp. 243.

108. The phrase is from the bull *In minoribus agentes* (26 April, 1463),—the last and most famous of his disavowals of his youth, — which may be consulted in Gaude, *op. cit.*, V, 172-180.

109. This interpretation is opposed to those usually advanced to explain his attitude as pope towards the humanists. On the one hand, we are told that he had sickened of the 'frivolities' of humanism, e.g., Creighton, *History*, III, 347f, and Paparelli, *op. cit.*, 286f, or, on the other, that the financial obligations of the Roman Church prevented patronage on a large scale, e.g., Pastor, *op. cit.*, III, 37.

110. *Commentaries*, V (XXX), 400.

111. Paparelli, *op. cit.*, 260, insists that his admiration betokens a secret harmony of soul with Franciscan poverty and solitude.

112. *Commentaries*, II (XXV), 134, 167; IV (XXX), 315-320.

113. *Commentaries*, VIII (XXXV), 523f is Aeneas's zestful record of the festivities surrounding the arrival of the head of St. Andrew in Rome.

114. Gragg and Gabel, *Commentaries* (XLIII), xxx.

115. Tenenti, *op. cit.*, has many pertinent observations on the conflicts of the age and Aeneas's involvement in them. See 26, 34, 191. The interpretation offered in the text steers a middle course between two extremes: Paparelli, *op. cit.*, 26-27, 80-85, insists that Aeneas was aware of the conflicts and also that he succeeded in reconciling them; Gregorovius, *op. cit.*, VII, I, 162, 217 can see no sense of conflict in Aeneas because he was

without principles, being compounded only of frivolity and vanity.

116. His account of his election is a good example of his self-deception, *Commentaries*, I (XXII), 93-103.
117. R. Haubst, *op. cit.*, *passim*; Schürmeyer, *op. cit.*, 50.
118. Baronius-Raynaldus, *op. cit.*, XXIX (1460), 230-231; Haubst, *op. cit.*, 203-204: 'Solenit enim homines facta magis spectare quam verba, et presidemt plerumque suorum vitam et mores populos imitatur.'
119. The older explanation for his failure to inaugurate extensive church reform was that Aeneas was hampered by his own morally shoddy past: Voigt, *op. cit.*, III, 99-101; Haller, *op. cit.*, 205f. In contrast, H. Jedin makes Aeneas's concern for the crusade bear full responsibility. See his 'Studien über Domenico de'Domenichi,' *Akad. d. Wissenschaften und d. Literatur in Mainz. Abhand. d. Geistes- u. Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse* 5 (1957), 177-300, here 185-186.
120. *Commentaries*, VII (XXXV), 499-502. Jedin, *History* (n. 46), I, 24, says that his antagonism was provoked by Nicolas's continuing sympathy with conciliarism. The text in the *Commentaries* will support this interpretation only with difficulty.
121. K. Pleyel, *Die Politik Nikolaus V.* (Stuttgart, 1927), 95f.
122. Haller, *op. cit.*, 194: 'Wie die Welt und die Kirche um 1450 aussahen, das spiegelt sich in seinen Schicksalen.'
123. As Haubst, *op. cit.*, 198, says in another connection: '—zgleich war er sich aber auch immer mehr bewusst geworden, wie wenig seine eigene Beredsamkeit und seine Verhandlungskunst in den Wirren seiner Zeit vermohten.'
124. To the contrary, Paparelli, *op. cit.*, 250, explains the retreat to the countryside by reference to 'il suo virgiliano amore della compagnia e degli ozi'.
125. *Commentaries*, XII (XLIII), 824. There was, of course, a political dimension in all of Aeneas's activities as a crusader, *supra*, n. 65.

THE FIFTH MONARCHY MEN: POLITICS AND THE MILLENNIUM

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Of the Puritan sects which proliferated in Cromwellian England, the Fifth Monarchy Men were distinctive because of the extreme political implications which they drew from their deep commitment to millennialism.¹ Sometimes called "millenaries" by their fellow countrymen, or "anabaptists" by continental observers, this sect wanted to set up the kingdom of Jesus Christ for His thousand-year rule by the Saints. Its members hoped to realize their quest for a religious utopia² by making the old kingdoms of the Stuarts into new saintly kingdoms of the Lord. In order to carry out this idea, several of the leading Fifth Monarchy spokesmen urged Oliver Cromwell to invoke a "Jewish Sanhedrin" or Parliament of Saints which first assembled in June, 1653.³

The Parliament of Saints or Barebones Parliament, whose 140 members were nominated by Independent church congregations and selected by the Council of the Army, proved to be shortlived and unsuccessful, but these very characteristics served to dramatize the social aspect of the Fifth Monarchy program as well as to shape the course of the sect's future political development. Although most of the Fifth Monarchy leaders did not sit in the Barebones Parliament, a radical group of M. P.'s led by Major-General Thomas Harrison, representing various social groups, attacked the system of tithes and patronage within the Church; in addition, they advocated the codification of the law and the abolition of the Court of Chancery within the nation's legal system. These steps were anathema to Cromwell (usually a conservative in matters of social reform), and his friends terminated the experiment in government by the Saints on 12 December.

The Fifth Monarchy Men believed that the dissolution of the Barebones Parliament was not only a personal apostasy on the part of Cromwell but also a betrayal of the New Model Army's previous engagements, such as the Declaration of Musselburgh (August 1, 1650), to usher in the one thousand-year rule of the Saints under the kingship of Jesus Christ.⁴ At numerous Independent church meetings in the city of London, the Fifth Monarchy Men began to lash out at the new Instrument of Government which proclaimed Cromwell Lord Protector of England on 16 December 1653. For example, three days later at St. Anne's church in Blackfriars, Christopher Feake and Vavasor Powell called Cromwell the "dissembleingst perjured villaine in

the world."⁵ Feake and Powell were brought into custody and were soon released, but for the rest of the life of the Protectorate, most of the Fifth Monarchy leaders spent a considerable part of their time in prison, presumably because of the threat they represented to the security of the Protectorate government. In his play, "Cutter of Coleman-Street," Abraham Cowley portrayed a young adherent of the Fifth Monarchy faith named Tabitha, who "was wont to go every Sunday a-foot over the Bridge to hear Mr. *Feak*, when he was prisoner in *Lambeth* house; she has had a Vision too her selfe of Horns, and strange things."⁶

The primary inspiration for the millennial views of the Fifth Monarchy sect was, of course, the Bible: the seventh chapter of the book of Daniel and the twentieth chapter of the book of Revelation. The four beasts of Daniel's prophetic vision corresponded to four great kingdoms (the Babylonian, the Persian, the Grecian, and the Roman), and the ten horns of the fourth beast (the Roman) corresponded to ten kings. Just before the fourth beast with all its horns would be completely destroyed, Daniel prophesied that *three* of the horns would be plucked up by a little horn. Before the Barebones Parliament this was taken as a reference to the beheaded Charles I who ruled over England, Scotland, and Ireland.⁷ After the Barebones Parliament the Fifth Monarchists saw the little horn as Cromwell who, in the course of his conquests, had subdued the same three kingdoms.⁸ In this way the prophet Daniel spoke directly to God's own Englishmen who would help usher in the Fifth Monarchy or the millennial kingdom of the Saints. Just exactly when the beast's fall would occur was a matter of considerable speculation among Fifth Monarchists, and it is at this point that many of them turned to the apocalyptic language of the book of Revelation for guidance. Here they found through a kind of "scriptural arithmetic" that the beast would reign for 1260 days (each day representing a year). By starting the reign of the beast in the year 396 ("the end of paganism") some Fifth Monarchists arrived at the year 1656 as the beginning of the Fifth Monarchy—the new Jerusalem; others, more cautious, began later and arrived at a date as remote as 1701. Nearly all of the Fifth Monarchy Men spoke of the thousand-year reign of Christ with His Saints after the fall of the beast of Babylon.

Ever since Jesus Christ enjoined men to pray "Thy kingdom come, thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven," the "pursuit of the millennium" has been a fairly persistent phenomenon of Christian sects from Montanus to the seventeenth century.⁹ Despite the richness and variety of the millennial tradition on the continent, the Fifth Monarchy Men do not appear to have been directly

influenced by the views of their European predecessors. They made occasional references to the activities of John of Leyden at Münster¹⁰ and at least one reference to the famous Italian and Bohemian millennialists—Savonarola and Hus.¹¹ However, apart from the writings of Jacob Böhme, English millennialism largely drew its immediate strength from English writers¹² and from the chaplains of Cromwell's Army (1645-48). Several of the Fifth Monarchy preachers had served in the New Model Army during the late 1640's, and one of the millennial strongholds in the 1650's continued to be two regiments of the Army.¹³ Millennialism in the New Model Army had been a part of its chaplains' general theological view known as Antinomianism.¹⁴

Antinomianism does not mean unlicensed sexual behavior or communal living which are only two of the extremes which this doctrine took in other Cromwellian sects related to the Fifth Monarchy Men—the Ranters and the Diggers respectively. By Antinomianism is meant the spiritual belief that the Elect or Saints of God are able to achieve assurance of salvation solely by the free gift of God's grace, i.e., by the Holy Spirit and not by obedience to the Mosaic law. The Antinomians eschewed both the assistance of human reason or good works, which was the error to which the Arminians tended, and the reliance upon a covenant or pact between God and man, which was the error to which Covenant theologians tended. By disengaging themselves from any kind of rational or legalistic program of salvation, the Antinomians achieved assurance of salvation by stressing the indwelling presence of the Holy Spirit to the exclusion of church or state ordinances. This doctrine of the indwelling Spirit was carried to extremes by two other Cromwellian sects also related to the Fifth Monarchy Men—the Quakers and the Muggletonians. Lodowick Muggleton damned his opponents to eternal perdition, and the Quaker, James Naylor, assumed the role of the Messiah.

Nearly all of the members of the Fifth Monarchy sect also appear to be clearly in the wake of the Antinomian emphasis upon the role of the Holy Spirit and the millennial kingdom of the Saints,¹⁵ but they, too, carried their views to an extreme, although of a still different kind. Their proposal to substitute the judicial but not the ceremonial law of Moses for the civil law of England bordered on political subversion. At least that was the implication of Cromwell's remarks before Parliament in September, 1654, when he criticized the Fifth Monarchy plan to impose a "Judaicall law" upon the nation.¹⁶ The use of Mosaic law is significant because it seems to be a

curious reversal of the anti-legalism that was implicit in the term Antinomian.

The Fifth Monarchy Men turned to the Mosaic law not as any legal aid in achieving assurance of salvation but instead as a general guide to show those who had this assurance of salvation just how the millennial kingdom, once Christ had come, was to be governed.¹⁷ What it would mean in effect, according to one hostile critic, was that "the *Statute Book* (the long experience and caution of our wise ancestors) shall be thrown out of doors, and men shall come into a Senate to consult of *Politick Emergencies* with Bibles in their hands."¹⁸ What they were seeking in their Biblicalism, and this would have shocked the Antinomian Army chaplains, were outward ordinances for an inward spirituality.¹⁹ They tried to find Biblical ordinances because each of them had had only a "glimpse of Zion's glory" and because there was no common agreement, apart from the emphasis on the Mosaic Code, as to the exact details of the millennial rule. Here was the characteristic dilemma of those in the Antinomian tradition, namely, the voice of the Holy Spirit was subject to multiple interpretations.²⁰ It had been to counteract precisely this individualistic, almost anarchical, tendency of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit that many of the Fifth Monarchy Men turned back to the tangible and literal authority of Judaic law. And this literalism was symptomatic of their chiliastic view of the millennium as well, for nearly all of the Fifth Monarchs preferred a personal and visible appearance in the flesh of Jesus Christ instead of a strictly spiritual or inward manifestation of the thousand-year kingdom.

It should by no means be assumed that a *spiritual* notion of millennialism had no strong spokesmen in Cromwellian England. Outside Fifth Monarchy ranks—outside "the persecuted remnants"—a sizeable group of Independents and sectarians did have a pervasive grasp of such a spiritual millennium.²¹ Even the Lord Protector expressed his sympathies with this spiritual concept at the very same time that he denounced the visible forms of the Fifth Monarchs.²² In addition, the Fifth Monarchs did not allow Thomas Goodwin and John Owen, both favorite Independent chaplains at Cromwell's court, to forget that they once had been strong advocates of a spiritual kingdom of Christ, even if it was only the speculation of "quiet dreamers." But Owen in rebuttal shrewdly noted the possible threat that chiliasm presented to the state: "This we find by *woefull experience*, that all who from the spirituality of the *Rule of Christ*, and delight therein, have degenerated into carnall apprehensions of the beauty and glory of it, have for the most part, been given up to carnall acting."²³ "Carnall acting" for the Fifth Monarchist Thomas Venner

and his obscure group of "armed insurrectionists" meant two abortive revolts—one in 1657 and one in 1661—before they were executed by the state. Most Fifth Monarchy Men stood somewhere between the "quiet dreamers" and the "armed insurrectionists."²⁴

John Thurloe, Secretary to the Protectorate Council of State, was convinced beyond doubt that the Fifth Monarchy Men were planning to take over the government. Accordingly, he established a very extensive spy system that kept surveillance over the sect's activities, and when Venner's first bid for power came, the troops were ready for him. As one reads the reports Thurloe received, as well as some of the anonymous Fifth Monarchy tracts, it does seem that his fears were justified.²⁵ Take this inflammatory passage from Rogers: "Come Sirs! prepare your *companies* for King Jesus, his *Mount Zion* Musterday is at hand, his *Magazine* and *Artillery*, yea his most excellent *mortar-pieces* and *batteries* be ready, we wait only for the *Word* from on high to *fall on*."²⁶ When another of Thurloe's agents reported that Powell had promised Rogers 20,000 Saints from Wales in order to overthrow the Lord Protector,²⁷ it is no wonder that Thurloe became convinced that Rogers and his friends were subversive. With regard to the use of troops, however, a foreign contemporary wrote: "Suppose that the Anabaptists could produce 5000 really valiant fighting-men, yet, being for the most part untrained, and without arms, horses, or able commanders, what could they do against an old, well-disciplined army, led with excellent conduct and accustomed to conquer? And as the Government had many watchful eyes set over them, it would be impossible for them to arm, horse and embody themselves without discovery."²⁸ Despite the Fifth Monarchy strength in the Army, nearly all of the Fifth Monarchy Men, especially Harrison, must have been aware of the truth of these observations. Their leaders stoutly denied any intention of encouraging or supporting insurrection.²⁹ But even if their denials were based merely upon expedient decisions against foredoomed plans of revolt rather than upon a deep conviction that Christ's kingdom was not to be ushered in with bloodshed, it is true that none of them accepted invitations to participate in Venner's revolts.³⁰

If the Fifth Monarchy leaders were not *fighting* Saints ready for direct revolutionary action in the sense that Venner's followers were, they did not become *suffering* Saints either, willing to allow the Fifth Monarchy to come by the progressive revelations of the Holy Spirit alone. They made preparations for Christ's second coming by means of seditious pamphlets and sermons which enabled them to bring the Cromwellian Protectorate into discredit, even to the point of not recognizing its claims to legitimacy.³¹ The chief weapon that the gov-

ernment employed in order to combat Fifth Monarchy preaching was imprisonment of the more influential and outspoken leaders by order of the Council of State. Rogers, Feake, and Harrison all spent long periods in various prisons, and when the prisoners petitioned for a court trial, they were informed that the proceeding in their cases was an act of mercy; court trial, they were told, would mean death.³² In the case of Rogers, his friends arranged a special interview for him at Whitehall with the Lord Protector who had once befriended him. When Rogers asked Cromwell why he had been imprisoned for "the *Testimony of Jesus Christ*," (i.e., preaching gospel truths), Cromwell told him that he had not been imprisoned for this reason (in fact no one in England had been) but only because he had been "a stirrer up of sedition." Cromwell specifically exempted Rogers from any charge of treason and went on to say: "Some words are *actions*, and words are conjugall with *actions*, for actions and words are as sharp as *swords*, and such things I charge you with, and you suffer not for the testimony of *Jesus Christ*." The most that you can say against me, replied Rogers, is that I am an "evil speaker" and not an "evil doer," adding it is abhorrent to me "to make words matters of fact as you do."³³

Cromwell believed that the preaching of the gospel should in no way be impeded until it began to threaten the existing political and social order—a far cry, incidentally, from the view he held when Charles Stuart was King. If the preaching of the gospel did threaten the existing order, then Cromwell thought that strong measures such as imprisonment had to be taken. Some of the government's advisors felt that "indulgency will rather heighten their evell, then win them from it."³⁴ Others, including John Milton, became convinced that imprisonment provided the Fifth Monarchy with the very fuel it needed in order to keep an otherwise sputtering cause alive.³⁵ (Indeed, Rogers seemed to thrive on persecution.) The government also made several attempts to win over Fifth Monarchy Men by persuasion. The friendly overtures to Harrison, Feake, and Rogers fell on deaf ears, but two of the lesser figures in the movement were actually won to the government's side in 1655, thereby producing a schism which weakened but by no means destroyed the sect.³⁶

The defections in the ranks of the Fifth Monarchists resulting from the alternating government tactics of imprisonment and persuasion brought back to the movement a problem which had plagued it earlier. The problem was "a very sensible *decay of Spirit*," a flagging interest, among the rank and file.³⁷ In the early 1650's—before the calling of the Barebones Parliament—an attempt had been made to stir up interest through the war with Holland which came, as Feake

put it, by an "irresistible Dispensation" from God. While Cromwell generally believed in a strong alliance between the two Protestant republics, the Fifth Monarchy Men pressed for the vigorous prosecution of the war until Holland would submit. Victory over the Dutch was part of an expansionist program which a few Fifth Monarchists hoped to carry to France, and even to Rome itself.³⁸ The ultimate goal of these visionaries was to subject not only England but also the four corners of the earth as well to the reign of "King Jesus" and His Saints—Saints, it might be added, who usually seemed to be "*English Christians*".³⁹ But most of these schemes came to an end with the termination of the Dutch War in April, 1654. Implicit in this nationalistic expansionism, especially as it affected Dutch Protestantism, was a certain religious intolerance. It is significant that most Fifth Monarchy tracts are distinctly lacking in the expressions of liberty of conscience that had been characteristic of the New Model Army, or even Cromwell himself.⁴⁰

Another unsuccessful tactic in which the Fifth Monarchy Men engaged as their strength again began to decline in 1656 and 1657 was to make connections with the Commonwealth Men. The Commonwealth Men were in some respects the heirs of the Levellers,⁴¹ who had sought political and religious rights for all men based upon reason and natural law, whereas the Fifth Monarchy Men sought the religious and political privileges of the Saints only, based upon the manifestations of the Holy Spirit. As early as the Whitehall Army Debates in 1648-49, Harrison had expressed his misgivings with the Leveller program, and it is significant that the Barebones Parliament would do nothing in behalf of the imprisoned Leveller leader, John Lilburne.⁴² Nevertheless, it should be noted that the social reforms which the Barebones Parliament tried to effect were integral parts of both the Fifth Monarchy and Leveller programs as far back as the days of the New Model Army. There is some evidence that the Fifth Monarchy Men and the Commonwealth Men did try to reach a rapprochement in 1656, the year of Henry Vane's pamphlet, *A Healing Question*.⁴³ Vane's pamphlet attempted to bring these two extremes together, and it has a clear millennial ring. Rogers' later writings state that human laws should be based upon reason and natural right, but he made it clear that his preference, like Richard Baxter's, was for a "Theocratick or a godly COMMONWEALTH."⁴⁴

The social reforms on which the Levellers and the Fifth Monarchy Men were in agreement did not reflect an interest on the part of the leaders of either group in any social "leveling" process as was the case with the Diggers. The Fifth Monarchist John Spittlehouse had only praise for "the *ranks and orders of men*, whereby *England*

hath been known for hundreds of years; as *a Nobleman, a Gentleman, a Yeoman*, (that being a good interest of the Nation, and a great one:)."⁴⁵ And Mary Cary saw that the pouring forth of the Spirit was confined to no status group: "Not only men, but women shall prophesie; not only those who have University-learning, but those who have it not; even servants and hand maide."⁴⁶ Nevertheless, the Fifth Monarchy attacks upon the tithing clergy and upon the common lawyers are coupled with scattered references to the oppression of the poor, especially in London and the provincial cities such as Norfolk and Bristol. It seems possible that some of these were "new poor" whose oppression consisted of burdensome excise and customs duties as well as the loss of "goods and estates for non-payment of unwarrantable contributions" to the government.⁴⁷ But some of these Fifth Monarchy followers were, as John Pell wrote to Thurloe, "Men variously impoverished by the long troubles, full of discontents, and tired by long expectation of amendment, (such) must needs have great propensions to hearken to those that proclaim times of refreshing—a golden age—at hand." It is no wonder, then, Pell continued, that some men will listen to "glad tidings, under the name of the kingdom of Christ and of the saints; especially when so many prophecies are cited and applied to these times."⁴⁸ Despite the Fifth Monarchy appeal through a broadly conceived political millennium, and despite its appeal through a specific yet limited social program ancillary to that political millennium, Fifth Monarchism failed to arouse any mass appeal which had characterized similar millennial groups on the continent.

The Fifth Monarchy Men constituted a millennial sect which, like other sects in the 1650's, grew out of Antinomianism, especially as it existed in the New Model Army. With the victories of that Army came the collapse of the traditional authority of the realm: the Stuart monarchy and the Anglican church. Both Cromwell and the Fifth Monarchy Men brought to the solution of this politico-religious problem a common millennial view which resulted in the convocation of the Barebones Parliament. Cromwell's *spiritual* view of the millennium and his social conservatism caused him to abandon this experiment in social reform. His apostasy was the signal for the *temporal* millenarians or Fifth Monarchy Men to lay the foundation for the kingdom of Christ first in England and later throughout the world. Having refused to allow social reform under the Barebones Parliament, the Cromwellian government also felt that it had to act boldly against the Fifth Monarchy's efforts to set up the political rule of the saintly few—a position, ironically, which had considerable appeal to Cromwell. The Fifth Monarchy movement in England was

not the result of the activities of an influential religious prophet, but it may be said to have come to prominence primarily as a reaction against the way in which Cromwell seemed to be playing that role. To them Cromwell seemed to be perpetuating the remnants of the society they had fought to end.

Although the Fifth Monarchy Men agreed on a general chiliastic pattern taken from Daniel and Revelation, the crucial problem for them was the means whereby the earthly holy community was to be realized. Not content to await the revelation of the Lord alone as *suffering Saints*, the Fifth Monarchy Men, except for the Venner insurrectionists, did not find it possible, either, to resort to arms as *fighting Saints*. This result was partly because they could not agree on the time when the millennium would begin, partly because they could not unite on a common constructive program of what to do until the millennium arrived, once the door of Parliament was closed to them. In fact no agreement had been reached about the nature of the millennial kingdom except for the acceptance of the importance of the Mosaic law. The voice of the Holy Spirit was not clear on these important matters. Hence many of the leaders dissipated their energies in seditious activities which the government successfully, and with some tolerance, contained by imprisonment and persuasion. In their grasping at straw issues (the Dutch War), and in their inability to seize the opportunity for alliance (the Commonwealth Men), the millennial claims of the Fifth Monarchy Men failed to engage the political realities of Cromwellian England.

1. The starting point for a treatment of the Fifth Monarchy Men is the book by Louise Fargo Brown, *The Political Activities of the Baptists and Fifth Monarchy Men in England During the Interregnum* (Washington, 1912).
2. On the quest for a religious utopia see Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, translated by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (New York, n.d.), pp. 211 ff; H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Kingdom of God in America* (New York, 1937), p. 49; Ernest L. Tuveson, *Millennium and Utopia* (Berkeley, California, 1949).
3. The standard treatment of this topic is H. A. Glass, *The Barebones Parliament* (London, 1899). The much needed revision has been begun by Geoffrey Nuttall in *The Visible Saints* (Oxford, 1957), chapter four. See also H. R. Trevor-Roper, "Oliver Cromwell and His Parliaments," *Essays Presented to Sir Lewis Namier*, edited by Richard Pares and A. J. P. Taylor (London, 1956), pp. 21-27.
4. For comment on the Declaration of Musselburgh, see John Rogers, *A Christian Concertation* (London, 1659), p. 62; *The Fifth Monarchy, or Kingdom of Christ* (London, 1659), p. 17.
5. *A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe Esq.*, edited by Thomas Birch (London, 1742), I, 641.
6. Abraham Cowley, *Essays, Plays and Sundry Verses*, text edited by A. R. Waller (Cambridge, 1906), p. 302.
7. Mary Cary, *The Little Horns Doom & Downfall* (London, 1651), p. 6.
8. *Calendar of State Papers (Domestic)*, 1653-1654, pp. 304-07.
9. Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium* (Fairlawn, New Jersey, 1957).
10. John Canne, *A Voice from the Temple* (London, 1653), p. 5; *The Fifth Monarchy, or Kingdom of Christ*, p. 1; *Look to It London* (N. p., 1648), p. 12.
11. *A Brief Description of the Future History of Europe* (N. p., 1650), p. 18; Edward Rogers, *Some Account of the Life and Opinions of a Fifth-Monarchy Man* (London, 1867), p. 82.

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12. To name only two: [John] Archer, *The Personall Reign of Christ upon Earth* (London, 1642), and Joseph Mede, *The Key of the Revelation* (London, 1650).
13. Those of Colonels Overton and Rich.
14. Leo F. Solt, *Saints in Arms* (London, 1960), chapter two.
15. Two exceptions are the Covenant tracts: William Aspinwall, *Thunder from Heaven* (London, 1655), and Vavasor Powell, *Christ and Moses Excellency* (London, 1650). For the influence of Walter Cradock's Antinomian views on Powell, see Geoffrey Nuttall, *The Welsh Saints, 1640-1660* (Cardiff, 1957), pp. 40-43.
16. *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell*, edited by Wilbur Cortez Abbott (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1937-47), III, 438.
17. Not many of the Fifth Monarchy tracts attempt to spell out in any great detail just how the period of the millennium will be ruled by the Saints. An exception is William Aspinwall, *A Brief Description of the Fifth Monarchy* (London, 1653), pp. 4-6. William Medley makes some specific recommendations for action until such time as God will make His will clearer to the Saints. See his *A Standard Set Up* (N. p., 1657), pp. 19-20. From Norwich came the following proposal for the Saints as early as 1649: "They shall rule the world by General Assemblies, or Church-Parliaments, of such Officers of Christ, and Representatives of the Churches, as they shall chuse and delegate, which they shall do, till Christ come in Person" *Certain Quaeres in Way of Petition, by Many Christian People, Dispersed Abroad Throughout the County of Norfolk and City of Norwich* (London, 1649), pp. 6-7.
18. *Confusion Confounded* (London, 1654), p. 8.
19. John Spittlehouse, *An Answer to One Part of the Lord Protector's Speech* (London, 1654), p. 8; *The Protector, (So Called,) in Part Unvailed* (London, 1655), pp. 60, 95.
20. "But one word more, and that is this; That though it is true, that usually Saints know the voice of Christ, and are able to say certainly, this is (or this is not) the voice of Christ. I say, though it be thus usually with them, yet there are some cases, in which they are uncertaine; and some truths about which they can neither say, that it is truth, or that it is not truth" (Cary, *op. cit.*, p. 47).
21. Thomas Goodwin, *A Sermon of the Fifth Monarchy* (London, 1654), pp. 18, 22; John Owen, *A Sermon Preached to the Parliament* (Oxford, 1652), p. 8; Peter Sterry, *England's Deliverance from the Northern Presbytery* (London, 1652), p. 3; James Culross, *Hanserd Knollys* (London, 1895), p. 97.
22. Abbott, *Cromwell*, III, 437.
23. Owen, *A Sermon*, p. 14.
24. These are almost the terms employed by Reverend Alexander Gordon in his article on Christopher Feake in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. For the division of Fifth Monarchy Men into "mere millenarians," "theoretical theocrats," and "practical theocrats," see John Stoughton, *History of Religion in England, from the Opening of the Long Parliament to the End of the Eighteenth Century*, new and revised edition (London, 1881), II, 59-60.
25. See *Some Considerations by Way of Proposall and Conclusion* (N. p., 1647), and *The Banner of Truth Displayed* (London, 1656).
26. John Rogers, *Jegar-Sahadytha* (N. p., 1657), p. 140.
27. Thurloe, *State Papers*, III, 137.
28. *Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers*, edited by O. Ogle, W. H. Bliss, and W. D. Macray (Oxford, 1869-76), II, 398.
29. Rogers, *A Christian Concertation*, "To the Council of State"; Rogers, *Jegar*, p. 39; Christopher Feake, *A Beam of Light* (London, 1659), pp. 44-45; Christopher Feake, *The Oppressed Close Prisoner in Windsor-Castle* (London, 1655), p. 2; John Canne, *The Time of the End* (London, 1657), p. 199; John Canne, *Truth with Time* (London, 1656), "Epistle Dedicatory"; John Tillinghast, *Generation-Work* (London, 1654), pp. 214-15. For Vavasor Powell's denials to Major-General James Berry of any designs "that tended to put things to distraction," see R. Tudur Jones, "Vavasor Powell and the Protectorate," *Congregational Historical Society Transactions*, XVII (August, 1953), 47.
30. Thurloe received information dated June 15, 1657, that Harrison, Feake, Canne, and Rogers met at a Mr. Daforne's house in Bartholomew Lane near the Royal Exchange, "where they professe themselves ready for an insurrection" (Thurloe, *State Papers*, VI, 349). However, Thomas Venner's journal indicates that although meetings took place between Venner and his followers and Harrison and his followers, the latter group refused to join with the former (Champlin Burrage, "The Fifth Monarchy Insur-

rections," *The English Historical Review*, XXV [October, 1910], 729, 732). Although Powell had the support in 1655 of some kind of armed force in Wales which might have been brought into use against the Protectorate, it is worth noting that he helped repulse in the spring of that year a royalist revolt against the Commonwealth in Wales led by Colonel Macowen (R. Tudur Jones, *Transactions*, XVII, 46).

31. Feake, *The Oppressed Close Prisoner*, Preface, pp. 3-4.

32. Samuel Richardson, *Plain Dealing*, (London, 1656), p. 14; *The Perfect Diurnall of... Armies*, number 270, February 5-12, 1655, pp. 41, 47-48.

33. *The Faithfull Narrative of the Late Testimony and Demand Made to Oliver Cromwell* (N. p., 1654), p. 9.

34. For example, Lord Broghill. See Thurloe, *State Papers*, IV, 343.

35. *The Works of John Milton*, general editor, Frank Allen Patterson (New York, 1931-38), VI, 365-66.

36. Thurloe, *State Papers*, IV, 348.

37. Feake, *A Beam of Light*, p. 44.

38. John Spittlehouse, *The First Addresses to His Excellencie the Lord General* (London, 1653), "To His Excellency the Lord General Cromwel"; Mary Cary, *The Resurrection of the Witnesses* (N. p., n.d.), pp. 131-38.

39. Cary, *The Resurrection of the Witnesses*, p. 50.

40. "That strange principle of theirs in insisting for a *Liberty of Conscience* for themselves," *Confusion Confounded*, p. 6.

41. Abbott, *Cromwell*, IV, 267.

42. See *The Clarke Papers*, edited by Charles H. Firth ("Camden Society Publications," 1891-1901), II, 185.

43. Abbott, *Cromwell*, IV, 220, 267.

44. Rogers, *A Christian Concertation*, pp. 62, 68. Perez Zagorin (*A History of Political Thought in the English Revolution* [London, 1954], p. 102) finds Leveler influences in Medley, *A Standard Set Up*, p. 16.

45. Spittlehouse, *An Answer to One Part*, p. 1.

46. Cary, *The Little Horns Doom & Downfall*, p. 238.

47. *Banner of Truth Displayed*, p. 4.

48. *The Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell*, edited by Robert Vaughan (London, 1839), I, 156.

RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION IN THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT*

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In France, religious persecution outlived Pierre Bayle and nearly outlived Voltaire. Only in the mid-1760's, when the Enlightenment had long been affecting other aspects of their thinking, did Catholics at last accept a measure of religious toleration. Six Calvinist pastors were put to death after 1745, and Jean Calas was condemned as late as 1762.¹ The purpose of this article is to study why the persecution of religions persisted in a non-theological age. Our understanding in this instance requires that we set aside strictly religious categories, and examine what role the secular state played in the thinking of Catholics and anti-Catholics alike; for it was this state to which the last Huguenot victims were sacrificed.

When eighteenth-century French Catholics thought about Calvinism, they thought not about the heretical principles and practices which imperilled their eternal souls, but about the living force which appeared to threaten their lives, their property, and their well-being in this world. Their fear of the Calvinists came from the Catholics' way of viewing the great events which marked the history of French Protestantism. The history books reminded Catholics about the sixteenth-century civil wars which had left the country scorched, torn, and prostrate, civil wars allegedly brought on by Huguenot fanaticism. The Catholics remembered also the Protestant Camisard revolt during Louis XIV's last wars against the coalition. Aided by British and Dutch money, unorganized bands of Calvinist peasants then had roamed the rough terrain of southeastern France, arousing in the hard-pressed authorities there an exaggerated fear of a supporting British and Savoyard invasion. Long after the wars were over and Louis XIV was dead, Frenchmen would recall how the foreign enemy and domestic Protestants had joined forces in the struggle which nearly destroyed France. These memories sustained a lasting feeling that Calvinists were anti-social and un-French, a feeling that would generate efforts toward systematic persecution of Calvinists under circumstances, such as war, when the French state and society seemed in danger.

The peace which came after 1715 gave hope to the Protestants. Harassment was only sporadic, and it did not seriously impede the

*A slightly different version of this article was read at the meeting of the American Historical Association in New York during December, 1960. For their helpful criticisms and advice, I wish to thank Professors C. C. Gillispie, R. Grew, and R. R. Palmer of Princeton University.

pastors and the dedicated Calvinist laity in the work of re-building their church. But in 1740 France again went to war, and the ensuing twenty-three years of military conflict and uneasy truce saw the re-crudescence of anti-Protestant sentiment. And this time the very vigor of the restored Calvinist organization reinforced the reviving fear. Although the proscribed and hunted pastors professed their loyalty to king and to France over and over again, the Catholics with a shudder noted not the professions of loyalty but the presence of pastors, men who incarnated in a new, organized form the old Calvinist tradition.

The revived persecution is illustrated in 1745 when Austrian and Piedmontese troops invaded Provence. Stories spread among the Catholics in Dauphiné that twenty-five Protestant "gentilshommes" planned to lead 25,000 Camisards to join the enemy. In November the parlement of Grenoble responded by taking the extraordinary action of condemning thirty-one Calvinist noblemen in a single decree.² The authorities watched anxiously for signs of organized practices by the Reformed Church. Let the Protestants think what they wanted about religion in their own homes, no matter. But when they chose deliberately to violate French laws by gathering for public worship, they exhibited a rashness which was thought to verge on revolt. Of seventy-three Protestants serving on the galleys or locked in the Tower of Constance in 1754, fifty-five had done no more than to attend a religious assembly.³

Even when the royal administration decided not to persecute, it acted from the same fear of the Calvinist revolt. The instructions sent to the new military governor of Languedoc in 1758 warned him that the troops were away, more pastors about, and assemblies more frequent. Harshness — hanging pastors, raiding assemblies, fining communities where the assemblies occurred — would not work; the Protestants would only be led to despair and to revolt. But leniency was not effective either. To negotiate with the pastors served only to make them bolder; this was always the danger in recognizing their existence without then repressing them. The only safe policy, therefore, was to mix gentleness with firmness. For example the governor should not try to disarm the populace, lest he both alarm the Catholics and show the Protestants how the authorities feared them. Let the Protestants get together in their homes for worship, directed the king's minister from Paris, but be on guard against the big assemblies. Above all, do not compromise royal authority by noticing too much. By this policy, he concluded, the Protestants were contained during the last war and so far in this.⁴ This uneasy spirit animated all the authorities' actions at the time, and the archives are full of records

showing their false starts and hesitations. The rising persecution, then, was not complete, but even when they did not act, the officials gave evidence of their political fears.

The political, although the most important, was not the only ingredient in eighteenth-century persecution. Daniel Ligou has shown how a social fear also contributed.⁵ Thoroughly frightened by Louis XIV's systematic persecution, the respectable Protestants, the merchants and the industrialists, had either left the country or embarked upon a kind of inner emigration by showing outward respect for Catholic forms and worshipping as Calvinists only in their homes. Law-abiding and friendly to the principle of order anyway, the bourgeois in their city houses were also more conspicuous to the authorities; before the 1760's they neither sought nor wanted any dealings with the revived Church "in the desert."

The Reformed Church, therefore, was left comprising a single class; its character was almost exclusively rural and peasant. This numerous Protestant peasantry, concentrated especially in the south, saw in Catholicism one part of the whole oppressive social order, and they clung to the ill-educated pastors with a fierce, nearly fanatical pride. But, for Calvinism, its association with the peasantry and with social unrest was unfortunate. At mid-century, France was suffering from a slack in trade and general economic instability caused by the wars; harvests also were bad, unemployment rose, and alarmed observers noted that many dangerous vagrants were wandering on the roads in search of work or charity. Social revolt, so it seemed to both Protestant and Catholic bourgeois, was impending, and in a Calvinist political rebellion they saw also the threatened peasant rising. This social fear was at work when the persecution of Protestants which began in 1745 for political reasons continued after the war was ended in 1748. The years 1748 through 1752 marked one of the two peaks in grain prices and the actions against peasant Protestantism went on and reached a level of intensity during the peacetime year, 1752, which matched the earlier war-induced persecution of 1745. Even in 1754 a Protestant at Geneva wrote warning his fellow Calvinists not to travel through Burgundy, for the inhabitants' "terror" over the rural wanderers' intent caused them to close roads and to question and to examine everyone who wished to enter a town.⁶ A similar mixture of political and social fears was at work during the next period of commercial distress and high grain prices, 1757-1760, and among its fruits were the Rochette affair at Caussade and the Calas affair at Toulouse.

* * *

To understand more fully the nature of the threat which Calvin-

ism was thought to pose, we may turn briefly to those attitudes toward the state which marked the thinking of the magistrates in the parlements. They too saw in Calvinism not heresy, but sedition. Men like them in the fourteenth century had no doubt understood it when Joan of Arc, a rebel in fact, died instead for the crime of heresy and religious indiscipline. But not in the eighteenth century. When the parlement of Toulouse in 1762 executed Pastor Rochette, whose real crime was heresy, his prosecutor felt that he had to make the court's position clear: the minister was put to death not at all for his theological errors, but for his politically rebellious behavior which was proved by his being a pastor.⁷ Such was one measure of eighteenth-century secularism.

If this secularism in politics antedated the eighteenth century, the widespread feeling in favor of extending the power of the secular state for the welfare of society evidently was new. And the Catholic magistrates shared in the rising secularist and statist sentiments. They took an especial fright when lawless men organized themselves in groups which would undermine the state and return men to the disorders of an earlier day. To illustrate the broad grounds for the magistrates' distrust of Protestants, we may examine the judges' views of another organized group which, they thought, threatened the health of French society.

The expulsion of the Society of Jesus from France during the 1760's ended the parlements' long struggle against ultramontanism. Their fight against the secular clergy who refused sacraments to the foes of *Unigenitus* had turned into a total attack on the Jesuits during the 1750's. The tone of excitement and urgency in the arguments against the Jesuits reached a higher pitch than ever it did when the courts dealt with Protestants. The judges, asked what made the Jesuits so dangerous, replied that the Jesuits' errors threatened the king, the state, and the secular welfare of all Frenchmen. The indictments and the decrees directed against the Jesuits were very explicit. The Jesuit, whether born in France or not, lived there always as a foreigner. Emissary of Rome, the alien Jesuit was incapable of receiving the impressions of the French national spirit. His will and his understanding were always at Rome; by the rules of his Order, he owed a total, slavish obedience to his General. The individual Jesuit's pledges meant nothing; they could be repudiated by the General at Rome whenever such action suited his or the Order's purpose. Each Jesuit was an automaton, simply one of the standardized, interchangeable parts in the world-wide Jesuit conspiracy. Each Jesuit necessarily embodied all the Society's pernicious views.

The list of all the criminal views and practices (such as kidnaping, wife-stealing, and murder) which the parlements imputed to a Jesuit, would be a long one. But worst of all, in their view, was that every Jesuit had to believe—or he could not be a Jesuit—in regicide and high treason. Extracts torn from the context of sixteenth-century Jesuit writings were circulated from parlement to parlement, confirming the judges in their direst fears about just how perverse and anti-social was the Society of Jesus. The inevitable result was the outlawing of the Order; its members had either to renounce their oaths or to get out of the country.⁸

The judges in the Jesuit affair, then, showed their fear of organized groups whose members shared in a tradition which menaced the secular French state, organizations whose alien spirit the state could neither assimilate nor tolerate. The Jesuit, like the Protestant, was dangerous for his alleged subversion of the political order. The coincidence in time between the magistrates' anti-Protestant activity and their frenetic hostility to ultramontanes and Jesuits suggests that deep statist sentiments were at work, sentiments gaining in strength and not deriving from war and economic crisis alone. After all, similar military and economic crises had come and gone before, but the Jesuits were expelled in 1760, and not in 1660, or earlier.

* * *

The problem next arises, why had the enlightened ideas of the day so little apparent effect in mitigating the persecution? Why did the philosophes, when writing so at length against historical fanaticism, say very little about the Huguenots until the 1760's? Analysis of what the philosophes, in particular Voltaire, meant by toleration and what they saw in Calvinism will contribute to an understanding of this question.

The enlightened eighteenth-century writers well knew that man's failure to achieve a better society was grounded chiefly in bad environment, a priest-ridden, Christian environment which had fostered superstition, fanaticism, and unreason. Voltaire, speaking over and over of the "infamous thing" which had to be crushed, meant by this more than the Roman Catholic Church, more than simple superstition and fanaticism; he meant all of Christianity which by its very essence tried to define the indefinable and caused men to insist on truth in an area where all was mysterious. This intrinsic Christian irrationality produced fanaticism; Christianity's inevitable works were not charity, but the Inquisition, the assassination of Henry IV, and Calvin's murder of Servetus. To be a good Christian was to be a fanatical, persecuting bigot.⁹ But this Christianity which Voltaire so detested embraced Calvinism as well as Catholicism; when all was

said and done, Calvin was no better than Loyola. And not only was Calvinism Christian and irrational, it was a sect, bad enough for this reason alone. Truth was a single thing. "There are no sects in geometry," wrote Voltaire in the *Philosophical Dictionary*; "one does not speak of a Euclidean, or an Archimedean."¹⁰ The moral truths which were written in natural law were plain for all to see, and a long dispute meant only that both parties were wrong. Sects squabbling over truth could only hinder the common perception of the single moral truth which paralleled the truth in mathematics.

The outcome of this was the view that sects in general and Christian sects in particular threatened the welfare of society and would undermine the state. The philosophes shared, in fact, the common, stereotyped views held by French Catholics that the Calvinists were rebellious. As Voltaire wrote, Calvinism "from its very nature necessarily produced civil wars and shook the foundations of states."¹¹ The Camisards, for example, illustrated how faith and fanaticism were linked, and these rebels represented the true essence of Calvinism. According to Voltaire, Huguenots, appealing to God and conscience against legitimate authority, called down upon themselves those "just laws which forbade tumultuous assemblies, insults, and sedition."¹²

What, then, did toleration mean? Voltaire and his disciples advanced their program for religious toleration first because they were themselves humane, because they hated cruelty and injustice. It would be foolish to deny this. But if the philosophes were tolerant, it was not because they felt that Calvinists as Calvinists might have something useful to say. It was simply that to persecute Huguenots in the name of a nonexistent, nonsensical Catholic truth was to be even more absurd than they. At bottom, the philosophes did not think that diversity and the process by which views conflict were good in themselves; they did not uphold the values of John Stuart Mill's pluralistic society. In its own way, toleration was a tactical step in their general strategic plan for eradicating Christianity and its sects. Voltaire in his *Treatise on Toleration* favored letting the Calvinists live in peace like the Lutherans and the Jews, but the reason he gave was that "the multiplicity of sects weakens them."¹³ The tragedy of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes was that it caused the Huguenots through silly pride to revive their old religious beliefs and thus to return to fanaticism. Toleration was good for society because it caused men to become bored with religion. What Voltaire and the others wanted was assimilation of denatured Calvinists and Catholics alike into a secular, enlightened French society. But it is worth noting that their arguments for toleration never led Voltaire and the others to say that

devoted Calvinists were loyal Frenchmen, only that if left alone, they would become good citizens by ceasing to be Calvinists.

Upholding the unitary, secular, and enlightened state, the philosophes then advanced a program of religious toleration which was in a sense irrelevant to the real bases of persecution before 1763. They concentrated their fire effectively on the fanaticism which silly dogmatic differences engendered, but in doing so they attacked an older persecution which was outmoded in the new day of political persecution. Stop religious disputation, stop killing one another over minor theological distinctions in an age which cares nothing for those distinctions, urged Voltaire. Can God, he asked, really think that the Catholic who slaughters twenty-four pregnant Huguenot women is twice as holy as the Catholic who dispatches only twelve, and he noted that "these are strange titles to eternal glory."¹⁴ Again and again Voltaire, Marmontel, and others argued that it was the mistaken pursuit of glory by upholding unknowable theological truths that caused men to persecute. But unfortunately the men who were doing the persecuting during the eighteenth century could read this enlightened message, agree, and go on persecuting. In their view, they persecuted not for divine truth, but for the protection of secular French society.

Voltaire's different responses to two cases involving Protestants who were on trial simultaneously at Toulouse in 1761 and 1762 will illustrate the point. Pastor Rochette's arrest north of Montauban had stirred hysterical Catholic fears of a Protestant rising. When asked to intervene for the doomed pastor, Voltaire answered that he could do nothing; the Calvinists were allowed to do what they wanted in their own homes, he wrote, but although "Jesus Christ said that He would be found wherever two or three were gathered in His name . . . , when there are three or four thousand, it's the devil who is found there."¹⁵ Voltaire, sharing the common view of the capacities of seditious Calvinism, mistakenly assumed together with the Catholics that there had in fact been a Protestant rebellion. The pastor's plight aroused almost no one's sympathy. But compare with this Voltaire's reaction to the other case, that of Jean Calas. Calas, accused of having murdered his eldest son through fanatical Huguenot hatred for his son's alleged Catholicism, was put to death by the parlement of Toulouse. The story of Voltaire's dramatic and successful campaign to rehabilitate Calas's memory is well known. But by selecting this case to dramatize the issue of religious intolerance, and by his choice of arguments — the court, clergy, and populace at Toulouse could well have been medieval, as he described them — Voltaire was in fact attacking the old and outmoded, not the new, basis of in-

tolerance. Finding bigotry in the Toulousains, Voltaire attributed it purely to religion, not at all to the state. And in defending Calas, Voltaire could illustrate Catholic perversity without defending the rights of superstitious and subversive Protestantism to speak out. Voltaire's idealized Calas was a kindly and moral *père de famille* who, though nominally a Calvinist, lived and thought virtuously like any ordinary deist; according to Voltaire, Calas cared so little about his own religion that he actually approved his son Louis's conversion to Catholicism. The tacit choice which he made for Calas and against the pastor indicates that Voltaire and others shared with the judges, even the ones at Toulouse whom Voltaire called "barbarous Druids," a powerful feeling in favor of protecting the state. Having attacked persecution on obsolescent grounds, that is, its theological and not its political foundation, the message of the Enlightenment on toleration, then, was not effective in alleviating the conditions under which Protestants lived before the war's end in 1763.

* * *

For all these reasons—the social and political fears, the growth of statist sentiment, the partial irrelevance of enlightened argument, and other reasons, clerical pressure, for example—sporadic persecution of Protestants lasted until the 1760's. One last problem remains. Although statism and unitary rationalism persisted and grew, Calvinism after about 1763 no longer aroused French secular anxieties. The last isolated raid on a religious assembly took place in 1767, the same year when the parlements began tacitly to recognize Protestant marriage.¹⁶ Several reasons may explain the shift in Catholic thinking. The mid-century wars had come and gone, and the pastors' repeated professions of loyalty to France had been proved good by the conduct of their followers. And internal changes made the Reformed Church seem at last to be susceptible to assimilation within the French social and political order. At mid-century some of the Calvinist bourgeois, the ones who had retained allegiance to their faith as a matter of family honor, reentered the Reformed Church. The new middle-class pastors showed not a trace of fanaticism. But the faith which they preached and which the bourgeois faithful accepted was no longer Calvin's burning faith; it was a comfortable deism which scarcely distinguished them from the religiously indifferent, essentially deistic Catholic majority around them.¹⁷ The Calvinist views and leaders came more and more to seem consistent with good citizenship. Judges, administrators, and philosophes alike, now arguing for the same state interests which earlier dictated the policy of repression, at last welcomed the Calvinists into French society. Catholics, who continued to attend Mass and to reject Voltaire's skepticism, accepted the

toleration of the Enlightenment by calling it Christian.¹⁸ A tame, denatured Calvinism seemed to pose no significant threat. Now, for a time, the liberal and humanitarian ideas and values of the Enlightenment could work in society and have practical effect. But the history of the Revolution was to give ample proof that when religion became mixed again, although in a different way, with political and social resentments, intolerance on every side was far from dead.

1. See the list of pastors executed in France in C. Coquerel, *Histoire des églises du désert chez les protestants de France depuis la fin du règne de Louis XIV jusqu'à la révolution française*, 1841, I, 507-509.
2. Abbé J. Dedieu, *Histoire politique des protestants français, 1715-1794* (2v. 1925), I, 116.
3. See list of prisoners in C. Coquerel, *op. cit.*, I, 512-523.
4. "Les protestants sous Louis XV. Mémoire lu et approuvé au Conseil, pour servir d'instruction à M. le maréchal de Thomond, dans la conduite qu'il doit tenir à l'égard des protestants du Languedoc (7 janvier 1758)," *Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire du Protestantisme français*, XVIII (1869), 429-435.
5. "L'église réformée du Désert: fait économique et sociale," *Revue d'histoire économique et sociale*, XXXII (1954), pp. 143-167.
6. "Voltaire agissant en faveur des protestants en 1754," *Bull. Soc. Hist. Prot. Fr.*; XXXII (1883), 528-529.
7. Decree of parliament of Toulouse, Archives Départementales de la Haute Garonne, B 1653, March 6, 1762.
8. This episode is treated in detail in the histories of the various parlements. See J. Egret for Grenoble, Dubédat and Bastard—D'Estang for Toulouse, Glasson for Paris, etc. My argument, based on records of the parliament of Toulouse, is developed more fully in *The Calas Affair: Persecution, Toleration, and Heresy in Eighteenth-Century Toulouse* (Princeton, N. J., 1960), pp. 55-71.
9. P. Gay sustains essentially this position in *Voltaire's Politics: The Poet as Realist* (Princeton, N. J., 1959) pp. 239-272; see also E. Champendal, *Voltaire et les protestants de France* (Geneva, 1919), pp. 16-43.
10. *Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire*, Louis Molland, ed. (52v. 1877-1885), XX, 414.
11. *Siècle de Louis XIV* (1744) in Voltaire, *Oeuvres*, XV, 39.
12. *Traité sur la tolérance à l'occasion de la mort de Jean Calas* (1763) in Voltaire, *Oeuvres*, XXV, 37. Marmontel, friend and disciple of Voltaire, set down in his *Bélisaire* the description of his ideal sovereign. This monarch was intellectually humble and he did not presume to judge the truth of religious beliefs. But he was wary of the social effect of all beliefs. Public order and morals demanded that the sovereign ask always whether the holding of any particular belief might hinder a man's being a good citizen. Marmontel, *Bélisaire* (1767), chapter 15.
13. *Oeuvres*, XXV, 37.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
15. "La tolérance au XVIII^e siècle. Lettres inédites de Voltaire à M. Ribotte de Montauban (1761-1769)," *Bull. Soc. Hist. Prot. Fr.*, XXXI (1882), 167.
16. E. G. Léonard, "Les assemblées au désert," *Bull. Soc. Hist. Prot. Fr.*, LXXXVII (1938), 471; E. Arnaud, *Histoire des protestants du Dauphiné au XVI^e, XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles* (1876), III, 286-289.
17. Léonard, "Le culte public dans le protestantisme français du XVIII^e siècle," *Foi et Vie*, XXXVIII (1937), 431-457; Ligou, "L'église réformée," *Rev. d'hist. écon. et soc.* (1954), pp. 161-162.
18. Bien, *Calas Affair*, pp. 166-174.

LESSING AND HAMANN: TWO VIEWS ON RELIGION AND ENLIGHTENMENT

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Lessing has long since been left behind; he is merely a vanishing little way station on the systematic railway of world-history.... Poor Hamann, you have been reduced to a paragraph by Michelet.

—Søren Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, pp. 63, 224.

The Lessing "legend" is grounded in paradox. It rests on his total dedication to the Enlightenment ideal of *Sapere aude* — dare to use one's own understanding—while at the same time he viewed himself as heir apparent to German Protestantism. Lessing was a religionist who depended on rationalism for the solution to every major problem. The unity of these apparently diverse perspectives was summed up in Lessing's program of seeking truth, not claiming its possession. "If God held in his right hand all the truth, and in his left hand the ever active longing for the truth, and said to me: 'choose,' I should humbly grasp his left hand and cry: give me this, oh Father! the truth is for you alone."¹ If truth were relinquished to God, then at least Lessing could lay claims to salvaging history for man. In this form, what appeared to the *philosophes* as alien traditions, human revolution and divine revelation, were to be united.

Although the French philosophic tradition never quite reconciled itself to Lessing's compromise of ideological traditions, the German world has continued to view him as the peerless figure of Enlightenment. Even during his lifetime, Lessing was given the highest vote of confidence by his colleagues. This is admirably expressed in a *festschrift* dedicated to Lessing, comparing him with Plato, Sophocles, Aesop and Molière, in which it is remarked: "Whoever thinks the way Lessing does, thinks to the honor of Germany."²

Johann Georg Hamann neither tendered nor received such glowing tributes. His life was colorful, but hardly celebrated. Like most men of the Enlightenment, he was not a "professional philosopher." He did not have a position at a university, and, as a matter of fact, failed to complete his formal academic training. He thus avoided the ambiguity of the philosopher, of not knowing whether he was primarily responsible for teaching inherited traditions, or for searching out new systems of metaphysics. Like the Encyclopedists, he was a cultivated gentleman with both far ranging interests and a concrete field of intellectual activity. His specialty was philology and the area of comparative linguistics. Hamann had a working knowledge of Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Spanish, French, Italian and English; this in addition to his keen sense of style in his *Muttersprache*. Nor

does Hamann's resemblance to Enlightenment figures cease with problems of style. Like Voltaire, Condillac and Helvétius, he was profoundly influenced by David Hume, and was responsible for translating into German *The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*.

The fact that Hamann was unsuccessful when judged either by the current bourgeois or the militarist standards is likewise a characteristic he shared with many men of the Enlightenment intelligentsia. Social alienation was in the eighteenth century a legitimate way of approach to reconsidering fundamentals. However, he differed from the French *philosophes* in that his background was that of a commoner rather than an aristocrat. Unlike Lessing, who had a sinecure as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick at Wolfenbüttel, the "Magus of the North" worked in the not so splendid isolation afforded by his post as a customs official in Prussia. It was, to be sure, a plum of sorts for one unable to lay hold of a sinecure or survive in the highly competitive world of university life. Hamann in later years had as friends and colleagues the most famous men of the German Enlightenment, including Kant, Jacobi, and Herder. The next generation of scholars recognized in Hamann a prime mover in the German romantic movement.

From these humble origins sprang an outstanding critique of the method of pure reason so germane to Lessing's thought. Hamann fashioned the materials of empiricism and a mystically turned Lutheranism into a damaging estimate of the common intellectual formulas of the age of reason. However, prior to taking up Hamann's critique of the Lessing problem, we must examine specifically what its components were. Lessing's problem was in essence the attempt to overcome the dichotomy between conservative theological consequences of the religious conscience, and the radical secular consequences of the social conscience.³

Comparing comments of two brilliant commentators on Lessing, one sees just how ambiguous alternative interpretations of Lessing's approach to religion have been. Franz Mehring stated that "Lessing, a cheerful child of this world, did not possess any theological streak at all." He strove "to come to a conviction in religious questions, but he never arrived at a *positive* conviction."⁴ What we have in Mehring's presentation is a picture of a man who simply *supplanted* the idea of theology with the idea of history. "Lessing conceived religions not as logical but as historical categories. They were not imperishable but indispensable steps in the evolution of the human mind."⁵ A radically different view was offered by the poet, Heine. For him, Lessing was the fighter against the tyranny of purely historical thinking. Indeed, he was held to be the greatest theologian since Luther.

"After Luther had freed us from traditionalism and exalted the Bible as the only source of Christianity, there arose a desiccated worship of the word, and the letter of the Scriptures ruled as absolutely as once had tradition. Lessing contributed mainly to our deliverance from the tyranny of the letter. Like Luther he was not the sole warrior against tradition — but he was ever the most vigorous one."⁶ Put directly, the social function of religion, in its Enlightenment form, was the fusion of reason and the passions. The worship of the word as goal instead of as instrument led to idolization and idolatry of the forms and not the contents of religion. History was to bring religion out of its sectarian pride.

Omitting references to large terms like Enlightenment and Protestantism, what is the answer to the question: did Lessing possess a religious consciousness? For if Mehring is correct, it is pointless to study the nature of Lessing's views on this subject, much less its effects on Hamann. On the other hand, if Heine is correct, all doubt of Lessing having had a religious conscience would be obviated; and as with a prophet of Lutheranism like Hamann, we could but enquire into the structure and consequences of his views on religion.

I should say that Mehring caught the apparent and Heine the underlying significance of Lessing's thoughts on religion. Adding to the ambiguity was Lessing's own inconsistency in evaluating German Protestantism and French Deism. Early in *The Education of the Human Race* he wrote: "Revelation gives nothing to the human race which human reason could not arrive at on its own; only it has given, and still gives to it, the most important of these things sooner."⁷ This traditional Deist formulation is, however, best understood in the light of subsequent statements, in which Lessing makes clear that individual education is a microcosmic representation of how revelation functions throughout human history. In this way Lessing set for himself the enormous task of bringing about a rapprochement between Enlightenment and Christianity.⁸

Beyond this equation, the theological direction of Lessing's thought is shown in his amalgam of history and religion. "It will come! It will certainly come! The time of perfecting, when man, the more convinced his understanding feels about an ever better future, will nevertheless not need to borrow motives for his actions from this future; for he will do right because it is right, not because arbitrary rewards are set upon it, which formerly were intended simply to fix and strengthen his unsteady gaze in recognizing the inner, better, rewards of knowledge. The time of a new eternal gospel, promised to us in the primers of the New Covenant itself, will certainly come."⁹

This historical foundation in Lessing, "the time of the perfect-

ing" rather than the time of perfection, reveals an even deeper duality of mind toward the Enlightenment. Sharing with it the general disdain for dogmatic theology, priestly orders, institutional religious abuses, Lessing managed to eschew the critical paths established by Voltaire, Helvétius and Holbach. He sensed that even were we to get a universal admission that religion is a series of fraudulent statements serving narrow clerical interests, we have not done with religion either as an historical fact, or as a rationalized emotional response to the paradoxes of existence. Even dogmas which are false, *prima facie*, are important for Lessing in that they form an integral part of sacred and profane history. To separate dogma from religion is one thing; to separate man from religion is quite another. To heap abuse on the non-scientific character of religion is, to Lessing, sure evidence of a fragmented sense of the evolution of social man. Of course, Lessing was perceptive enough to see that this historicity cuts two ways. For religion could no longer be considered as given to man with a finality. The whole system of miracles is viewed by Lessing as a vulgarized attempt to account for sudden changes in the historical fabric of antiquity. Lessing's attempted synthesis of theism and deism, whatever its intellectual shortcomings, served as a way out of the impasse eighteenth century philosophical ideologies had reached.

A conception which sifts out the irrational elements in dogmatic theology, and seeks to substitute a naturalist basis for religious belief, leads to a situation which, in Lessing's view, places revelation into an educational framework. His subtlety on this is perfectly captured by Cassirer. "The historicity of the sources of religion is no longer utilized merely for the purpose of criticizing, or of refuting, religious doctrine; it now becomes a fundamental element of the deepest sense of religious teachings. If Spinoza seeks to dispute the absolute truth of religious revelation by an investigation of its history, Lessing attempts by the same procedure to accomplish the opposite end, namely, the restitution of religion. The authentic, the only absolute religion is simply that religion which comprehends within itself the totality of the historical manifestations of the religious spirit."¹⁰ It can be said, therefore, that Lessing's religious consciousness is indubitably established, first, by his belief in the unity of religion and history; second, by his notion of rationally merging education and revelation; and third, by a conscious concern with the double problem of religion—as a form of consciousness in contrast to a style of organization, as the religion of Christ in contrast to the Christian religion.¹¹ The search for the historically true led Lessing into an analysis of the social functions of religion. Granting every premise of the French Deist psychological critique of religious belief, he went

beyond it by asking the next question: what now remains of religion?

We can, by implication, begin to discern the contours of Lessing's theology. I say theology rather than religion, because while it is true that he held no brief for dogma, his primary contribution was towards a theoretical *justification* for relating historical fact to Christian revelation. This theological mooring is clear in his frequent excursions into the relation of reason and belief. It took the form usually of distinguishing between miracles observed and miracles reported in sacred texts. This was another form in which Lessing expressed his belief in a fundamental dualism between Christ and Christianity, prophecy as authority and prophets as historians, preaching as teaching and teaching as preaching. Even the phrasing of Lessing's sentences reveals how much Jacobi and Mendelssohn, and in the next century, Feuerbach and Stirner, owe to the intellectual capital provided by Lessing.

Deism divided itself on the issue of whether to view the Testaments as a sacred document, or as a work of deceptions formed years after the origins of the great religions. Lessing sought to liquidate this paradox by seeing the Testaments as both sacred and historical. The title, no less than the content, of one of his longer studies indicates this religious liberalism: "New Hypothesis Concerning the Evangelists Regarded as Merely Human Historians." This essay, a detailed expansion of the title, illustrates Lessing's use of historical language as a way back into the ground of religious belief. *The Education of the Human Race*, his most widely known work of non-fiction, realizes the full implications of this historical conception of truth. "Every primer is only for a certain age. To delay the child that has outgrown it, longer at it than was intended, is harmful." This was the case with the *Old Testament*. For this reason, he continues, "a better instructor must come and tear the exhausted primer from the child's hands—Christ came!"¹² The *New Testament* is thus higher education presented as new revelation, although in historical fact it is simply the next higher stage in the phenomenology of religion.

Doctrinal distinctions between Occidental and Oriental religions tend to be obliterated by Lessing, and in their place is the capacity of a given doctrine to meet changing historical situations. Even the notion of reincarnation is accepted as a legitimate expression of historical needs. Knowledge is the Holy Grail. To touch knowledge is to be related to eternity. "Why should I not come back as often as I am capable of acquiring new knowledge, new skills? Is so much gained from one visit that it is perhaps not worth the trouble of coming again?"¹³ An objection might be registered that Lessing is using the idea of reincarnation only as a literary device. But I submit that such

an appraisal is too simple. Lessing means himself to be taken literally on this point. For if revelation is education, and education a historically conditioned reflex, the stages in the education of mankind involve the steady reincarnation of the ideals of the good. Reincarnation is thus the symbolic representation of regeneration, the rebirth of the ideals of reason.

This interpretation would connect up with Lessing's determinist philosophical anthropology. No less than Holbach, Lessing was committed to a determinist physics. But whereas in Holbach predictable patterns are clearly physical, for Lessing determinism is revealed through the unending, if somewhat uneven, progress of mind. This phenomenalist view is exhibited in the "three stages" of the history of religion. The Judaic-Old Testament stage is characterized by appeals to authority, obligation and coercion. Without such appeals, Lessing holds, man could never make the sacrifices required to perfect the bold idea of monotheism. This then is the childhood of religion. The Christ-New Testament stage signifies the replacement of a system of coercion with a system of education. As we later find in Hegel, Lessing replaces law by a theory of rights. It was in this sense that Christ "was the first *reliable, practical* teacher of the immortality of the soul." If Moses is the law-giver, Christ comes to announce the eternity of human history. The difficulty with this second stage is that it still envisions eternity as an individual rather than a collective or social fact. Salvation is reserved for the ego, and not for man as man. What the age of enlightenment required, and what it moved towards in Lessing's opinion, was a religion of humanity. This final, mature stage, inscrutably ground out over centuries and millennia, marks the ultimate acquisition of the religious conscience. Religion becomes universalized. The idea of progress becomes organically united to the religion of history, and with this, philosophical anthropology is born.¹⁴ It is from this notion that the evolution of sociology in the hands of Comte and St. Simon proceeded.

Two distinct philosophical sources of Lessing's religious views should be noted. First is his acceptance of the Averroist-Alexandrian position that there exists only one immortal intellect in all men, namely the capacity to rational thought. Personal immortality is impossible since it involves the individuation and fragmentation of Divine Will. Even the way in which Lessing resolves the question of how we know God exists is stated in Averroes' terms, since to judge the ways of a Universal Deity implies the existence of an instrument for such judgment, reason. The second source is embedded in the French utilitarian conversion of private interests into public goods. The moral calculus for ensuring that private and public ambitions come together

is education. The emphasis on education is common to both Helvétius and Lessing. For both, the education of the human race moves from selfishness to sociality. Helvétius' Society is Lessing's Humanized Nature. Lessing represents the spiritualization of the utilitarian doctrine of universal goodness.

As internal evidence for this position is the fact that Lessing's God was one of immanence rather than transcendence. God becomes individualized. "As soon as human reason began to elaborate a concept of One God, it broke up the one immeasurable into many measurables, and gave a distinguishing mark to every one of these parts."¹⁵ The expression of God as immanent is further elaborated in Lessing's theory of the reciprocity of revelation and reason. Critical reason is the individualized agent for expressing the Supreme Will. The very diversity of human beings occasioned by historical differentiation ensures a belief in an immediately apprehended God.¹⁶ God is immanent in yet another crucial respect, that is, in the contingency of "the immutable being of God." Lessing is so intent on establishing this point that he resorts to scholastic modes of arguing ("ideas of contingent things are themselves contingent ideas"). This resort to the ontological proof for contingency had the effect of converting theology into a justification of a historically grounded moral system.¹⁷

Lessing's emphasis on a sensualized God leads to the conclusion that something far more concrete was at stake. That something is the doctrine of the individual basis of religious belief. Individuality involves the idea of limited truth, limited knowledge socially conditioned. A libertarian, Lessing sought to achieve a completely democratic view of religion. The humanization of religion involves the end of élites deriving their authority from religion—the end of internecine, sectarian conflict. Lessing's principle of the private character of belief is a consequence of his entire teaching on religion. "To hit on the right road is often pure luck. To be anxious to find the right road is alone praiseworthy."¹⁸ The right to privacy of belief is a translation of the political slogan of the German burghers into a religious first principle. Such a position makes clear that men will not mistake human power for divine power. No man can confound historic truths with eternal truth, nor make the survival of the human race contingent on egoistic strivings. To those who would substitute human élites for the equality written into the Scriptures, Lessing points to the dismal conclusion of despotic regimes throughout history. "The suppression of an individual's reason, even of a Solomon, did not arrest the progress of the common reason, and was itself a proof that the nation had now taken a great step nearer to the truth. For individuals only deny what the many are thinking over; and to think

over an idea about which before no one troubled himself in the least, is half the way to knowledge."¹⁹ This then, is the core of Lessing's efforts to intertwine a historical theology and Enlightenment individualism. He phrased in religious language what the German intellectual was not yet able to say directly in the name of man.

The prophetic language of Lessing, calculated to break the force of élitism in religious questions, had however a quite different immediate effect. German society did not respond to pleas of toleration, but rather to the louder political pleas of unification and centralization of authority. Herzen, in a remarkable piece of writing on the age ushered in by Lessing, pointed out that the German Enlightenment solved its problems only "in the sphere of art and science, the intellectual world being separated from public and family life by a Chinese wall. There was a Germany within a Germany, the world of the savants and the artists; and there was no real contact between the two worlds. The people could not understand their teachers. The greater part of the people had stayed where they had come to rest after the Thirty Years' War. The history of Germany from the Peace of Westphalia to the time of Napoleon can be read on one page, and namely, on the one on which the exploits of Frederick II are recorded."²⁰

Given this social and intellectual duality, religious thinking became separated from religious practice. The doctrine of "waiting and anticipating" became the concrete expression of the historical approach to religion because such a doctrine implied the "unfinished" character of religious practice. Lessing could do nothing to alleviate the growing isolation of the intellectual from the commoner. His view, to the contrary, tended to reinforce the condition of social alienation brought about by the industrial revolution. The theology of historical reason is hardly calculated to arouse the chiliastic impulse, and yet it is this impulse toward a fervent expression of faith that united men in common religious endeavor. It was thus inevitable that a commoner's reply to Lessing's intellectualist religion be framed. This was the task Hamann took upon himself.

During a secret mission to London in 1758, designed to establish the Baltic provinces as an independent republic (a mission which ended in total failure), Hamann was converted to a fervent Lutheranism. God had apparently asked for and received Hamann's heart.²¹ From this point dates his concern with the Lessing problem: the relation of faith to feeling, God to Reason. The rational, historical proof of religious belief did not, in Hamann's view, adequately indicate the direct apprehension of God by man, and indeed moved in a direction which made such an apprehension impossible. If history had to be

invoked, it was only in terms of the temporal conditioning of faith, of the various forms religion takes. The Enlightenment invocation of history as the ground of religion, asserting itself through an evolutionary educative process, was condemned by Hamann in *Golgotha und Scheblimini* on the grounds that historicism only confuses the temporal with the eternal. It is precisely this confusion of the two that leads to the liquidation of any meaningful distinction between man and God.²²

It was the direct apprehension of the eternal, the recognition that there is an existing alternative to the changing order of human events, that formed the ground of Hamann's mysticism, and laid the intellectual basis of his particular form of romantic revolt against the rational, mechanical ideals of the eighteenth century intellectual. Socrates taught Hamann the superiority of method over system, Hume the superiority of experience over metaphysics, and Luther the personal nature of the human encounter with Providence. With these as tools, Hamann set to work on a transformation of Enlightenment into Romanticism.

The essential starting point in reconstructing Hamann's critique of Enlightenment is the nature and limits of human reason. Hamann is not completely committed to an anti-rational posture. In his brilliant criticism of Kant, *Metakritik über den Purismus der Vernunft*, he notes, grudgingly to be sure, that "the first purification of philosophy consisted in the partly misunderstood, partly unsuccessful attempt to make reason independent of all custom and tradition, and all faith in them."²³ But what rationalism also does, and here Hamann is particularly incisive, is to convert reason from an object of knowledge into the sole source for procuring knowledge. This *metaphysical* predisposition to stop where human reason fails is the characteristic stamp of the French Enlightenment. The second stage in Hamann's phenomenological account was brought to perfection by Kant. It is the "second purification" which is "more transcendental and aims at freedom from experience and its everyday inductions."²⁴

The Kantian perspective, however, remains enveloped by the rationalist prejudice for exploring the universe by means of, and in terms of, the power of finite human understanding. In Kant the rational order of the physical world follows from the power of human reason. If for the French Enlightenment this power is derived from experiencing an objective atomic world, and for the German Enlightenment from the intrinsic properties of a rational a-priori, they nonetheless shared an unwillingness to come to terms with the *empirical* fact of non-rational types of experience. For Hamann, what reason fails to know most completely is the tool of knowledge, language. "The third

and highest stage, as it were, empirical purity, concerns therefore language; the first and final organon and criterion of reason, requiring no other credentials than tradition and usage."²⁵ The centrality of language forms the springboard, not only for Hamann's critique of rationalism, but also for his own positive theory of religious consciousness.

Hamann saw in Enlightenment skepticism an extension of the dilemmas confronting scholastic realism. Both express a dogmatic belief in something outside human consciousness, one in Nature and the other in Providence. However, neither seemed able to account for the nature of experience itself. Hamann here incorporates the work of empiricism, especially Hume's, to show that an "overall looseness" is common to purely objectivist philosophies. They establish as facts notions that are in reality only "uses of speech in the general perception and observations of common-sense—open and disguised."²⁶ But whereas Hume was content with giving skepticism a more rigorous epistemology, Hamann is not easily put off by the immediate barriers of pure empiricism. It was Hamann's belief that an empiricism nourished by a theory of language is the first principle of a firm anti-rationalism. "Everything that man heard in the beginning, saw with his eyes, contemplated, and his hands touched, was a living word. For God was the Word. With this word in his mouth and in his heart, the origin of language was as natural, as obvious, and as easy as child's play."²⁷ Thus did Hume's assertion made in *A Treatise of Human Nature*, and cited approvingly by Hamann, "that in general an abstract idea does not exist in itself, but is tied to certain words, to which one assigns meaning" becomes the anchor of a general theory of religious belief. The relativism of Protagoras, the sensationalism of Helvétius, and the materialism of la Mettrie are turned against themselves. The subjectivity of knowledge, the impressions made on the human senses, these all take a verbal form, just as do the revelations of a religion. The assignment of precise meaning is a human task, the necessity of a symbolic representation of things, a mystery of eternal duration.

Within this philosophy of symbolic forms lies Hamann's solution to the connected questions of truth and thought. For beyond and behind the assertions of the Enlightenment religion of reason lies a more profound basis for belief—more powerful because it rests upon direct sense data, rather than upon assumed causal relationships which, again with Hume, are but habits of thought flowing from observation of invariant relations. Hamann provided a clear account of his empirical mysticism when he insisted on the primacy of linguistic analysis. "If it still remains a principal question as to how the capacity to think

is possible—the capacity to think to the right of and to the left of, before and after, within and beyond experience—no deduction is necessary to establish the genealogical priority of language and its heraldry over the seven sacred functions of logical propositions and conclusions. Not only does the entire capacity to think rest on language, but the unknown prophecies and the ultimate wonders spread before Samuel in consequence of this ability.”²⁸

It is just this union of the configuration of life and language which reason fails to understand, trying vainly to resolve the religious question into mechanical systems, chemical and biological systems, and failing this, into metaphysical systems. The Enlightenment attempted to garner an objective uniformity out of what is essentially “a heap of coincidences.” It does not realize that this “idealist leap” is simply “the misunderstanding of reason with itself.”²⁹ That which reason in fact demonstrates is the necessity of going beyond its boundaries to fashion answers to ultimate questions. The reasonableness of religion is not, for Hamann, the religion of reason. The former rests upon the direct apprehension of the word of God, while the latter takes solace in the indirect, and essentially static, category-ridden inferences from human consciousness.

The hostility Hamann displayed for Enlightenment rationalism and historicism stemmed not only from what he believed to be its limited perspectives, but, more profoundly, from the limits it set for human prospects. This hostility was consecrated by Hamann’s unwavering belief in both neo-platonism as the necessary philosophy of the thinking man, and trinitarianism as the necessary theology of the feeling man. Enlightenment rationalism surrendered its claims both to a knowledge of ultimate dilemmas and to a religion of feeling controlled by obligations. Rationalism did not do away with religious feelings and passions, but only debased them by a recasting into the commercial mould of a schematized and legalized hedonism. Everything, including morals, is considered in the light of reason. But this rational purification is essentially a reductionism resting on a metaphysic of nature “offering a critique which is merely a propadeutic.” The disdain Hamann had for system-building philosophies common to idealist and materialist rationalism, is nowhere made clearer than in his comments on Kant. Hamann cannot see how rationalism, which denies the need for subjective probings, can adopt a posture that it is superior either to the scholastic esthetic of unity, or to the trinitarian syllogistic apodictic.³⁰

Rationalism, whether in its bold utilitarian forms, or in its subtler theological forms, i.e., Lessing’s view of the ultimate union of religion and reason through education, remain for Hamann illustrations

of the untenable ideological alliances sought by Enlightenment. Just as there seem to be three major divisions in the unfolding of philosophy, Hamann likewise provides a theory of three stages in the phenomenology of religious consciousness. First, there is paganism, where man is satisfied to have his reason and his wisdom. Second is Judaism, which makes the really significant departure from naturalistic forms of worship by recognizing the power of the word and the symbol. It is not the rationality of Judaism that gives it its strength, as Moses Mendelssohn maintained, but rather its mysticism, its Cabalistic acceptance of the reality of personally communicated symbols.³¹ Christianity moves along the same path, transforming even natural objects into divine entities. In obedience and respect to the mystical origins of the communion of God's word into human symbols "consists the superiority by which Golgotha is transformed." The scene of Jesus' execution, Golgotha (Matthew XXVII: 33 and parallels), becomes enshrined in language and parable. The historical scene of martyrdom is meaningless, the elevation of such a scene into a super-historical context is what yields the power of evoking faith.³²

The highest stage in this phenomenology of religious belief, and here Hamann is clearly employing his super-historical criterion, is Christianity. To the symbolism of Judaism is added the word of a God of love, and the concrete expression of this love in the ethical heroism of the passion of Jesus. If the Judaic tradition provides *faithfulness* to the Covenant, the Christian way demands that this be augmented by *faith* in the Testaments as such. The Jew has faithfulness *to* the word, while the Christian has faith *in* the word. Without minimizing these major differences between Judaism and Christianity, the large gulf in human thought remains for Hamann that between paganism and religiosity, between Enlightenment and Revelation. What Christianity provides for this battle, in Hamann's view, is to temper the word of supreme power with the deed of supreme humility. Christianity strengthens belief by individualizing it. Feeling replaces obedience as the handmaiden of faith.³³

Hamann did not realize the extent to which he was offering an alternative historical model for understanding religious belief, and not, as he suggested, an alternative to the kind of historicism found in Lessing. Nor do I think Hamann was aware of the degree to which he was tailoring his Lutheranism to the needs of a budding romanticism, which of course was precisely what Lessing's historical Christianity attempted. This is not to minimize differences between the two. Hamann could not conceive of subjecting human feeling and its religious expression to the kind of higher scientific criticism that is one of Lessing's major claims to fame. For Hamann, the word, the

feeling, and the myth were neatly separated from the thing, the understanding, and the idea. And it was to bridging this dualism that Lessing dedicated his career.

It cannot be said that Hamann addressed himself to original questions. Rather it was the inherited problem of the feeling man versus the rational man that occupied his thoughts. Hamann spent himself against what Huxley in this century has called "the God of 2 plus 2 equals 4." He reminded the Enlightenment, at the moment of its greatest intellectual triumphs, that man had not yet earned the right to be the measure of all things and values. On this he shared with Lessing a serious reservation about the completeness of a psychological world stripped of divine ideals.

Lessing was not unaware of the dilemma Hamann's position posed. The religion of reason tended to substitute quietism for pietism, while the religion of transcendental authority preserved only the worst elements of dogmatic theology, of anti-Enlightenment. It seemed that mysticism better satisfied the demands of an active religion than rationalism. The impulse to convert faith into historical fact was, after all, an intellectual rather than a popular urging. Lessing was faced with the choice either of giving up religion altogether, or of justifying his position in terms of moral norms rather than historical events. He chose the latter path, turning to Hamann's word. "My European children! Listen to God's words of reason in yourselves, perfected in each of you through use. Freedom is only for the young to attain; virtue alone may be attained through reason. Hate can only produce the spilling of blood. With blood alone you cannot buy freedom. No. You purchase only shame, repentance, agony. You kill your friends. This is the price of blood, and it is not worth any blood."³⁴

The rise of the utopian, romantic imagination did not proceed in a straight line. To be sure, the romantic philosophy was from the outset plagued with the problem of the moral and social end of man. Both Lessing and Hamann shared, despite intense theological differences, a suspicion of Goethe's militancy as expressed in *Egmont*. Neither seemed convinced that the "blood of heroes is not shed in vain," or that the "field of battle is the field of victory," and certainly not that we should "fall joyfully" when the time comes. Lessing's religion of history was in practical terms a sociology of pacifism. Likewise Hamann, starting from radically different philosophic premises, developed a religion of subjective, direct experience, but no less of the sanctity of the private personality and its superiority to the demands of social institutions. Thus we see that, in its Germanic form, the

Enlightenment contained not only the origins but also the destruction of the romantic view of life.

The legacy handed down to us by Lessing and Hamann is not purely abstract by any means. There are definite consequences each position makes possible. In church recruitment policies, does one seek out the fervent believer in the word, the ascetic personality, or the calm advocate of a "reasoned" Christianity? In the presentation of conflicting interpretations of biblical statements, does one admit the priority of historical and empirical evidence in an exegesis, or in fundamentalist fashion insist on the symbolic truth of the word? In dealing with the relation of religion to politics, is one to take the standpoint that Christianity as an historical religion has a definite social mandate, or does one maintain the triviality (or better, the accidental character) of external worldly affairs? Clearly, viewed in this light, Lessing and Hamann are offering alternative views on what constitutes Christian conduct, no less than alternative views on religion and enlightenment.

1. *Lessing Samtliche Schriften*, edited by Karl Lachmann and Franz Muncker. (Stuttgart and Leipzig 1886-1924); hereinafter referred to as LSS. Vol. XIII, p. 24.
2. *Neujahrs geschenk für das schöne Geschlecht herausgegeben*, edited by Friedrich Nicolai. Cited in Heinrich Schneider, *Lessing: Zwölf Biographische Studien*, (Bern 1951), p. 253. [The exact phrase is, "Wer einen Lessing denkt, Denkt sich zu Deutschlands Ehren."]
3. The following works offer an able introduction to the problem of the relation of history and religion in the eighteenth century: Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (Princeton 1951); Roy Pascal, *The German Sturm und Drang* (Manchester 1953); Paul Hazard, *European Thought in the Eighteenth Century: From Montesquieu to Lessing* (New Haven 1954). For more detailed studies of Lessing's treatment of this issue, see Henry Chadwick, "Introduction" to *Lessing's Theological Writings* (Stanford 1957); and Marta Waller, *Lessings Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts, Interpretation und Darstellung ihres rationalen und irrationalen Gehaltes* (Berlin 1935).
4. Franz Mehring, *The Lessing Legend* (New York 1938), p. 50. See also his historical placing of Lessing in *Zur Deutschen Geschichte*, in *Gesammelte Schriften und Aufsätze* (Berlin 1931), Vol. V, pp. 88-90.
5. Franz Mehring, *ibid.*, p. 51.
6. Heinrich Heine, "Lessing," in *The Poetry and Prose of Heine* (New York 1948), pp. 709-10.
7. *Lessings Werke*, edited by Julius Petersen and Waldemar Olshausen (Berlin and Leipzig, n.d.); hereinafter referred to as LW. Vol. VI, p. 64 (No. 4).
8. LW., Vol. VI, p. 64 (No. 1, 2).
9. LW., Vol. VI, pp. 80-1 (No. 85, 86).
10. Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Enlightenment* (Princeton 1951), pp. 191-92.
11. LSS., Vol. XIII, p. 45; and Vol. XVI, p. 519.
12. LW., Vol. VI, p. 74 (No. 51, 53).
13. LW., Vol. VI, p. 82 (No. 98).
14. LW., Vol. VI, p. 75 (No. 57, 58); p. 81 (No. 87, 88).
15. LW., Vol. VI, p. 65 (No. 6).
16. LW., Vol. VI, p. 71 (No. 36, 37).
17. LSS., Vol. XIV, pp. 292-3.
18. LSS., Vol. XVI, p. 371.
19. LW., Vol. VI, p. 70 (No. 31).
20. Alexander Herzen, *Selected Philosophical Works* (Moscow 1956), p. 34.
21. Josef Nadler, *Johann Georg Hamann: 1730-1788* (Vienna 1949), pp. 71-8. This is the definitive biography of Hamann. There are but two works on Hamann in English, both worthwhile: J. C. O'Flaherty, *Unity*

and Language: A Study in the Philosophy of Johann Georg Hamann (Chapel Hill 1952); and Walter Lowrie, *Johann Georg Hamann: An Existentialist* (Princeton 1950). Even though O'Flaherty sees Hamann as a precursor of logical empiricism, while Lowrie's position is defined by the title, they prove, not so much that one thesis is correct and the other erroneous, but rather that positivism and existentialism have more in common than adherents of either camp are willing to admit.

22. *Hamann's Sämtliche Werke*, edited by Josef Nadler (Vienna 1951); herein-after referred to as HSW. Vol. III, pp. 303-04.

23. HSW., Vol. III, p. 284.

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*

26. HSW., Vol. III, p. 283.

27. HSW., Vol. III, p. 32 ("Des Ritters von Rosencreuz letzte Willensmeynung").

28. HSW., Vol. III, p. 286.

29. *Ibid.*

30. HSW., Vol. III, p. 278 ("Kritik der reinen Vernunft von Immanuel Kant").

31. HSW., Vol. III, p. 319 ("Golgotha und Scheblimini").

32. HSW., Vol. III, p. 289 ("Metakritik über den Purismus der Vernunft").

33. HSW., Vol. III, p. 305.

34. *Erinnerungen aus dem Jahre 1790 in historischen Gemälden und Bildnissen*. Cited in Schneider, *loc. cit.*, p. 190.

RELIGION AND THE WRITING OF THE COLORADO CONSTITUTION

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Religion has been a potent social force throughout American history. The reverberations of the Protestant Revolt and the Catholic Reformation have been experienced many times in many American communities since the 17th century, in varying degrees of intensity. Colorado, in the last quarter of the 19th century, was typical of this tradition. Colorado had been part of a vast Spanish domain and, therefore, many of its citizens, particularly in the southern half, were both Spanish-speaking and Catholic in faith. On the other hand, a preponderance of the adventurers and fortune-hunters who came after the gold discoveries of 1858 and 1859 and who tended to settle around and north of Denver, were Protestants. This, then, was the religious setting as convention delegates met in Denver in the winter of 1875-1876 to write a constitution for the state.

Needless to say, many of the social conflicts confronting the constitutional convention were sufficient in themselves thoroughly to test the delegates' patience and fortitude. Were the churches too strong and too wealthy or did they need paternal encouragement from the state government? Were the public schools thriving or were they threatened by forces irrevocably dedicated to their destruction? Was the constitution going to be a God-less document or would it acknowledge that Christianity flourished in Colorado? Should women remain before their stoves and cribs or should they march forth and mark ballots with their husbands? The arguments on these social questions seem to have excited more popular reaction than all of the remaining controversies combined.

Taxation of School and Church Property

When a few delegates revealed their intent to authorize the taxation of church property, the immediate repercussions throughout the territory suggested the controversial nature of the subject. Like the irrigation question and the regulation of railroads, this subject thrust the convention into what one reporter called "a hopeless muddle."¹

The people and the delegates were further aroused by President U. S. Grant's seventh annual message. The President recommended taxing "all property equally, whether church or corporation . . ." Grant estimated that there was at least a billion dollars in untaxed church property in the United States.²

The convention was flooded with petitions. The church-goers tended to defend the traditional immunity from taxation and support-

ed their position with memorials. In extreme opposition to them was a group of fifty-six petitioners who took a thoroughly anti-clerical approach and sought to end all tax privileges for churches.³ Between these groups were those who favored postponing action until the legislature was formed and those who would compromise the argument by providing for taxation of church properties only when they exceeded a certain assessed valuation, such as seven or eight thousand dollars.

A brief newspaper exchange epitomized the basic conflict. One concerned citizen asked if the people could afford to

insult the claims of God and . . . Christianity by dragging down to a common level of taxation the property which has been solemnly consecrated to God, and force them to stand upon an equal footing with the race course [and] drinking saloon?⁴

This was bunk, replied an irritated reader. Does taxing homes, where the mothers, wives, and daughters reside, lower them to the level of the race course?⁵

The controversy became heated when it first came up for debate. Henry Bromwell took the most extreme position. He wanted to tax all public and private schools, all churches and cemeteries held in trust or for which rent or price was charged, and all other church property exceeding \$7000 in value.⁶ A Denver newspaper had expressed a similar viewpoint when it called for taxing all revenue-producing property, whether belonging to church, school or charitable institution, "but we pray that beyond this the people of the state may not be invited to go."⁷ This journal estimated that Colorado church property, not used strictly for church purposes, was valued as follows: Baptist, \$100,000; Protestant Episcopal, \$72,000; Roman Catholic, \$58,000; Congregational, \$50,000; and Presbyterian, \$10,000. This taxable wealth totaled \$290,000.⁸

The delegates would not go so far as to tax all revenue-producing property. Led by Daniel Hurd, president of the Denver school board, their first successful effort exempted public schools from taxation, "unless otherwise provided by law."⁹ There was no significant opposition to this move.

Private schools were still left on the tax rolls, however, a situation quickly criticized by delegates with Catholic constituencies. Robert Quillian, representing Huerfano County with its many Spanish-speaking residents, protested discriminating between public and parochial schools. He admitted that although religious schools should not siphon off the public school fund, at the same time the state should encourage private schools by relieving them of taxation. Wilbur Stone also opposed taxing private schools. Although he was the president of the Pueblo school board, he was also a leader of the Pueblo Coun-

ty Democrats, who were predominantly Spanish-speaking and Catholic.¹⁰ Quillian entered the fray again with the assertion that all schools should be treated alike.¹¹ Excusing himself for being old-fashioned, he said that he believed in religion.

Men were getting so wise that they would not admit that they had been created by a Creator, but contended that they had created themselves by some process of evolution.¹²

Quillian explained that parents who sent their children to religious schools were still compelled to pay public school taxes. He concluded with the question, why should they also have to pay on their own schools?

George Pease decided to give a reply to this particular point. Those who wanted aristocratic private schools should pay high enough tuition to enable the schools to pay taxes.

How did Benjamin Franklin, Henry Clay, Horace Greeley and Elihu Burritt get their education? Not at those elegant high toned schools, but in the old log house or at a blacksmith's forge.¹³

Pease concluded that the convention had already cut taxes in enough other ways without exempting parochial schools.

Byron Carr, a former public school superintendent in Longmont, also favored taxing private schools. He did not believe that parents who sent their children to parochial schools had the right to ask the public to contribute to supporting the schools through tax relief, with the consequent increase in taxes elsewhere. Despite the opposition led by Pease and Carr, the convention voted to exempt both private and public schools from taxation.¹⁴

After conceding this tax relief to all schools, consideration of churches naturally followed. After the early attempt of Henry Cromwell of Denver to tax churches there was very little support for this effort. Wilbur F. Stone, also of Denver, castigated the theory underlying church taxation as "that which built up the French Commune." There were more practical tasks to be done in the convention.¹⁵

The former territorial governor, John Evans, entered the dispute and lobbied for eleven Denver churches seeking immunity.¹⁶ The anti-clerical George Pease, representing Park and Lake Counties, conceded that if churches were to be exempted, the constitution must acknowledge such condition. Pease agreed and added that because the question had stirred the minds of the people from one end of the land to the other, any solution had to be imbedded in the constitution. A few of the delegates were aroused and an occasional temper flared. Carr charged that the move to exempt churches was a relic of religious fanaticism. Quillian quickly retorted that Carr's opinion was an expression of infidel fanaticism.¹⁷

Pease then sought to settle the immediate problem by evading it. He pointed out, with considerable exaggeration, that petition after petition had urged leaving the entire matter to the legislature. He regretted that the convention had abandoned the "state movement and had gone off on a church and school crusade." William Clark answered that any delay would be unwise. He called attention to President Grant's recommendation for taxing church property, but he did concede that he thought that Grant had gone too far. He urged that the convention strive to "avoid the spectacle of a lobby of religionists gathering about each legislature." The taxation of churches should not be a legislative dispute every two years.

Wilbur Stone laid the basis of final agreement with his motion to exempt all churches, school buildings, and necessary grounds from taxation, unless otherwise provided by general law. The delegates approved, 17-13.¹⁸ The constitution as finally enrolled declared that, unless the legislature acted to the contrary, lots with buildings used solely for religious worship, for schools, and for charitable purposes, as well as cemeteries not used for profit, were to win tax immunity.¹⁹ This moderate viewpoint won, and although the convention conditionally granted tax benefits to schools, churches, and charities, the delegates gave the legislature final authority over the matter. It was clearly a compromise and probably a wise one at that.

Although the prolonged dispute tended to unite all churches, there was still a perceptible undercurrent of anti-Catholic hostility. A Denver paper claimed that the Catholic attack on the public school system was the foundation for the taxing proposition.²⁰ John Evans agreed. With sarcasm he explained that most Protestant ministers wanted to tax the Catholics and be exempted themselves. He also revealed his own active role in the issue.

It seems much like the Know Nothing movement—the Republicans are going into secret societies against the Catholics . . . But I keep my hand covered while I stir them up.²¹

An obscure and short-lived newspaper, springing up in a mountain canyon west of Boulder, expressed a common reaction to the convention's solution. With the eyes of the nation on Colorado, it was particularly wise to make a good constitution. By steering clear of resolving the vexed church taxation issue with finality, the delegates had succeeded in their purpose.²²

Division of the School Fund

Although the question of taxing parochial schools brought the Catholics and Protestants into conflict, they fought with even greater bitterness over the future of school appropriations. Should the state

school fund be reserved exclusively for the public schools or should the constitution permit the division of funds between public and private schools? Since the enabling act set aside two sections in every township to support the public schools, one-eighteenth of the territory's public lands was at stake. By this same enabling act such land could not be sold for less than \$2.50 an acre. Even with much of the public land depleted by sale, the value of the school lands was at least \$5,000,000, an unusually tempting prize.

Religious leaders besieged the convention.²³ One tired delegate noted the extraordinary consternation. The delegates' pay, which he had heard about, and which no member would ever get, should be diverted to the pay of the churches, petitioners, and those outside influences which have engrossed so much of the time and attention of the convention.²⁴

Father Joseph P. Machebeuf, Catholic bishop of Denver, led the campaign for the private schools. He opened the door to anti-Catholic fulminations by sending a rather tactlessly-worded resolution to the delegates. After asking the convention to leave the matter to the legislature, the petition concluded:

We shall feel bound in conscience, both as Catholics and as American citizens, to oppose any Constitution which shall show such contempt of our most valued rights, both political and religious.²⁵

Bishop Machebeuf followed this petition with a more conciliatory one, in which he again protested locking the door of the school fund. Stating that the Catholics were not being represented fairly in the convention, he felt that the people in the territory should have more time to consider the matter. An additional reason for leaving the question to the legislature, so the bishop argued, lay in the fact that while a bare majority of votes would adopt the constitution, it would probably take a two-thirds approval of the people to amend it. Such a condition would give to one-third of the voters too much power over this vital aspect of education.²⁶

The bloc representing the private school view within the convention was small. John Hough, representing Bent and Elbert Counties, warned that a ban on dividing the school fund would place the whole Catholic vote in opposition to ratification. The constitution would fall as surely as the sun would set that day.²⁷ Henry Crosby (La Plata County) and Lafayette Head (Conejos County) joined Hough in seeking to postpone any convention decision. It would be much wiser to leave the matter to subsequent legislatures. Casimero Barela (Las Animas), Jesus Garcia (Las Animas), George Boyles (Las Animas), William Cushman (Clear Creek), and Lewis Rockwell (Gilpin) were the other members actively presenting "the Catholic

views of the territory."²⁸ Except for Cushman and Rockwell, these delegates represented southern Colorado.

It was not convention action but Bishop Machebeuf's participation which evidently publicized the issue throughout the territory. Had it not been for his demands, an editor asserted, the delegates would have ignored the question.²⁹ John Evans wrote that the bishop had "put the Protestants on their ear" and that in retaliation they would "put in and make a fight." Evans at least said that he preferred not to mix religious and political questions, but after Machebeuf "forced the issue" there was no alternative.³⁰ One newspaper regretted offending the Catholics, but as though to justify such consequence, asked, ". . . is it not enough that Rome dominates in Mexico and all South America?"³¹ The following week this same journal backed off and warned delegates not to divide the people over such a sensitive subject.

Set the parties [church and state] fighting, and the come-out may be like that of the fighting Kilkenny cats, nothing left but the tip ends of two tails.³²

After Bishop Machebeuf imperiled the constitution's ratification with his intimidations, a Denver editor wondered what would happen if the Baptists, Methodists, or Jews threatened to defeat the constitution unless it allowed their dogmas to be taught at public expense.

If we all go to work in that manner we will see Noah's ark come sailing along over the plains before we become a State.³³

Although the Catholic leadership may have given the dispute greater publicity it hardly controlled the outcome. The forces opposed to granting legislative appropriations to private schools were dominant from the outset. The public school teachers of Colorado had held their first convention in December, 1875. The educators resolved that the new constitution should exclude sectarianism and prohibit a division of the school fund "as set forth . . . in Article VIII, Section 3, of the Illinois Constitution."³⁴ Early in the convention William Beck of Boulder introduced several resolutions calling for a rigid separation of church and state, including a ban on reading the Bible in school.³⁵ All in all, twelve delegates presented forty-five petitions, of which thirty-eight called for prohibition of any school fund division.³⁶

The Education Committee's first report prohibited payment of "any public fund whatever" to any church or sectarian society.³⁷ A reporter declared that the sentiment was so decided against dividing the school fund that the vote to adopt the preliminary provision was a "mere matter of form."³⁸ The one-sidedness in conviction did not stifle debate, however. George Boyles sought to strike out the whole section. He contended that public schools were still experimental and

that more than half the children in the East attended private schools. Several delegates vigorously defended the ban. They argued that the section prohibiting division of the fund failed to go far enough; it would be better to defeat the entire document than allow the dispersion of school funds. Henry Bromwell added that the provision was basic to maintaining a system of popular education. Having survived for two hundred years, the public schools were certainly not failures.

Byron Carr asked his colleagues to ignore Boyles' objections. This delegate from Las Animas, Carr explained, had intimated that a division prohibition would alienate a majority of his constituents against the constitution; but Boyles also admitted, Carr argued, that these people would oppose anyway. So, if negative votes were inevitable, the ban might as well be inserted. Carr reported talking to at least twenty men in that week who had threatened to vote against the document if the parochial schools were allowed a share of the public revenue. The viewpoint of Bromwell and Carr prevailed.³⁹ The delegates voted 24-3 to retain the ban on granting public funds to private institutions.⁴⁰ Crosby, Head, and Hough, all from southern Colorado, comprised the minority. There were a number of abstentions.

Sentiment in southern Colorado was perhaps not nearly as uniform as some of the delegates assumed. Of the three delegates of Spanish descent, Agipeta Vigil was the only one present; he voted against the Catholics.⁴¹ William Meyer's Catholic constituents in Costilla County failed to swerve him from his "German loyalty to the cause of free schools."⁴² Furthermore, the Las Animas newspaper had recommended "forbidding the diversion of school funds" well before the convention opened.⁴³

A related provision, which again provoked more alarm throughout the territory than in the convention, banned the teaching of any sectarian tenets or doctrines in the public schools. President Grant's annual message also aroused interest on this issue because he had just criticized teaching religion in tax-supported schools. Popular agitation centered on the question of using the Bible in the classrooms. The Boulder Y.M.C.A. conducted a debate on the subject: Resolved, that the reading of the Bible should be prohibited in the public schools.⁴⁴ The notice that the Erie Lyceum discussed excluding the Bible from schools appeared amidst ads for Fonda's Cough Syrup and wire rope.⁴⁵ A correspondent from Gold Hill, defending the school use of the Bible, wrote that "just as the twig is bent the tree's inclined." The Bible had taught him moral lessons and since signing the pledge at the age of fourteen, no vice had tempted him.⁴⁶

The delegates decided to take a determined stand. They barred all

"sectarian tenets or doctrines" from the public schools. The convention rejected the assumption that Bible-reading was indispensable evidence that the schools were moral institutions. A citizen put it simply: the Bible could take care of itself and needed "no legislation to bolster it up."⁴⁷ Another observer applauded the decision to "let religion be taught in the family circle, in the church, and in the Sunday school."⁴⁸ Almost lost in the heat of religious dispute was Bromwell's amendment to this section which forbade segregation in Colorado's schools "on account of race or color." One alarmed citizen noted it however, and expressed his fear that equality would encourage a "social intimacy" and lead to "an amalgamation and mixture of races . . ."⁴⁹

The religious animosity aroused by these general provisions died slowly. During the period between the convention's adjournment and the ratification date, there were still many Protestant expressions of alarm. A Protestant minister predicted that "if the Romanists have their way," Colorado would have no part in the presidential election of 1876. But the people could feel right in "voting up a constitution which the Pope of Rome . . . [had] ordered voted down."⁵⁰ A Georgetown resident reported a rumor that Catholic officials in Denver had requested their members to avoid committing themselves on the state question and await further orders. So far as Georgetown was concerned, continued the letter, "any orders from Machebeuf or his lieutenants will be treated with contempt."⁵¹

Thus, the convention decided that the parochial schools could not share in the public school fund, and that the public schools could not teach sectarian religious dogma. On these two issues alone the convention refused to compromise contending factions. The Protestant majority saw to that. To strengthen the separation of church and state, Coloradans had to pay an initial price of animosity to avoid later and more corrosive bitterness.

¶

God in the Preamble

The final controversy involving religion tended to encourage Catholic and Protestant cooperation. The issue arose when an early version of the preamble contained no reference to a Supreme Being. William Beck, who introduced this resolution, had copied the federal constitution's opening paragraph.⁵² At the same time a petition from the "Liberalists" of the territory demanded a rigid separation of church and state. These "Liberalists" even denounced the enforcement of Sunday as the Sabbath as well as all laws related to Christian morality.⁵³ Abram Yount, representing Weld and Larimer Counties, presented

this petition and he received considerable abuse for introducing it. He was indicted as

the mouthpiece of sentiments which recall equally the days when the goddess of reason was proclaimed the guardian angel of Paris, and those which witnessed the excesses of the Commune.⁵⁴

When Yount explained that the memorial did not reflect his personal opinions, the convention resolved that the right to present petitions should remain unrestricted. Furthermore, the press should not attack any member for implementing a basic democratic right.⁵⁵

The convention then bogged down in a dispute between delegates defending the freedom to petition and those championing the freedom of the press to criticize the petitioners. The decision of the territorial House of Representatives, meeting at that time, to open its sessions without prayer, heightened the anxiety of many pious Christians. One newspaper correspondent wondered if this meant that the legislators doubted the efficacy of the Denver clergymen's prayers, or on the other hand, whether the ministers admitted that it was a waste of religious ammunition to pray for a Colorado legislature.⁵⁶

The first report of the Committee on Miscellaneous Subjects failed to mention the Deity, whereupon Bromwell offered an amendment very similar to the Illinois phrasing, beginning "Grateful to Almighty God . . ."⁵⁷ Debate centered on the implications of acknowledging a creator. A delegate predicted the constitution's rejection if the convention neglected such recognition. Other members explained that the United States Constitution was no weaker without such a reference. Besides, they continued, the omission did not deny the existence of God, and it was insulting to so charge. Beck conjured up memories of the Spanish Inquisition, where under the union of church and state, "men were roasted alive, their bodies mutilated." Bromwell's amendment, he continued, was the first step in placing theological matters in a civil document. Clarence Elder explained that the committee had not even discussed the Divine Being but it was not their intention to ignore Providence.

Petitions poured in from hamlets and river crossings of the territory. The recognition of the Almighty was "agitating the people of Colorado more than any other matter."⁵⁸ An assembly of Presbyterians demanded that the convention confirm "Jesus Christ as the ruler of nations."⁵⁹ Certainly contrary to his personal views, Byron Carr offered a lengthy version calling for the constitution to acknowledge God and to accept the truths of the Old and New Testaments. The petition demanded using the Bible in the schools, the proper edition of which the legislature would decide.⁶⁰ Henry Crosby's first

reaction was to consign the request to a new "Waste Basket Committee." Upon Clark's reminder of the unlimited right to petition, Crosby quickly withdrew his motion. With some doubt about the sincerity of the petition, the convention referred it to that catch-all, the Federal Relations Committee.

Clarence Elder, a delegate from Arapahoe County and a member of the miscellaneous committee, amended Bromwell's reference to God to read virtually as it does today: "with a profound reverence for the Supreme Ruler of the Universe . . ." Carr objected because the wording raised an unnecessary religious issue. Robert Douglas of El Paso County objected, on the other hand, because the wording failed to raise the religious issue enough. Most of the delegates thought Elder's phrase was less sectarian than the use of the word God. This version, identical to the phrasing in the Missouri constitution, passed by a vote of 30-4.⁶¹

The "God-in-the-constitution party" gained their point, but the delegates would not go so far as to deny state office to professed atheists. Resolutions to this effect found no sympathy. Toward the end of the convention Ellsworth presented a petition asking for constitutional recognition of His Satanic Majesty.⁶² Crosby, always generous with his committee assignments, moved to send it to the Committee on Lunatic Asylums, but the delegates preferred to entomb it in that refuge of ambiguity, the Federal Relations Committee.

The popular demand that the constitution confess that man lives not by bread alone revealed a characteristic of evangelical Christianity not present when states wrote constitutions earlier in the century. The date 1840 marks a distinct transition in this practice. In the sixty-four years, 1776-1840, there were forty-five new state constitutions. In only nine of these (one-fifth) were there references to the Creator in the preamble. In the sixty-year period, 1840-1900, sixty-two constitutions were written, of which forty-nine (four-fifths) acknowledged God.⁶³ Colorado's constitution of 1876 dramatized one significant change in America's social fabric.

1. *Denver Daily Tribune*, March 2, 1876.
2. James D. Richardson, ed., *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1902* (11 vols., Washington, 1900-1909), VI, 4288.
3. *Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention* (Denver, 1907), 83; Colin B. Goodykoontz, "Some Controversial Questions before the Colorado Constitutional Convention of 1876," *Colorado Magazine*, XVII (January, 1940), 6-7.
4. *Denver Daily Times*, January 18, 1876.
5. *Ibid.*, January 20, 1876.
6. *Proceedings*, January 19, 1876, 148-149.
7. *Denver Weekly Times*, January 12, 1876.
8. *Ibid.*, February 23, 1876.
9. *Denver Daily Tribune*, March 1, 2, 1876.
10. *Ibid.*, March 4, 1876.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Proceedings*, March 3, 1876, 547. Those

voting against exempting private schools from taxation were Bromwell, Beck, Carr, Cushman, Clark, Elder, Ebert, Felton, James, Plumb, Pease, Wells, and Yount. Only Felton represented a district with a high Spanish population, mostly Catholic. Apparently the common bond of Masonry was immaterial. Six Masons approved and five disapproved exempting parochial schools. The most heated exchange occurred between two Masons, Carr and Quillian.

15. *Denver Daily Tribune*, January 20, 1876.
16. *Ibid.*, January 14, 1876; John Evans to Margaret Evans, January 16, 1876, *John Evans Collection*, (Microfilm), Colorado State Archives, Denver.
17. *Ibid.*, March 4, 1876.
18. *Proceedings*, March 3, 1876, 547.
19. Colorado Constitution, Article X, Sec. 5.
20. *Denver Daily Times*, January 25, 1876.
21. John Evans to Margaret Evans, January 9, 1876, *John Evans Collection*, Colorado State Archives.
22. *Sunshine Courier*, January 22, 1876.
23. Bromwell, H. P. H., "The Constitutional Convention," Chapter XIV, Frank Hall, *History of the State of Colorado*, II, 305.
24. *Denver Daily Tribune*, January 14, 1876.
25. *Proceedings*, February 4, 1876, 235.
26. *Ibid.*, 330-331.
27. *Denver Daily Tribune*, February 21, 1876.
28. *Ibid.*, January 29, 1876.
29. *Denver Weekly Times*, February 16, 1876.
30. John Evans to Margaret Evans, February 8, 1876, *John Evans Collection*, Colorado State Archives.
31. *Boulder County News*, January 21, 1876.
32. *Scribner's Monthly*, no date, quoted in the *Boulder County News*, January 28, 1876.
33. *Denver Daily Times*, February 6, 1876.
34. Horace M. Hale, Aaron Gove, and Joseph C. Shattuck, *Education in Colorado, 1861-1885* (Denver, 1885), 37-38.
35. *Proceedings*, 43; *Denver Daily Tribune*, January 6, 1876.
36. Daniel Hurd, chairman of the Education Committee, reported that the petitions on division of the school fund contained an equal number, pro and con, *Denver Daily Tribune*, February 14, 1876. He either meant an equality in number of signatures (both between 1100 and 1600) or his committee received many more petitions than the public records acknowledge.
37. *Proceedings*, 186.
38. *Denver Daily Tribune*, February 14, 1876.
39. *Ibid.*, February 21, 1876.
40. With one very minor exception the Colorado provision, Article IX, Section 7, is identical to the provision the Colorado teachers favored: Illinois Constitution of 1870, Article VIII, Section 3.
41. Of the sixteen Masons, twelve voted. Ten favored the prohibition while Head and Hough sought to delete it. Cushman, James, Webster and White did not vote.
42. *Denver Daily Tribune*, February 14, 1876.
43. *Las Animas Colorado Leader*, November 5, 1875. There were several petitions identified as being Catholic, which called for prohibiting a division of the school fund. *Denver Daily Tribune*, February 10, 21, 1876.
44. *Boulder County News*, January 21, 1876.
45. *Ibid.*, December 17, 1875.
46. *Ibid.*, February 18; 1876.
47. *Denver Daily Times*, December 29, 1875. One petitioner questioned the validity of the translations of the Old and New Testaments. The Federal Relations Committee reported that, unfortunately, the members could read neither Greek nor Hebrew, and since the original manuscript was unavailable the petitioner would have to seek guidance elsewhere. *Denver Daily Tribune*, February 2, 1876.
48. *Colorado Miner* (Georgetown), February 12, 1876.
49. Colorado Constitution, Article IX, Sec. 8; *Colorado Weekly Chieftain* (Pueblo), June 22, 1876.
50. *Boulder County News*, May 12, 1876.
51. *Denver Daily Tribune*, June 21, 1876.
52. *Proceedings*, January 5, 1876, 43.
53. *Ibid.*, January 8, 1876, 83-84; *Denver Daily Tribune*, January 10, 1876.
54. *Daily Rocky Mountain News*, January 11, 1876.
55. *Denver Daily Tribune*, January 12, 1876.
56. *Silver World* (Lake City), January 15, 1876.
57. *Denver Daily Tribune*, January 11, 1876. When this "anti-clerical" preamble was offered, John Wheeler of Weld County, "dispatched one of his shepherd dogs in search of Bromwell, and the animal succeeded in cutting

him out of a crowd down at Carl Von Pretzel's lunch room." *Colorado Weekly Chieftain* (Pueblo), January 27, 1876.

58. *Denver Daily Tribune*, January 22, 1876.

59. *Ibid.*, January 14, 1876.

60. *Ibid.*, January 13, 1876.

61. Both the abortive Jefferson constitutions of 1859 (State and Territory) used the expression, "Supreme Ruler of the Universe," and Governor Robert Steele of Jefferson Territory appointed December 29, 1859, as a day of thanks giving to the Supreme Ruler of the Universe. Jerome C. Smiley, *History of Denver* (Denver, 1901), 318. There is no evidence that the delegates reviewed the Jefferson constitutions, but because the Missouri draft furnished most of the Colorado bill of rights, it is probable that this particular phrasing of the preamble also came from that source.

62. *Denver Daily Tribune*, March 13, 1876.

63. This compilation was made by Colin B. Goodykoontz, "Controversial Questions before the Constitutional Convention," *Colorado Magazine*, XVII, 6.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Theology of the Gospel According to Thomas. By BERTIL GÄRTNER. Trans. by Eric J. Sharpe. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961. 286 pp. \$5.00.

The Gnostic documents discovered in 1945 or 1946 at Nag-Hamadi, Egypt, are beginning to rival the Dead Sea Scrolls for popular and academic interest. Of these documents, *The Gospel According to Thomas* has been the most discussed, since, in addition to reflecting the "Gnosticising" of the Christian tradition, it *may* present a version of the sayings of Jesus independent of the canonical Gospels.

During 1960 two book length studies of this Gospel appeared in English: *The Secret Sayings of Jesus* by R. M. Grant with David N. Freedman, and *Studies in the Gospel of Thomas* by R. McL. Wilson. Now Bertil Gärtner, the distinguished Professor of New Testament at the University of Uppsala, has written a book which is independent of the other two and which carries the reader further into the meaning and milieu of *The Gospel According to Thomas*. While not supplanting the other books this study is a step forward in determining the meaning of the *Logia* and their relationship to the emerging Gnostic literature.

The book is divided into two parts. Part One deals with "The Literary Character of the Gospel of Thomas" and discusses the various literary forms with their relation to canonical and non-canonical literature. Thus on pp. 21-25 he comments on the dialogue form which is particularly characteristic of Gnostic writings. Part Two, the longer half, presents "The Theology of the Gospel of Thomas" under headings such as the following: "The Theological Thought World of the Gospel of Thomas," "The Nature of Jesus," "The World and Man in the World," and "Seeking and Rest." The

book concludes with two cautious pages on "Date and Place of Origin" followed by an "Index of Logia" and a most useful "General Index."

The strength of the book lies in its careful survey of the Thomas' *Logia* in the light of similar sayings in other relevant literature. From this method a clear light falls even on the more obscure *Logia* and the basic motifs of Gnostic thought are revealed. Professor Gärtner appears to side with those who regard the sayings in this Gospel as reflecting a development from the Synoptic Gospels rather than a parallel tradition.

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Porphyry's Philosophy from Oracles in Augustine. By JOHN J. O'MEARA. Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1959. ii, 184 pp.

What was the Platonic text which most directly affected the conversion of Augustine to Christianity? By means of a detailed analysis of the Greek and Latin fragments of the *Philosophy from Oracles* by the Neoplatonist Porphyry, and by a careful comparison of the results with the quotations and paraphrases Augustine gives from a book by Porphyry which he calls *De regressu animae*, Professor O'Meara is able to show that the two books are one and the same, reflected not only in the *City of God* but also in the *Confessions* and other works. The conclusions are significant not only for the recovery of much of the argumentation employed by Porphyry but also for tracing the development of Augustine's thought. The method O'Meara employs is a model of careful philological-historical analysis.

ROBERT M. GRANT
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A History of Antioch in Syria from Seleucus to the Arab Conquest. By GLANVILLE DOWNEY. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. xix, 752 pp. 21 plates. \$15.00.

To a remarkable extent the history of the early church is interwoven with the history of the great cities which became see-cities — Rome, Antioch, Alexandria, Constantinople. Events which at first seemed to have merely local significance became turning-points in church history, and in turn the life of the church became the life of the city. For this reason a full history of a great center provides insights indispensable for the church historian. No guide to Antioch could be found more capable than Professor Downey of Dumbarton Oaks/Harvard, who participated in the excavations of 1932-1939 and has studied the city's history for many years. His full, refreshingly leisurely account is the standard history of Antioch from the time of its foundation by Seleucus I on the 22nd of Artemisios (May) in 300 B. C. through its decline after its capture and sack by the Persians in June, A. D. 540.

Antioch was the scene of many important events in the history of the church, and Downey introduces the earliest of them after he has carried his general picture to A. D. 284. After the accounts of Christian activity at Antioch in Acts and Galatians, we possess no information about Christianity there — unless the Gospel of Matthew was written at Antioch (against this, cf. G. D. Kilpatrick, *The Origins of the Gospel According to St. Matthew*, Oxford, 1946, in addition to the literature cited by Downey) and perhaps that of John (on the lack of ancient attestation for this theory, cf. L. Leloir in *Biblica* 40, 1959, pp. 959ff.) — until the time of Ignatius and the Gnostic teacher Saturninus (Satornilus). Downey fills in some of the gaps by means of a sensible discussion of the current hypotheses.

His remarks about Ignatius, though brief, stay close to the evidence and

thus tend to resemble those found in the recent study by Virginia Corwin, *St. Ignatius and Christianity in Antioch* (New Haven, 1960). Of special importance is his comment on Ignatius' expression, "bishop of Syria," which he takes as pointing toward Antioch's leadership in the province. (As for a footnote on p. 297 about the Odes of Solomon, it can now be added that the presence of Ode 11 in Greek among the Bodmer papyri — early 3rd century — may well suggest that Greek was the original language, and that Ignatius was not necessarily bilingual.)

The next figure in Antiochene church history about whom we know anything is Theophilus. Here I should add only that further studies in his work have suggested the significance of his training in rhetoric for the development of his theology (*Vigiliae Christianae* 13, 1959, pp. 33-45) and have also suggested that the paschal homily by Melito of Sardis is not such a remarkable phenomenon in 2nd-century Christianity as some have thought.

Something should perhaps be said about a writing "traditionally" ascribed to another early bishop of Antioch, Evodius. On p. 283 Downey refers to an epistle called *Phos*, cited by the 14th-century ecclesiastical historian Nicephorus Callistus. The "information" given in it, to the effect that Christ baptized only Peter, while Peter baptized Andrew and the sons of Zebedee, probably does not reflect local Antiochene tradition, for the same notion is ascribed to the *Hypotyposes* of Clement of Alexandria by Johannes Moschus (PG 87, 3045C-D) and recurs in late versions of apocryphal lives of the apostles (cf. T. Schermann in *Texte und Untersuchungen* 31, 3, pp. 149-53).

Furthermore, in relation to Ignatius and the veneration of his memory at Antioch it should be said that the dogmatic florilegium used by Antiochenes at the council of Ephesus (431) included quotations from his works, and that the Monophysite patriarch Severus — who, as Downey

points out (p. 455 n. 22), preached in the Church of St. Ignatius — made a profound study of his letters. Something more could have been said about various attitudes toward his relics, at Antioch and elsewhere.

All these remarks are intended merely to supplement what Downey has given us, and they are not especially important when compared with the massiveness of his achievement. Still more minor would be the notice by Tertullian (*Adv. Val.* 4, 3) that in his time there was only one Valentinian teacher left at Antioch (*Axionicus*).

I have only one comment to make on the treatment of Christian history as a whole, and this perhaps leads to an insoluble difficulty. Church history is never fully "contemporary." Christians, or Catholic Christians, are always concerned with the tradition as it lives in the present — though of course their idea of tradition involves considerable selectivity. For example, among the early bishops of Antioch Ignatius was remembered, while Evodius and Theophilus were forgotten. But in dealing with the Christian life of Antioch the memory of Ignatius has to be taken into account — in the 4th century with Chrysostom's panegyric, in the 5th with Theodore's quotations, and in the 6th with the studies of Severus. His memory was a living one, as we can see from the transfer of his relics from the old Christian cemetery to the Tychaion (cf. p. 455), perhaps about 430. Rome's claim to Peter was stronger than Antioch's; but Antioch possessed the relics of Ignatius, in legend (and perhaps in history?) a disciple of the evangelist John. In other words, at every stage the history of the church of Antioch (as of other churches) involves the way in which Antiochenes viewed their own history. At Antioch, at least, Severus was not "simply" a Monophysite; he was the defender of the ancient tradition. But it is not clear how one can write a history of a church or of a city and bring this out with-

out making it intolerably lengthy. When so much is given, it is unnecessary to ask for more.

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Skara House at the Medieval University of Paris: History, Topography, and Chartulary. By A. L. GABRIEL. Notre Dame, Indiana: The Medieval Institute, University of Notre Dame, 1960. (No. IX of Texts and Studies in the History of Medieval Education.) 195 pp. \$4.00.

Swedish students at the University of Paris in the late thirteenth, fourteenth, and early fifteenth centuries were not forgotten by their bishops and cathedral chapters. This attractive book is an account of one house maintained by the Chapter of Skara for the benefit of such students. The author discusses the Scandinavian colleges in general, as a setting; he then devotes two short chapters to the other Swedish establishments, Linköping House and the College of Upsala. The balance of the book is a detailed account of the purchase, upkeep, location, description, and final disposition of Skara House, along with its relations to the parent Chapter and the English-German Nation of the University. In Part III, the author presents eighteen relevant documents, only one of which has been printed. Although they have not been previously noted, the documents relating to Skara House were kept in one package because of the many actions concerning the House in which the Nation was involved. The chapter entitled "Conclusions" is translated into French and Swedish as a résumé. A full bibliography and thirty plates complete the volume.

Throughout the scholarship is sound; the book is well-printed (except for very occasional typographical errors), especially the plates. Because of the character of the documents, much of the information in the text is necessarily concerned with repairs, rents, and litigation, although

such other important matters as the rules for the students living in the house are also fortunately preserved. All told, this monograph will be useful to those interested in the history of the University, of medieval Sweden, and of medieval education.

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Testimonia Patrum. The Function of the Patristic Argument in the Theology of Philip Melanchthon.
By PETER FRAENKEL. Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1961. 382 pp.
Fr. s. 50-.

This extremely interesting study, published in the series *Travaux d'humanisme et renaissance*, provides a full and valuable treatment of a subject somewhat neglected by historians of Christian doctrine. The author, who did much of his work at Lund, discusses Melanchthon's presuppositions in reading the Fathers; his use of their teaching; his purposes in using it; and the relation of these points to "other factors of his theological method, in particular the primary authority of the Scriptures." In a brief review it is impossible to do justice to the richness of the materials or to the author's skill in handling them. There are some questions, however, which he raises himself and does not answer. "One of these is the question of Melanchthon's patristic sources" (pp. 7-8). To the reviewer it would appear that such a question is an indispensable preliminary to the question about the use being made of these sources, especially since Melanchthon was not at all hesitant about creating a schematic picture of church history — presumably on the basis of what he did know. In Melanchthon's view the apostolic age lasted through the second century and was succeeded by the age of Origen, in which speculation and emphasis on works supplanted the Pauline theology which was the key to apostolic faith. Relying on what Eusebius says about Irenaeus, Polycarp, and the apostle John — as well as on Irenaeus as recently edit-

ed by Erasmus — Melanchthon found in Irenaeus the last real witness to apostolic times; Tertullian was nearly as good, but Clement of Alexandria led toward Origen. Dionysius the Areopagite, dated in the second or third century, also pointed in a wrong direction.

What could we ask Melanchthon to know that (apparently) he did not know? What might have modified his conception of "the apostolic age"? In 1549 he wrote Camerarius about a manuscript of Justin which he had recently seen; it contained an excellent statement of church doctrine and he was thinking of publishing it. He did not do so, and in 1551 Robert Stephanus published the works of Justin at Paris. These works included the treatise Melanchthon had seen, the *Expositio rectae fidei* probably written by Theodoret. To point this out is not necessarily to criticize Melanchthon. He can hardly be blamed for accepting a work which most of his contemporaries were to regard as genuine. It is simply to suggest that his ideas about the early church are not closely related to what we should regard as the evidence. But were they related to the evidence available then? Did Melanchthon pay any attention to the early patristic writings recently published at Paris? In 1498 Faber Stapulensis had published Latin translations of Dionysius the Areopagite, eleven letters of Ignatius, and the letter of Polycarp (re-published by Stephanus in 1515). In 1513 Faber published in Latin his *Liber trium virorum et trium spiritualium virginum*, which began with the *Shepherd* of Hermas. Melanchthon seems to have made no use of these works.

As far as the reviewer knows, he paid no attention to the treatise of Athenagoras (?) on the resurrection, published in Latin by Georgius Valla in 1498 and in Greek by Petrus Nannius in 1541, nor did he make use of the edition of Tatian and Theophilus by Johannes Frisius in 1546. He did know Clement of Alexandria, whose

works were published by Petrus Victorius in 1550. Here Fraenkel's judgment on his scholarship seems over-severe. Clement gives a non-Pauline (actually Pythagorean-Philonic) definition of *dikaiosyne*, and he is quoting from the Gnostic Epiphanes. According to Fraenkel, Melanchthon wrongly attributed it to Clement himself and then criticized Clement. As the reviewer reads the passages in Melanchthon, it does not make too much difference to the reformer whether Clement held this view or not. Melanchthon noted that it was a *vetus definitio* and a non-Pauline one; therefore, Clement's or not, it illustrated the infiltration of non-Christian elements.

The reason for referring to the various early Christian writings of which Melanchthon seems to have been unaware is simply to indicate how difficult his position would have been to maintain had he made use of them. His "apostolic age" would have had to include the semi-philosophical ideas of apologists other than Justin; it would have had to include Ignatius, with whom Calvin and others had great difficulties. Fraenkel says that at one time Melanchthon hoped to inherit the library of his great-uncle Johannes Reuchlin, with its valuable manuscripts. But that library contained only two manuscripts of writings ascribed to ante-Nicene Christians: (1) the manuscript, later at Strasbourg, of writings ascribed to Justin (none authentic), and (2) a manuscript containing the works of Dionysius the Areopagite.

In other words, at least as far as the crucial transition in Melanchthon's scheme from the apostolic age to the age of Origen is concerned, his theory suffers from an absence of factual information which is in part due to the condition of patristic learning in his time and in part due to his own failure to obtain what information was actually available. His patristic argument therefore needed to be revised completely; Flacius Illyricus took steps in this direction. If with

Fraenkel we speak of Melanchthon as an advocate of "critical patristics" — though we should recall that Faber's treatise of 1498 was entitled *Theologia vivificans. Liber solidus* — we must remember that both the criticism and the idea of patristics were essentially apologetic.

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The Scottish Reformation. By GORDON DONALDSON. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960. 242 pp. \$5.50.

These Birkbeck lectures for 1957/8 make a fascinating, significant, and sometimes controversial contribution to the history of the Scottish Reformation. Dr. Donaldson has confined himself to institutional development, and has used new materials, especially public records, to trace the actual operations of ecclesiastical bodies. His conclusions are often provocative.

The main fault of the late medieval church was that it was "topheavy." Monasteries were no longer of much religious significance; nunneries were positively disreputable; the friaries provided most of what preaching was available, and the collegiate churches, burgh churches and university colleges had largely replaced the older institutions as favorite objects of endowment. All this machinery, together with the Curia and prelates, was maintained at the expense of the parish ministry. The bulk of the revenues of 85% of the parishes was diverted. There was a chronic shortage of churches and progressive dilapidation of the buildings. The vicars lacked a living wage and were forced into pluralism, secular activities, and simony. They were generally ignorant and often scandalous. Episcopal oversight was ineffective. Discipline of the priesthood was thwarted by papal privileges and dispensations, so that the reforming councils of 1549, 1552 and 1559 were not at all ultramontane. Some sees, such as Argyll and the Isles, were vacant for decades.

Four dioceses of the thirteen were vacant in 1560.

In terms of institutional structure the Reformation was consequently a movement to strengthen the parish ministry and episcopal supervision in the interests of adequate preaching, instruction and sacramental ministry. It was also a movement in favor of lay participation in the life of the church, in worship, education, discipline, and the administrative authority of the civil power. In fact the Reformers created within a very few years a more adequate parish ministry than Scotland had known for generations.

One of Dr. Donaldson's chief intentions is to expose the "conspiracy of silence" (pp. 60, 72) which has obscured the continuity in the 1560's of the old episcopal structure, lay patronage, and benefices beside the new reformed congregations. The two ecclesiastical systems, he points out, existed side by side. Two thirds of the church revenues still went to the old incumbents. The bishops, of whom five had joined the reformers and three continued their functions, continued to sit in council and parliament and exercised some judicial as well as financial prerogatives. They were supplemented by five new "superintendents" and the dioceses were reduced from thirteen to ten. Not until 1567 did the new reformed structure have effective legal standing beside the old.

This type of episcopal organization was akin to the Danish or German superintendency. There was no conception of episcopal "orders," and no effort was made to preserve the succession, which would have been perfectly possible. It was agreed that the apostolic succession had already failed. But the Scots, on the other hand, did not object to a reformed episcopacy any more than had Bucer, A Lasco, Gualter, Calvin, or the Helvetic Confession. The Scots "consciously and deliberately" rejected the pattern of the French *Discipline* "with its firm emphasis on parity of pastors and churches and its hierarchy of courts"

(p. 148). Knox' "farewell advice to the Church of Scotland was that it should have bishops" (p. 170). And there is no reason to suppose that the system of superintendents was conceived as a mere temporary expedient, as presbyterian historians have sometimes argued.

But if the superintendents were not conceived as temporary, the General Assembly probably was. It was in origin political, a kind of provisional government, rather than the predominantly clerical assembly it later became. It represented "the privy council with superintendents, ministers and commissioners" (p. 143). The ministers were not originally elected delegates. Had the Queen been ready to play the role of the "godly magistrate," the Assembly would presumably have withered away and something very like Elizabethan Anglicanism would have emerged. Dr. Donaldson notes the parallels of bishop and superintendent, priest and pastor, deacon and reader.

The Scottish Reformation up to 1584 is thus seen in terms of the theory of the godly magistrate. The normal evolution, however, was "dislocated" (p. 184) by the injection of Beza's presbyterian theories, brought to Scotland by Melville in 1584, as they had been to England by Cartwright and Travers. The first statutory presbyterian constitution came in 1592. The new conception gave elders a new character as permanent officers, attacked the superintendency, changed the Assembly to a predominantly clerical body and developed permanent presbyteries out of the "exercises." All this was based on a new theory of two distinct societies, church and commonwealth.

Dr. Donaldson has put us in his debt in many particulars. One of his basic theses, however, seems questionable. He implies that reformed churches generally assigned discipline to the godly magistrate whenever they were established. Non-established churches, in contrast, such as the Marian exiles on the continent, or the "privy kirks" in Scotland, assigned

discipline to elders and deacons without committing themselves thereby to any particular system of church order" (pp. 50, 80, 185). Surely there are very definite origins for these elders and deacons who turn up as "normal" in the 1550's. Were not these origins precisely in the *established* churches of Strassburg and Geneva? Even earlier Zurich and Basel reformers had urged the need of distinctively church officers for discipline beside the magistrate. The roots of church government independent of the magistrate go right back to the beginnings of the Reformed tradition, even in the case of established churches. Or again, there is a notable difference between Knox and Melville, no doubt, but is there not a substantial continuity between the financial claims of the first Book of Discipline and the aims of Melville's party to restrain the abuses of ordination and patronage and to secure greater financial support for the parish ministry?

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Ginevra e l'Italia (Vol. XXXIV of Biblioteca Storica Sansoni [Nuova Serie]). Edited by DELIO CANTIMORI, LUIGI FIRPO, GIORGIO SPINI, FRANCO VENTURI, VALDO VINAY. Firenze: G. C. Sansoni, 1959. 709 pp.

This collection of nineteen essays, the work of scholars associated with the Waldensian Faculty of Theology at Rome and honoring Calvin's Academy on the fourth centenary of its founding, includes nine studies of 16th century relations between Geneva and various Italian reformers; the remainder cover an assortment of topics drawn from Italian-Genevan contacts during the ensuing three centuries. The organization is chronological. Altogether twelve of the essays deal with religious history. As might be expected, Waldensianism receives special emphasis, but the range of subjects is wide, reflecting the diversity of Italian activities in the 16th century and the changes in the Univer-

sity of Geneva since Calvin established it in 1559.

A number of articles are of special interest to readers of this journal. G. Gonnet analyzes the theological and ecclesiological contributions made to Waldensianism by Oecolampadius, Bucer, and Farel in their transactions with Waldensian representatives leading to the concord of Chanforan in 1532. Farel's minor role supplies a tenuous connection with Geneva. B. Nicolini usefully supplements Bainton's chapter on Ochino's Genevan sojourn by accounting for its duration from 1542 to 1545 on the grounds that throughout this time Ochino still believed in the possibility that he might be able to return to Italy and lead a reformation movement there. To this end he made use of Calvin's unrivaled contacts and facilities to communicate with many Italians who had not gone into exile. When Ochino became convinced that a successful evangelical movement in Italy would be out of the question, he turned his attention to the Italian exiles and devoted the remainder of his life to them. From T. R. Castiglione's projected book on the anti-trinitarian Valentino Gentile there is drawn an excerpt which treats in detail the circumstances which produced Calvin's diatribe against him. D. Cantimori considers the case of one of those secret doubters and dissimulators among the Italian reformers whom he follows Calvin in calling "Nicodemites." This man, who translated several of Calvin's works into Italian, is agonizingly concerned with the conditions (aside from persecution) under which flight into exile is justifiable. V. Subilia sees the tension between Calvin and many of the Italian reformers as a function of their differing fundamental outlooks on liberty and dogma. G. Pevrot traces in detail the important French and Genevan influences which culminated in 1564 with the adoption of the Waldensian Church Order. S. Caponetto describes Calvinistic influences on a number of Sicilian Protestants in the 1560's and 1570's. L. Firpo's history

of the Italian evangelical community at London, although centering on its relations with Geneva, goes much beyond this limitation. G. Spini's study of the part played by the Italian Reformation in the total Genevan influence on New England Puritanism, while owing much to the work of Miller, Morison and Murdock, is appropriately tailored to the purposes of this volume and of the Waldensian Faculty. A. Armand-Hugon presents a little picture of the warm and kind reception given by Geneva to the Waldensians of Piedmont on occasion of their exile (at the behest of Louis XIV) between 1686 and 1690. Of present-day ecumenical interest will be G. Miege's study of G. A. Turrettini (professor at Geneva, 1697-1737), who attempted to produce a set of fundamental articles on which disputing groups might agree. Turrettini embodies a transition from the older Calvinistic dogmatism (represented in fact by his grandfather and father before him) to the newer rationalistic mode. V. Vinay concludes this collection with an account of the evangelical church of the Italians exiled at Geneva from 1850 to 1855.

The other essays, which are interspersed with those of religious historical interest, deal with the Piedmontese colony at Geneva in the 16th century, political liberty at Geneva around 1600, Burlamacchi (professor of natural law at Geneva) and 17th century constitutional history, Voltaire and Geneva, Sismondi and Napoleon, influences of the Count de Selon of Geneva on his nephews Gustavo and Camillo Cavour prior to 1830, and some experiences in Nice and Piedmont of the Genevan socialist professor Henri Dameth in the 1850's.

In spite of the miscellaneous subject matter and in some cases the forced connections, this mélange stresses well the considerable and wide-ranging influence that Geneva has had upon Italy and Italians.

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Makers of Religious Freedom in the Seventeenth Century. By MARCUS L. LOANE. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1961. 240 pp. \$4.00.

Four churchmen — two Scottish Presbyterians and two English Non-conformists — are the subjects of this study. Alexander Henderson and Samuel Rutherford figured in the liberation and renewal of Presbyterianism during the reign of Charles I, while John Bunyan and Richard Baxter helped form radical and conservative Dissent under Charles II. The lives of all are briefly related, and summaries of their writings and historical achievements are provided. The author, an Australian bishop, admires all as "freedom-fighters in their own age." They "fought for freedom of truth and conscience, freedom for life and worship, freedom both as citizens and as Christians" (p. 12).

The author never makes clear exactly what this means or why this particular collection of lives was assembled. Were these men fundamentally important in the contest for civil and religious freedom? None except possibly Rutherford was intimately concerned in the constitutional struggle of the seventeenth century. Three of them labored to erect powerful and comprehensive Establishments and shrank from any generous toleration. A fourth, Bunyan, favored separation of church and state, but the author fails to stress this point. Apparently these men are valued without discrimination or analysis simply for their conscientious resistance to governmental interference in the life of the church.

The dust jacket warns us that "this book is most definitely *not* for historians only!" Is it primarily for them at all? Certainly a student of seventeenth-century history can learn something from these essays, but basically they seem to be uncritical appreciations presented in a warmly evangelical style for edification. Indeed, they resurrect the authentic hagiographical tradition, complete

with accounts of youthful misdeeds (muted somewhat in the case of Ruth-
erford, so as not to offend) and
deathbed affirmations of faith. Are
they *good hagiography*? In one sense,
yes. The author can write interestingly
and can communicate enthusiasm
and conviction. But his interpre-
tation is not very soundly based.
He has been dependent on a handful
of sources, none (except for the *Dictionary of National Biography*) of
later date than 1929. His Bunyan es-
say, resting on the *Works* and three
old biographies, ignores modern in-
sights into Puritan sectarianism and
recent Bunyan research. His com-
ments are sometimes rather naive,
and he repeats improbable anecdotes
and doubtful quotations. In short, he
seems unsure of the social and theo-
logical environment in which his
subjects lived. The distortion is re-
grettable since these men are great
and admirable enough to deserve
more critical treatment.

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Backgrounds to Dispensationalism.
By CLARENCE B. BASS. Grand
Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerd-
mans Publishing Company, 1960.
184 pp. \$3.50.

This is the second book on dis-
pensationalism to appear recently, fol-
lowing closely C. Norman Kraus,
Dispensationalism in America (Cf.
Church History, XXIX, 111). Al-
though not duplicating each other, the
books are similar in several respects.
Both share a prosaic quality but both
also are informative, impartial, and
rooted in thorough research. Bass has
concentrated upon the life and theo-
logy of John Nelson Darby, generally
acknowledged as the founder of dis-
pensationalism, and upon the Plymouth
Brethren, the sect he established.

Darby was converted to the An-
glican ministry in 1825 from a prom-
ising law career in Dublin and then,
after some success in a County Wick-
low parish, quit his charge in despair
over the Erastianism of the Archbish-

op of Ireland. He began meeting in
Dublin (1827), and later in Plymouth,
with other Christians — mostly An-
glicans — who had also become dis-
illusioned and were seeking a more
“spiritual” fellowship outside ec-
clesiastical organizations. The result
was the formation of a sect which
practically exhausted the limits of
sectarianism. Bass relates the early
history of the Plymouth Brethren —
a pitiful chronicle of division and
contention carried on (mostly at Dar-
by's instigation) in the name of unity
and Christian love. This might ap-
pear to be a political failure — a
simple lack of leadership. But the
shaky structure of the Brethren as-
semblies was no accident. The dis-
pensationalist theology which Darby
was spinning out in the years after
1826 prevented him from organizing
his followers in anything but an un-
stable society without creed, ministry,
or organizational structure.

Dispensationalism is usually equated
with or confused with premillen-
nialism, but, as Bass takes pains to
point out, the heart of dispensational-
ism is hermeneutics. Ever since Dar-
by, dispensationalists have insisted
that Scripture be interpreted in an
exceedingly literal manner, especially
in connection with prophecy. Words
must mean precisely the same thing
in every context. This has led to a
fragmentizing of the historical revela-
tion into dispensations during which
God deals with his chosen people in
different ways. Each dispensation
has been marked by apostacy, judg-
ment upon the erring, but the salvation
of a tiny remnant such as Noah,
Joshua, or Ezra. Returning to the
Plymouth Brethren, we can see why
Darby eschewed a tightly-knit ec-
clesiastical organization. That kind
of thing was under God's impending
judgment, while he and his followers
—a purely “spiritual” remnant —
could expect to be imminently (and
premillennially) raptured.

Bass, in discussing Darby's doctrine
of the Scriptures, the Church and
eschatology, has fulfilled a part of his
purpose: to explain the implications

of dispensationalism to the unwary. But insofar as he has attempted "to seek to determine the historical genesis of this system" (p. 8), his presentation has been too narrow. John Nelson Darby is not an aberration of the nineteenth century, but we are not told of the hundreds, such as Edward Irving and Thomas Campbell, who shared some part of Darby's faith in the leadership of the Spirit and the presence of *charisma*, a reawakened interest in the nature of the church, or the imminence of the Second Coming. Such a full study may have been beyond the intention of the author, but without this background we cannot see Darby in perspective.

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Chicago

The Mind of the Oxford Movement. Edited and Introduced by OWEN CHADWICK. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1960. 239 pp. \$4.25.

The dramatic interest of the events of the Oxford Movement has often led to some exaggeration of its historical importance; by way of reaction it has also been depreciated, and in some circles "tractarian" has been employed as a term of abuse, suggestive of rigidity in dogma and archaism in practice. C. C. J. Webb's study of some years ago is almost unique in paying attention to the Oxford leaders as religious philosophers, though Archbishop Brilioth has treated them with respect as theologians. The anthology which the Master of Selwyn College, Cambridge, has contributed to the "Library of Modern Religious Thought" should further redress the balance. Chadwick's selections bring the central ideas of the Oxford divines out of the obscurity of volumes of Sermons and Tracts, forms which are likely nowadays to discourage all but the most determined student. He rightly confines himself to the Oxford Movement properly so called—that is, the ideas expounded by the Tractarians between 1833 and 1845—exclud-

ing the developments after 1841 related to Newman's "Anglican deathbed," but admitting that "certain passages from a later date forced themselves into the book" (p. 61). The selections are related to three central topics—the nature of faith as an act of moral decision (mainly Newman's University Sermons)—the authority of the Church, a far richer and deeper concept than the merely mechanical approach to the Apostolic Succession—and sanctification, which largely means the Ascetic Theology of Pusey. The whole is prefaced by an admirable survey of the High Church tradition in Anglicanism and its flowering in the Tractarians, with some notes on their influence.

Further comment would lead into discussion of the Oxford Movement rather than of Chadwick's selections. Differences with his choice would be largely matters of taste; I for instance agree with him that Keble's *Christian Year* is not great poetry (p. 63), but would still rank it both as poetry and as religion above the anxiously theological verse of Isaac Williams. The Oxford Movement is only one source of Anglo-Catholicism, but an important one; and those who want to know its heart and strength will find its ideas and devotion well presented in Chadwick's anthology. What was proclaimed at Oxford after 1833 burst on the world after 1841 in a variety of forms—monastic, parochial, missionary, as well as academic—which made the *Via Media* no longer the "paper religion" (p. 46) that Newman had found it. Even Pusey's iron piety reveals remarkable flashes of social concern (cf. p. 228) and mystical rapture. Chadwick suitably ends his volume with the burning words of an Ascension Day sermon (p. 233):

Thou Who, when lost, didst find us,
be Thou Thyself the Way, that we
may find Thee, and be found in Thee,
our Only Hope, and our Everlasting
Joy!

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America. A Sketch of Its Political, Social, and Religious Character. By PHILIP SCHAFF. Edited by PERRY MILLER. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1961. 241 pp. \$4.50.

As an important help for better understanding Schaff, the republication of his *America* in the John Harvard Library must be greatly welcomed. This book consists of two lectures which Schaff delivered in Berlin early in 1854, which were subsequently enlarged during various stops on his journey through central Europe. In the English edition of 1855 (published by Scribner) Schaff included a very interesting report on "Germany and America" which he had delivered at the seventh meeting of the *Kirchentag* at Frankfurt/Main in September 1854. Unfortunately, the English edition contains only 24 pages on the German American churches as compared with more than 100 pages in the first and second German editions. The book, especially if considered together with its companion volume *Germany* (1857), gives us some very interesting clues to the speed and the direction of the process of Schaff's "Americanization." "In the history of that mysterious process called 'Americanization' it is a document of primary importance," as the editor remarks (p. xxvii). But its main distinction is that it is "an astute reading of the American destiny" (*ibid.*), and for this reason deserves to be read even today.

In his introductory remarks about Schaff's German background the editor unfortunately belabors the point of German "ignorance" and "fear" of American Christianity too much and unjustly, and with his apparent flair for colorful and dramatic language adds the unpleasant spice of certain factual and interpretative inaccuracies to this part of his presentation. Miller, for instance, claims that German theologians saw in the "religious chaos" of American Christianity "the source of a plague that threatened to

spread around the world, despite the efforts of German scholars working sixteen hours a day in their libraries to protect the Fatherland by erecting the thick walls of their erudite tomes" (p. viii, certainly a most unusual and novel evaluation of the role American Christianity played in stimulating German scholarship in the 19th century). It can easily be shown that German theologians, ignorant of the contemporary conditions and the history of American Christianity as most of them were (and some still are), nevertheless usually held more enlightened views regarding the importance of the United States and her churches than Miller wants us to believe. It also can be shown that German theologians were not so solidly united in support of the Establishment as Miller again wrongly asserts. A closer scrutiny of Schleiermacher's and Neander's views, for instance, would have made this quite clear. And if it is said that one of Schaff's early letters containing a defense of the American system of religious voluntarism was received by "a no doubt amazed Frau Heusser" who as she read on was "further outraged" (p. xxiv), I for one believe that the lady in question was neither amazed nor outraged, but pleasantly surprised. For Meta Heusser-Schweizer was the poetess of Wuerttemberg pietism, and Wuerttemberg pietism had in 1819 set up in Kornthal a religious and civil community based on the principle of complete independence from the state. (It was in Kornthal that Schaff experienced his "conversion.") It also had coined the phrase "The salvation of the soul takes precedence over the church" and around 1850 had not hesitated to welcome the first Methodist preachers to Wuerttemberg as allies in this important work of saving souls. On these and some other points, therefore, Miller's otherwise valuable introduction should be corrected.

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Abraham Kuyper. By FRANK VANDEN BERG. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1960. 307 pp. \$4.00.

It is the purpose of this book "to introduce Dr. Abraham Kuyper to the general reader. Its chapters design to give a factual and interpretive account of the days of Kuyper's years" (p. 7). This, of course, is no easy task, for Kuyper lived in The Netherlands, 1837-1920, and his influence is largely confined to that country. Besides, his activities covered a wide range since he was a minister of the Gospel, journalist, founder and professor of the Free University at Amsterdam, organizer and leader of a secession from the Dutch Reformed Church, organizer and leader of the (political) Anti-Revolutionary Party, prime minister, theologian.

Unfortunately, the author adheres to a rigidly chronological presentation which hampers him severely in elucidating "the days of Kuyper's years." The use of the footnote, here strangely lacking, could have helped to answer questions presenting themselves to the general reader, such as what is a "ministry of affairs" (p. 99); what percentage of the popular vote in the election of 1879 put eleven Anti-Revolutionary representatives in the States General (pp. 98-9); or what was the Reformed Seminary at Kampen and which denomination did it serve (p. 75), not to mention more. But even so, the author seems to have been so concerned to keep his story within chronological order that he gave little attention to such details, and it has caused him to make a number of incorrect statements. A few of the more obvious are: "it was the Calvinists who had fought Holland free from the tyranny of Spain" (p. 107); Kuyper's secession caused the Dutch Reformed Church's "severest blood-letting in all her history" (p. 159); in 1918 all Frisian soldiers were Anti-Revolutionaries and Kuyperites (p. 291). Perhaps these could be ascribed to an excusably enthusiastic bias, if it were not so clear that his method leads him to serious mis-

interpretations. He states, e. g., that Groen van Prinsterer, leader of the right-orthodox wing, introduced "something entirely new in Dutch politics" (pp. 70-1) to which Kuyper supposedly fell heir. It has escaped the author that for a limited time only complete identity of goal existed between Groen van Prinsterer and Kuyper. The former sought to undo the results of the French revolution and desired to return in principle to the situation formerly prevailing under the Republic of the United Provinces. Kuyper, on the other hand, aimed at incorporating into the orthodox pattern the modern evolutionistic way of thinking. Hence Groen van Prinsterer did not continue to support Kuyper's public school policy — a fact which the author fails to mention. Other consequences of this difference, such as the political break between Kuyper and De Savornin Lohman and the theological split between Kuyper and Hoedemaker, are treated as if they were simply of accidental nature.

A similar failure to grasp underlying concepts is apparent in the account of Kuyper's conflict with the Dutch Reformed Church. In spite of what the author says (pp. 27-8), Kuyper's doctoral thesis is decisive because there he made his choice against Calvin and for A. Lasco. The latter's influence can be clearly seen when Kuyper transformed the secession which he led into a new denomination.

Because of heavy use of the black-and-white scheme, Kuyper's allies are called orthodox and his opponents classified as liberals. How unjust and unsatisfactory this artifice is appears when the orthodox who refused to follow Kuyper into secession are accused of "timidity and apprehension" giving them "understandable, yet not to be justified" reasons (p. 160). However, A. Lasco the "anthropologist" — as Kuyper called him — and not Calvin the "theologian" was Kuyper's guiding star. Besides, Kuyper had argued that "the tendency of our age is not toward complete unity, but toward dividing into parts" (cf.

Praedicatieen, 1917, p. 442). On that basis he had demanded that "pluriformity of the church is the undeniable demand of a richer development of life" (cf. *Het Calvinisme*, p. 96; and *Gemeenre Gratie*, III, p. 235). He maintained this demand, too, over against Calvin's insistence that the church must be one (cf. *Encyclopaedie*, II, p. 608). Consequently, Bronsveld, Gunning, Hoedemaker, and so many others did not lack courage, as the author implies, but only refused to accept Kuyper's interpretations as correct. It is a mistake, therefore, to accuse them of cowardice, and the author should have known so.

One wonders, too, why the phenomenal rise of the socialist movement in The Netherlands under the leadership of the reverend Domela Nieuwenhuis and Troelstra is not sketched at least in outline. On the backflap of the jacket the publisher states that this book offers "straightforward evaluations of men and movements." Had this been so Kuyper's difficulties with the working man in the clash over the railroad strike of 1903 would have received a much clearer interpretation, and the objections raised by Staalman against Kuyper would not have been brushed off by calling the former a "maverick," a "super-democrat," and a "chronic rebel" (pp. 248-9).

In other words, this is quite an unsatisfactory book because it does not do justice to the true genius of Kuyper. Too laudatory in its style, it buries Kuyper and his friends under sheer goodness and orthodoxy. The reader who might want to investigate beyond this presentation looks in vain for a bibliography of Kuyper's writings and studies on him and his work. Although it is true that most of the material is not translated into English, the author should at least have shared his own sources with the reader.

It is a pity that the praiseworthy effort of such a willing "layman," as this author proves to be, is lost in a style which simply follows the ques-

tion-and-answer method, while the really significant movements in the "days of Kuyper's years" do not come to light.

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History of Religion in the United States. By CLIFFTON E. OLMSTEAD. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960. 628 pp. \$10.00.

As one who teaches courses in the area of religion in America, I feel a debt of gratitude to Mr. Olmstead and his publisher for this work. I can send my students to it as the best available one-volume history. As such it fills an acutely felt need.

The work is comprehensive and accurate in most respects. The author has drawn on a wide range of monographs and other types of secondary material and has assembled between two covers a mass of detail that has not been available before in quite the same form. Beginning with "The European Heritage" and concluding with "Religion at the Dawn of the Atomic Age," he has described the historical development of the major as well as most of the minor religious groups in colonial North America and the United States, the growth of a host of religious and quasi-religious movements, major theological trends, and has attempted to relate all of this to the ongoing history of the United States. For the benefit of those who wish to go deeper he has included "Suggestions for Additional Reading" which contain most of the works that one would want on a selective bibliography for the use of the non-specialist.

Professor Olmstead informs the reader that his "primary aim has been to achieve a fairly balanced treatment of American religion . . ." This is no doubt the primary virtue of the work—its "balance."

Still, there are difficulties in it for this reviewer. As I neared the end of the book (about page 563) I was reminded of one of Thurber's early cartoons with the line: "Well, who

made the magic go out of our marriage — you or me?" Possibly one should not expect magic or romance in a history of religion in the United States, especially if the treatment is to be "balanced." But the field is full of fascinating figures, dynamic movements, significant and unusual developments and interacting forces — all of which add up to a story which, if it is not romantic, can certainly be intriguing and instructive.

The chief problem is one of framework. By what standards does one judge whether an account is "balanced" or not? On what string does one arrange the pearls? In the opening sentence of the first chapter Professor Olmstead points out that "American religion" is a product of the heritage of Europe "adapted and molded in the crucible of the American physical environment." (Shades of Ellsworth Huntington!) He then proceeds to drop the "American physical environment" until chapter 12 where he refers to the area between the eastern mountains and the great plains as "the crucible in which Americanism was fashioned . . ." Are we to assume that there is something unusual about the "American physical environment" that accounts for the form of "American religion"? If so, we need more explanation.

Beyond this reference to environment there is little additional effort to structure the story in any other fashion than the conventional one of allowing the facts to push it along under the pressure of their own weight. Chapter headings are quite explicit and do provide some framework. Even here there are limitations, however, such as the inclusion of Jonathan Dickinson and other New Englanders in the chapter on "The Scotch-Irish Presbyterians" and the discussion of such items as "The Recovery of Worship" in the chapter entitled "The Retreat to Normalcy."

No doubt we've had enough of the frontier thesis; what is needed now is

the "balanced" account. But it doesn't make as exciting reading for this reviewer as does the frontier thesis. There, at least, there's something with which to argue.

A few specific items: the "lay reader" may be somewhat confused at the author's tendency to introduce terms such as Erastian, Arminian, sect, cult and denomination without adequate definition. While the style is generally straightforward, an occasional metaphor adds a florid touch, for example, "When the dove of peace once more flew over the land. . ." (p. 25).

Chapter one on "The European Heritage" is one of the weaker chapters in the book. A number of generalizations should be questioned. The Reformers of the right wing, according to Olmstead, conceived of Christianity "as an individual relation between the soul and God. . ." (p. 4). John Calvin was "pessimistic in his view of natural man" and "optimistic in his view of history. Here, in a religious form, was the doctrine of progress" (p. 9). The New England Puritans put into practice such principles as "freedom of conscience based on the clear and explicit teaching of Scripture . . . and government by the consent of the governed" (p. 16).

The author's view of the frontier as having a primary role in giving birth to cults and utopias is open to question. On this point compare, for example, his treatment of the Mormons and others with that of Whitney R. Cross (*The Burned-over District*) who says "the phenomena of the Burned-over District history belong to a stage of economy either of full or of closely approaching agrarian maturity" (pp. 75f.).

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Man As Churchman. By NORMAN SYKES. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960. x, 205 pages. \$4.00.

The death of Norman Sykes at the age of sixty-three has come as a shock to many who have seen him in recent years taking leadership among the historians of the Church of England. Most of his books have had to do with problems and personalities of English church history. The present one is on a broader pattern, and preserves the author's Wiles Lectures given in Queen's University, Belfast, in 1959. It consists of four long chapters on somewhat divergent themes. Chapter I, "Church History, History and Theology," gives some data on the history of church history as an academic subject as well as a vital discussion of the chief problems that have beset the church historian, such as paucity of sources for the early period, the handling of incidents reported as miraculous, and the historian's right to interpret, independently of the dogmatist, the thought of the church at its various periods. Chapter II, on "The Petrine Primacy" has the subtitle, "Irenaeus and Cyprian at the Councils of Trent and the Vatican" and shows something of the inside story of debates in these councils, in which episcopal and papalist members employed the Fathers in support of their contentions. Attention is drawn to the "Primacy text" of Cyprian's *De Unitate*, and some verdicts of recent scholars on the Roman claims are introduced. "Scripture and Tradition at the Reformation and Since" forms the title of chapter III. Chillingworth's flat statement in *The Religion of Protestants* serves as a convenient starting point for a penetrating historical discussion of the arguments about the authority of tradition in the council of Trent, the position of Martin Chemnitz in his critique of Trent, Calvin's use of the Church Fathers against the Tridentine doctrine, the defence and alteration of the latter by Melchior Cano and others, and the relation of the problem to the controversial use of history in the

Magdeburg Centuries and Baronius. The subjection of history to controversy was broken by the work of the Benedictines of St. Maur, and thereafter such scholars as Morin and Du Pin felt free to reject or ignore elements of tradition. The distinction of *latent* tradition, where *patent* or documented tradition is absent, applies to the declaration of the dogmas of the Immaculate Conception and of the Assumption of the Virgin. Dr. Sykes gently indicates that the passages of scripture and the opinions of late Fathers cited in support of the Assumption do not constitute adequate evidence that the doctrine was held at an early period. The closing chapter, "Church, State and Education since 1815" covers much ground and is so condensed that it might well have been extended to the dimensions of a book. Laying a basis in the sixteenth century, our author treats many problems and crises in the relations of church and state with respect to education in the principal countries of Europe. The attitude of Roman Catholicism is illustrated on the one hand by the large toleration extended in Austria (1934) and Eire (1937), and on the other by the prohibition of non-Roman Catholic public worship in Spain (1953). Using Bishop Dupanloup's distinction between the *thesis* of the Church's absolute right and the *hypothesis* of a relative tolerance under necessity, Dr. Sykes remarks that in Spain "the *thesis* has swallowed up the *hypothesis*." He would follow Mandell Creighton in regarding tolerance not as a device for untoward conditions but as "an integral element of the Gospel." There is an abundance of quotations, most of them wholly apropos, although in some places their arresting character is such as to throw a little out of focus the author's own points of view. But the book is one of fine historical workmanship in the Cambridge tradition.

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Athos, The Mountain of Silence. By PHILIP SHERRARD. London: Oxford University Press, 1960. 110 pp. 57 illustrations, with color photographs by Paul DuMarchie V. Voorhuyzen. 50s. net (in U.K. only). \$12.50 (in the U.S.A.).

This is the first of a new series of scholarly, illustrated books in color on selected places. It is perhaps highly fitting that the series should begin with the ancient monastic center of Eastern Orthodoxy, Mount Athos, the Mountain of Silence, in view of the 1000th anniversary this year of its founding in 961.

Dr. Philip Sherrard, a Fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford, author of the recent important book *The Greek East and the Latin West*, and an expert on Greek Orthodoxy, was a happy choice for the inauguration of the new series. The color reproductions in this book are beautifully done and the text, though scholarly and highly informative, provides a brilliant verbal background to the even more brilliant photography.

After a brief chapter on the beauty and background of Mount Athos, Dr. Sherrard describes the development of monasticism on Athos from its origins to the present, in which is included a discussion of the current organizational set-up of the monastic communities, the art and architecture of the monasteries, and the physical

and spiritual life of the monks. The five basic chapters ("Athos, the Holy Mountain," "The History of Athonite Monasticism," "The Organization of Monastic Life on Athos," "The Life of the Monk," and "The Contemplative Life") are well written and well documented. The reader of Dr. Sherrard's *Athos* can rest assured that he will have in his hands an authoritative account of the Holy Mount, with notes and bibliography, that uses the best of primary and secondary sources (Sherrard is, however, apparently unaware of Constantine Cavarnos's *Anchored in God*), and one that is strengthened and illuminated by personal contact with monastic life on Athos itself.

The way of Athos, Sherrard clearly indicates, is the way of silence. The way of silence is practiced by purification of soul and body from the effects of the "fall," a purification which precedes the raising of the mind to the meditation of divine realities. The final stage of the way of silence is union with the Divine Itself. "For in it, man is resurrected to, or renewed in, that state for which he was created 'in the beginning'" (p. 102). To this way of silence and ultimate "deification" are the monks of Mount Athos dedicated. Dr. Sherrard, with the aid of magnificent color photography and excellent scholarship, has managed to capture vividly the essence of Mount Athos, both past and present.

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